

1. SECURITY AND GEOPOLITICS

HOW CAN NATO AS A COLLECTIVE ALLIANCE EFFECTIVELY COUNTER THE THREAT OF RUSSIA'S HYBRID WARFARE?

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ABSTRACT

Crimea annexation and ongoing Ukrainian crisis are major issues which have influenced the perception of security in Europe, being a result of the Russian Federation assertive policy making. As fundamental Russian national interests are defined in 'Russian National Security Strategy to 2020 (RNSS)', it deserves closer attention as it provides insight into strategic national priorities and prescribes measures to ensure security and development. The paper aims to analyse threats recognized in the Strategy including those related to three Baltic States. The paper analyses the main threats arising from RNSS towards the Baltic region, next it evaluates the actual feasibility of Lithuanian, Estonian and Latvian defence concepts to counter threats emerging from RNSS and implications for the Baltic States' military security.

KEY WORDS

Russian security strategy, Baltic States, international relations.

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'In the Soviet days we scared the world. (...) But ten years ago we decided for some reason that everyone heartily loves us. (...) We must get rid of imperial ambitions on the one hand, and on the other clearly understand where our national interests are, to spell them out, and fight for them".

Vladimir Putin (as quoted in Donaldson and Noguee, 2002, p. 341)

Introduction

In light of Crimea annexation and ongoing Ukrainian crisis, the president of the Russian Federation (RF), Vladimir Putin delivered a speech at the Valdai International Discussion Club in 2014. He emphasized that the crisis in Ukraine is a result of U.S.

and European partners hasty backstage decisions disrespecting Russian national interests (Putin, 2014). He stressed that 'since he have come to where he is today and to this office he holds, he considers it his duty to do all he can for Russia's

prosperity, development and to protect its interests' (Putin, 2014). Since fundamental RF national interests are defined in the 'Russian National Security Strategy to 2020 (RNSS)', it deserves closer attention as it provides insight into the RF strategic national priorities and prescribes measures to ensure RF security and development. The analysis of the RNSS could imply how Moscow plans to address its security concerns and what three 'Baltic States (3Bs)' could face in the future.

The paper aims to analyse what threats RNSS poses towards 3Bs and how respective States' defence concepts address the issues in a military domain. A research question is: What are the implications of the RNSS for the Baltic States' military security? Thus, it can be said that in the meantime, the RF claims to have a peaceful agenda and is not a threat to Baltic States. Despite this widespread Kremlin's view, the paper will argue that the RNSS poses a wide range of internal and external threats towards 3Bs. These threats imply that national military defence concepts should primarily focus on the initial independent territorial defence capability as a precondition for NATO collective defence. Due to the paper constraints, it is narrowed to a military domain only, although it cannot ensure comprehensive state defence alone and requires employment of all national instruments of power¹. For this reason, firstly the paper will analyse the main threats arising from the RNSS towards 3Bs. Secondly, it will evaluate the actual feasibility of Lithuanian, Estonian and Latvian defence concepts to counter threats emerging from the RNSS and implications for the military security of Baltic States.

1. Main threats emerging from the RNSS towards the 3Bs

The implementation of the RNSS is ensured by consolidation of all national instruments of power to defend Russia's national interests and to pre-empt internal and external threats which comprises wide range of threats towards 3Bs. Senior Military Analyst of Virginian National Institute for Public Policy Ciziunas argues that 'since 1991 Russia has been attempting to outline its identity where it has seen itself as a great power in a shifting international security environment while three Baltic countries were seen as a buffer zone against West' (Ciziunas, 2008, p. 287). This faith is reflected in Russia's attempts to influence the policies of 3Bs which are considered as part of Russia's sphere of interests and influence (Ciziunas, 2008, p. 287). Additionally, Ciziunas argues that to ensure its national interests, Russia has tried to influence Baltic States through political and economic pressure, propaganda, economic leverage and energy controls, exploiting ethnic and social discontent as well discrediting governments via political influence (Ciziunas, 2008, p. 287). Later in 2009, the RNSS outlined strategic objectives, national interests and ways to achieve them, which was replaced in 2015 by adopting the new 'Russia's National Security Strategy (NSS)'. According to the New York University professor Galeotti, the tone of the new RFNSS reflects 'Russia's new antagonism with the West', but fundamentally, the strategy remained unchanged (Galeotti, 2016). Further, he contemplates that the Russia's drive for success in future security is based on the protection of its own interests and territorial integrity by non-military methods and if it fails, by the use of military means including nuclear weapons against existential threat (Galeotti, 2016).

¹ Military, political, economic, civil.

Additionally, BALDEFCOL faculty member Romanovs shares a similar point of view that RF transformation into the of world leaders² causes ultimate changes in Europe as illustrated in ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine (Romanovs, 2015, p. 44). However, Galeotti suggests that the NSS like the RNSS is considerably dedicated to issues such as financial stability, health, economy, education and so on, because Moscow is fully aware that these concerns influence a security domain (Galeotti, 2016). For example, a demographic decline and poor health weakens the RF conscript pool and reserves of human resources, an economic decline reduces defence budgets and social expenditure, which leads to public unrest. Indeed, Galeotti claims that in several ways, Moscow demonstrates its conceptual advance in realising that security and governance are basically inseparable, therefore 'Russia's hybrid warfare is a rational reflection of that understanding' (Galeotti, 2016). This understanding of the contemporary full spectrum of 'political-informational-economic battle space' is still unappreciated by their Western counterparts and it is '*not necessarily a military threat to West*' (Galeotti, 2016).

This view is reflected in the RF Military Doctrine paragraph 5, which explicitly mentions that the RF is committed to implement military measures to protect its national interests only after political, diplomatic, legal, economic, information and other non-violent instruments have been exhausted (RF, 2014). This approach exemplified by aggression against Ukraine has increased concerns in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The 3Bs are EU and NATO members, therefore they enjoy protection by NATO collective defence and the EU 'Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)' and 'Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)'. Nev-

ertheless, 3Bs are their smallest and geographically most vulnerable members. This fact has led to increased interests not only in Russia's traditional military threats but also in other forms of threats against the 3Bs which could be found in both security strategies as a pretext for the aggression. A further analysis of the RNSS and NSS revealed RF fundamental coercion areas towards Baltic States which are considered as threats to Russian national interests and consequently, could be best exemplified by 2008 Georgian war, 2013 annexation of Crimea and ongoing Ukrainian crisis. They are as follow:

1. The expansion of NATO, its infrastructure, increased military activities close to Russian borders are unacceptable and pose a direct military threat, especially towards Kaliningrad area³.
2. The effective defence of the rights and lawful interests of Russian citizens abroad⁴ poses a direct threat towards Latvia (24%) and Estonia (27%) because of large numbers of Russians compared to Lithuania (6%) (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, 2011, Statistics Estonia, 2012 and Statistics Lithuania, 2011).
3. Attempts to revise the Russia's role and place in world history⁵ including different views and interpretation of Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (1939), which enslaved Eastern Europe and led to the Second World War.
4. Finally, both Russian strategies include the consolidation of political, military, diplomatic, economic, information and other means, directed towards the defence of Moscow's national interests⁶.

³ RNSS §17 and NSS §16, §17, §106.

⁴ RNSS §38 and NSS §44.

⁵ RNSS §81 and NSS §79.

⁶ RNSS §98 and NSS §30, §31, §36.

² RNSS §1.

In fact, Lithuanian foreign minister Linkevicius caught the essence of the 3Bs threats saying that 'the Ukrainian conflict is a major breach of rules by Russia, not just a simple deviation of views, "but grabbing pieces of land and keeping them not to be confused with peacekeeping" (Linkevicius, 2014). In his opinion, Russia executed its aggression by fully utilizing political, military, economic and energy means, including ruthless warfare, encouraging separatism and terrorism and supplying them with weapons (Linkevicius, 2014). It reflects a new Russian nonlinear approach to conflict, so called the Gerasimov doctrine. RF Chief of the General Staff General Gerasimov claims that the rules of war are changed and the most important fact is that in many cases 'non-military means exceed the power of military force in their effectiveness in reaching political and strategic goals', as exemplified in the annexation of Crimea (Gerasimov, 2013). This appreciation that all conflicts are only means to the political ends leads to the conclusion that the actual use of force is irrelevant if non-military means can reach the goal more effectively. Therefore, Russia must increasingly 'look for non-military instruments such as the wide use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military means in conjunction with coordinated protest potential of the population' (Gerasimov, 2013). Furthermore, Gerasimov emphasises the use of the concealed character of supplementing military means, including information operations and the use of Special Force while the open use of force is expected just under the auspice of peacekeeping in crisis regulation (Gerasimov, 2013). However, peace is restored only to a particular stage to achieve ultimate goals and success in the conflict (Gerasimov, 2013). This approach is not really new, as exemplified in long standing and current Russian peace-

keeping operations in Transnistria (Moldova), South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Georgia) and the ongoing implementation of Minsk agreement in eastern Ukraine.

Now when the concept of Russian aggression is defined, the actual situation in 3Bs should be summarized and potential threats should be highlighted. First, the 3Bs are former Soviet Union members, therefore they fall under the Russia's national interest, which could be protected by all means necessary. Second, Latvia and Estonia have a large number of Russian citizens/com patriots, while Lithuania stands in the way to the Kaliningrad District, so Russia could decide to protect its citizens abroad. Third, 3Bs have small armed forces and see themselves vulnerable despite being NATO and EU members (see Annex 1). For that reason, if Russians could launch aggression against 3Bs, it is likely to take non-linear form, according to the Gerasimov doctrine, to avoid triggering NATO Article V. Fourth, Russian economic sanctions against one or all Baltic States have become rather regular, especially in energy, transportation and trade fields, which were used to promote Russia's agenda. Fifth, Russian companies are increasingly trying to dominate media industry in 3Bs and support Russian agenda. In that context a very sensitive topic concerns the opposing views on the Soviet Union occupation of the Baltic States in 1940, as exemplified in the dispute over the Bronze Statue in Tallinn in 2007' (Winnerstig, 2014, p. 19). And finally, what worries is expressed by security services about Russian efforts to 'influence policymaking in Baltic States' (Winnerstig, 2014, p. 19). The whole picture indicates that Baltic States are now in the transition from the first hidden/unnoticed, emerging phase to the second sharpening phase in interstate conflict resolution, where according to the Gerasimov doctrine, military acts only as a deterrent (see Figure 1).

2. Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian defence concepts.

Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia rely on both the EU and NATO, which provide the security and defence framework in the case of crisis or war. Under the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, the EU adopted a CFSP to generate a military and defence framework for the EU policy, which aims to establish a common European defence capability and conflict prevention (EU, 2016). Furthermore, according to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, NATO aims to defend the freedom and security of its members through political and military means (NATO, 2015). Therefore, Baltic States defence should be viewed within the context of EU and NATO membership.

2.1. The Lithuanian defence concept

Lithuanian deterrence strategy is rather declarative because national means available are inconsistent with its aims in conventional terms to convince an aggressor that any military actions against Lithuania will fail resulting in unacceptable losses. According to the LTU 'Ministry of Defence (MoD)', Lithuanian defence is based on the concept of total, unconditional, individual and collective defence with EU and NATO allies as a core of the deterrence strategy (LTU MoD, 2012). This concept involves three main components: deterrence, ensuring national security in peace time and finally, individual and collective defence in a war time (LTU MoD, 2012). However, deterrence requires: well-trained, well-armed and capable forces to defend Lithuania against potential aggression (LTU MoD, 2012). Furthermore, as there are no permanently stationed Allied forces on the Lithuania territory, it requires a well developed 'Host Nation Support (HNS)' system, which enables the deployment of Allied forces

and preparing citizens for total armed defence and unarmed civil resistance (LTU MoD, 2012). According to the official Lithuanian MoD information, 'Lithuanian Armed Force (LAF)' in 2015 constituted two brigade size units and small 'Territorial Defence Units (TDF)' (LTU MoD, 2015). In contrast, the Russian Western Military District constitutes 36 brigade size units from Central Command, 6th and 20th Armies (Hedenskog and Pallin, 2013, p. 58). Furthermore, Russia owns extensive conventional offensive and defensive capabilities in contrast with ill equipped LAF (see Annex 1). Finally, Lithuanian Defence Budget for 2015 amounted for '1.43% (555m €) of GDP' (LTU MoD, 2015), while Russian expenditures amounted for '4.4% of GDP (6425b €) for national defence' (Hedenskog and Pallin, 2013, p. 103-106). It seems illogical that the hundredfold smaller army could be able to deter Russia on its own.

Thus, according to the defence concept, national defence is 'balanced between territorial and collective defence', which implies a response to aggression by conventional and non-conventional means (LTU MoD, 2012). One of the decisive factors to deter potential aggression is attributed to preparing citizens for the total armed defence and 'unarmed civil resistance (UCR)'. UCR falls under the responsibility of Lithuanian government and directly depends on the will of population to resist in coordinated manner and allocated resources to fulfil it. Last time successful UCR in Lithuania was observed in 1991 when Moscow tried to crackdown on Lithuanian's aspiration for independence (BBC, 1991). Subsequently, effective deterrence depends not on LAF capabilities alone or a defence concept itself but rather on the will of government and population to resist, on the actions of EU and NATO allies, and how potential aggressor perceives this deterrence.

Therefore, TDFs, which are composed of volunteers and perceived as both military and civilians, at once would form a base for local military resistance, which is likely to be decisive in the case of crisis, as exemplified in 1939 Russian winter war against Finland (Howard, 2016). In addition, due to the changing character of threats, LAF together with supporting institutions shall respond to non-military and military threats occurring in the peacetime and provide military assistance to civilian authority (LTU MoD, 2012). According to legislation, the employment of LAF in peace time is legal only on request of civilian authority to assist and manage extraordinary situations within Lithuanian territory in supporting role⁷ (LTU Parliament, 2011).

However, a Ukrainian example revealed a need to deploy armed forces in a very quick and firm manner against hybrid warfare threats in peace time. Regulations on how to deal in such situations were implemented in 2014 and exercised in 2015 during Lightning Strike 2015 exercise (LTU JHQ, 2015). An analysis of LAF military capabilities in conjunction with working procedures, political will and readiness to employ it in response to military threats could be assessed as 'well balanced and appropriate' (LTU JHQ, 2015). In spite of the fact that LAF is relatively prepared to act against hybrid threats in initial stages and provide assistance to civilian authority, it seems doubtful that Lithuania could seriously deter a potential aggressor on its own. For this reason, the military security environment suggests that LAF will be required to take initial independent defence influenced by the geographical distinctiveness, like Latvia and Estonia. That implies that LAF should be capable of sustaining prolonged war and TDFs are better suited

and self-sustainable for this task as they know area and people, if they are trained and equipped to fight conventional warfare by using guerrilla warfare.⁸ Ukrainian crisis revealed that a potential aggressor could instigate aggression as non-international and therefore short in preconditions to activate of NATO Article V. Therefore, in the case of aggression like in Ukraine, LAF should defend territorial integrity individually (LTU MoD, 2012). In summary, the Lithuanian defence concept is relatively well balanced to face peace time challenges; however, recipe to deter Russia is not justified with reasonable resources. The situation implies that the greater use of TDFs in a more efficient way, especially to fight a superior aggressor by using irregular warfare methods needs to be reconsidered.

2.2. The Latvian defence concept

If properly developed, 'Latvian National Guard (LNG)' as TDF could become a credible preventive measure to deter potential threats or as self-defence capabilities to reinforce 'National Armed Forces (NAF)' with modern capabilities and effective personnel reserve. Latvian's defence concept is laid down as a comprehensive State defence based on expeditionary Armed Force and relatively large and quickly accessible mobilization of reserves (Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia, 2012). Moreover NAF together with state institutions, local governments and society must conduct defence in support of the arrival and deployment of allied forces (Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia, 2012). It requires NAF to guaranty early warning, military preventive measures, self-defence capabilities and HNS for deployment of Allied forces (Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia, 2012). Consequently, the ultimate strategic tenet is to 'minimise

⁷ Reinforcing Border police in protection of the LTU border, reinforcing police and internal security force to protect key infrastructure, search and rescue and etc.

⁸ Currently LTU TDF is not tasked to conduct such a task in war time.

potential threats to national security by preventing, defeating and overcoming them' (Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia, 2012). However, a researcher from the Latvian Institute of International Affairs Rublovskis argues that NAF current institutional structure with total force less than 5000 troops in conjunction with low GDP allocated for defence resulting in situation where NAF is not able to provide modern combat capabilities (Rublovskis, 2014).

Furthermore, Rublovskis claims that in the case of conventional or unconventional war, the current form of NAF and its command and control structures would 'cease to exist' (Rublovskis, 2014). Moreover, an anticipated early warning system, which aimed to allow NAF to prepare for the war, is losing its importance as warning timings become too short to meet required preparations. For example, RAND's Shlapak and Johnson's war gaming suggest that in conventional terms, 'Russia could be able to reach the outskirts of Tallinn and Riga within 36-60 hours' (Shlapak and Johnson, 2016, p. 4-5). Taking into account that Russia periodically conducts snap exercises along the borders of 3Bs, as exemplified in 'Western Military District "Complex" Readiness Exercise in 2014 involving approx. 150,000 troops (Norberg, 2015, p. 75). Consequently, no early warning system will be able to warn early enough to prepare the state for war (Norberg, 2015, p. 75). This situation implies that military preventive measures should be in place or ready to be employed within very short time, which is not in line with the expeditionary armed force concept. Nonetheless, LNG, which aims to strengthen NAF military capabilities, could potentially be developed in both fields as an important military preventive measure and as a self-defence capability to act in early stages based on its permanence.

In addition, Rublovskis argues that the lack of financial resources and a declining demographic situation will have a negative impact on NAF manning causing 'deficiency in recruiting and maintaining the required number of qualified personnel and reserve' (Rublovskis, 2014). This implies that the development priorities of NAF operational capabilities should be reassessed involving further development of LNG. If developed properly, LNG could potentially act as a source to train and maintain adequate NAF reserves. Furthermore, a LNG aspect of TDF aggregates civilian population and integrates it into the national security matters, which just by active presence, minimise potential military threats. Finally LNG could be employed as deterrence measure and if required as self-defence capability to act in early stages of hybrid war because of its local knowledge and permanence.

2.3. The Estonian defence concept

An Estonian defence concept is well managed and resourced, but requires integration of Russian minorities into defence force, otherwise their will continue to constitute grounds for Russian intervention. The Estonian defence concept is based on the tenet of sufficient defence capabilities to guarantee State's sovereignty, which relies on both territorial and non-territorial units for initial independent defence capability and on NATO's collective defence (EST MoD, 2011, p. 10-11). It envisions the principle of total defence as a basis for collective defence in the case of a surprising attack and provision of military assistance to civilian authority in the case of emergency in both peace and war times (Parliament of Estonia, 2010, p. 13). This concept basically requires to ensure control of territory, to provide early warning, HNS, efficient reserve force and a mobilisation system and finally, to develop mobile, modern, sustain-

able and rapid response units (Parliament of Estonia, 2010, p. 14). According to the Junior Fellow of the 'Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW)' Szymanski:

The Estonian defence concept is backed up with wide consensus to allocate NATO's 2% of GDP for defence as a precondition to develop mobile, modern, sustainable and rapid response units. (...) Estonia's decisions to keep its conscription system and maintain the TDF (Kaitseliit) as a traditional volunteer formation proved to be correct in long term (2015).

Currently, the Estonian Defence Force consists of approx. 6,000 professional troops and 15,000 TDF troops (see annex 1), being a reliable force (Estonian Defence Force, n.d.). However, there are two major issues to solve. Firstly, the integration of Russian minorities (the same as in Latvia) with following assimilation into both country's life and armed force, especially into TDF, and secondly, with 16 days of training per year TDF cannot reach the same level as professional troops (Szymanski, P, 2015). This implies that TDF should prioritize their training to those vital areas for initial independent defence and try to involve Russian minorities. According to the Estonian MoD, conscription will remain the main source of reserves, generating an efficient readiness and mobilisation system, which in conjunction with early warning and command and control will allow initial independent defence capability (Estonian MoD, 2011, p. 12). The most important requirement is rapid reaction, especially in the case of a surprising attack and TDF are well suited for this purpose as TDF members live and work in respective areas. Ongoing crisis in Ukraine revealed necessity to defend key infrastructure, which according to the Estonian MoD, is a precondition for collective defence (Estonian MoD, 2011, p. 11). Therefore, Szymanski argues that:

Estonia's decision to align TDF with regular force by providing TDF formations with similar equipment to the regular forces has far reaching positive consequences. In chasing for security Estonia continues to develop TDF anti-tank capabilities, by 2022 intent to increase number of TDF members to 30,000 and finally battalion size units are to be replaced by more mobile company size units which are recruited from locals. Furthermore, to increase reaction time TDF staff would like to raise authorised TDF members who allowed to keep their personal weapons and ammunition at home to 75% (2015).

To summarize, the Estonia's defence concept mirrors a Finnish defence model by absorbing the principles of total defence, conscription with professional element and the most important classic TDF, which in current situation suits best in order to counter threats posed by the RNNS.

Conclusion

Changing the security environment, unfriendly neighbour driven by their national interests, a diverse view of history and minority issues will continue to determine 3Bs defence concepts. Therefore, it must be constantly adapted to adequately meet actual security challenges. The evidence implies that in the current security environment, 3Bs depend on NATO's deterrence and collective defence in the case of crisis. However, the absence of permanent Allies troops in Baltics and geographical peculiarity prescribes that 3Bs must retain initial independent defence capability in the case of a surprising attack as a prerequisite for collective defence or as defence against non-linear war. In spite of this view, Lithuania and Latvia, unlike Estonia, give higher priority to expeditionary capabilities over TDF, though it is obvious that the importance of TDF is increasing for both 3Bs and

NATO. In the case of an attack against 3Bs, NATO should respond militarily and expel the aggressor or accept Russian strategic victory leading to catastrophic consequences for alliance. Therefore, it is so important to deter it and if failed, to expel an aggressor, however a conventional approach to the preposition of substantial force is rather demanding. Because it would require indefensible funding, it would be a pretext for escalation and vulnerable for pre-emptive strike. Otherwise, deploying it immediately after the crisis breaks out due to the slow NATO decision making would give an aggressor time to achieve its objectives and becomes challenging due to the Russian's anti-access and anti-denial capabilities. It will result in the situation that in all cases, 3Bs will be responsible for the initial independent defence with all national means available.

Consequently, Russian superiority in the case of linear warfare should be fought by taking advantage of its weaknesses and using own strengths, such as sabotage and guerrilla warfare. Therefore, if properly trained and equipped, TDF could operate independently or according to the national defence plan in support of professional armed force. Furthermore, it could support civilian authority or operate in decentralized and aggressive civilian resistance or even organize it. If successful, such an approach disrupts aggressor's land lines of communication, damage command and control infrastructure, slows down digging in and denies easy victory by buying time for Allies to fight back. Such an approach in conjunction with political will and a comprehensive defence approach go over traditional TDF efforts. Therefore, an integrated defence concept would serve both ways to deter and if failed, to defend. In fact, such a defence concept should be integrated into national security strategy to make the best

use of single elements by putting them together into an all-encompassing defence strategy which aims primarily to deter a potential aggressor.

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
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Annex 1. Contextual base line of military capabilities covering time period from 2013 to 2015 expressed in absolute numbers.

	Lithuania	Latvia	Estonia	EU	NATO	Russia
Population (CIA, 2015).	2,884,433	1,986,705	1,265,420	510,540,617	906,002,051	142,423,773
GDP (US\$) (CIA, 2015).	79,93 billion	48,36 billion	36,78 billion	16,63 trillion	37,480 trillion	3,577 trillion
Military expenses in 2014 (US\$ billion) (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015).	0,377	0,299	0,509	303	919,917	84
Troops number (active) (Global Firepower, 2016).	~14,900	~6,000	~6,000	~1,691,217	~3,585,000	~771,000
Major military equipment (Global Firepower, 2016).						
Total Naval Strength	12	18	6	1,521	1,783	352
Total Aircraft	10	4	6	6,740	21,699	3,429
Tanks	0	0	0	6,691	19,124	15,398
Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs)	432	250	318	48,971	97,738	31,298
Self-Propelled Guns (SPGs)	0	0	0	2,312	5,140	5,972
Towed-Artillery	54	20	66	3,492	4,928	4,625
Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems (MLRSs)	0	0	0	1,069	3,153	3,793

Figure 1. Gerasimov's concepts of hybrid warfare (Connell and Evans, 2015, p. 5).



Legend: Deployed measures indicator ★