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# SECURITY FORUM

EVALUATION OF DRILLS ORGANIZED BY INSTITUTIONS  
RESPONSIBLE FOR CIVIL PROTECTION

EVOLUTION OF POLISH MILITARY MISSIONS  
ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE POLISH MILITARY CONTINGENT  
OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE  
IN AFGHANISTAN. PART 1

DETERMINANTS OF SAFE EVACUATION  
OF LARGE PRODUCTION FACTORIES



# **SECURITY FORUM**

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# SECURITY FORUM

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# PREFACE

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The mission of people of science is to provide up-to-date, valuable knowledge and to lay the foundations for the acquisition of the skills to use it by all those who wish to do so. Importantly, only full implementation of this mission lays the foundations for individual and social development. This mission can be fulfilled by being guided by truth, wisdom, courage and responsibility in the search for new and scientifically sound solutions.

Various forms of scientific activity are linked to the implementation of this mission. These mainly include education and the multiplication and dissemination of scientific achievements. The aforementioned forms cannot be hierarchized, because they are partner forms for each other. Their intrinsic value is their demanding work and passion.

It is both this kind of work and passion that I see in this issue of the “Security Forum” semi-annual addressed to readers. This issue forms a collection of various studies that fall within the area encompassed by the object of cognition of the security sciences. A collection demonstrating the relevance to science and social life of the issues taken up by the authors of the individual articles.

I am pleased that, in an era dominated by online publishing, those responsible for running ‘Security Forum’ have also decided to offer their semi-annual magazine in traditional form.

As President of the Board of Directors of the Polish Society for Security Studies, I am delighted to see such a valuable activity of the security science research community, manifested by the contributions of national and international authors in this issue of Security Forum. I wholeheartedly encourage you to read this and subsequent issues of this interesting scientific periodical.

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# THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES WITH MIGRATORY FLOWS ON THE RESILIENCE OF THE SCHENGEN SYSTEM – CHALLENGES FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

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## Abstract

Science and technology are constantly advancing, both to the benefit of finding new solutions to maximise the security of modern states around the world, and to the detriment of creating new threats. The Schengen countries have the tools to protect their internal security despite the abolition of external border controls. However, interoperability of databases is still lacking. Despite repeated announcements of the completion of the project, the EU's operational systems are not interconnected, leading to significant information gaps. In most cases of illegal immigration for both material

and non-material reasons, it should be noted that these are migratory movements of people coming from underdeveloped countries and trying to find their way to highly developed countries. Illegal immigration has a significant impact on the growth of crime by creating threats such as terrorism, drug, and dangerous cargo smuggling. It is a well-known fact that smugglers are earning crores from the migration crisis, but when analysing the financial aspect of the crisis, it is important to note that someone has to finance it to some extent. It is worth considering who would be the main beneficiaries of the profits generated by the phenomenon described.

## Key words

Frontex, SIS, VIS, immigrant, hybrid warfare, organised crime group, disinformation

## Introduction

Hybrid warfare defies precise definition.<sup>1</sup> It can be described as a combination of conventional and unconventional methods of action that exploit an opponent's vulnerabilities to weaken his position, while blurring the line between war and peace. It also involves deliberately created ambiguity, i.e. any ambiguity in the situation aimed at avoiding responsibility on the part of the attacking state and the failure of the attacked state to respond appropriately. The civilian population and its positive attitude towards its own state, which can be undermined by the public disinformation spread by the attacking state, plays an important role here.<sup>2</sup> It is the citizens' lack of trust in the state that is the main target of hybrid warfare.<sup>3</sup> Europe has changed significantly over the last fifty years. The technology associated with digitalisation and information technology has transformed life on earth. The perennial conflict between Eastern and Western European states has also evolved. Grey tones blurred the red-white colours of relations. As the

Cold War came to an end and the "demolitions" breathed a breath of freedom, it was time to use information as the main tool in the fight against the enemy. This information is often untrue or exaggerated, and in this form, it is the enemy's strategy to distort the true picture and mislead public opinion. After the organised rush of immigrants across the Belarusian-Lithuanian, Belarusian-Latvian and Belarusian-Polish borders, the time has come for Finland. The issue of the Finnish-Russian border came at a time when the largest such movements in the entire EU were taking place. The year 2015 brought a huge amount of change for which the community was not prepared. In fact, the Schengen Treaty did not anticipate that there would ever be a situation where foreign nations would enter the territory of the European Union.<sup>4</sup> The year 2015 heralded a series of changes that will be reflected in the Union's internal and external policies<sup>5</sup>. On 13 May 2015, the 'European Agenda on Migration' was launched, providing guidelines for further action on migration. Particular attention was paid to the need to fight

1 See: M. Banasik, *Hybrid warfare and its consequences for Euro-Atlantic security*, Warszawa 2017; A. Bilal, *Hybrid warfare – new threats of complexity and 'trust as antidote'* (<https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/11/30/hybrid-warfare-new-threats-complexity-and-trust-as-the-antidote/index.html>, access: 29.09.2023 r.); T. Rid, *Information warfare*, Warszawa 2022; Turkowski S., *Hybrid Warfare. Istota, struktura i przebieg konfliktu*, Warsaw 2021.

2 See: T. Balcerzak, E. Jasiuk, A. Fellner, M. Feltynowski, *The Polish perspective of using unmanned aerial vehicle systems in international firefighting and crisis management missions-legal and technological analysis*, 2021 International Conference on Unmanned Aircraft Systems (ICUAS) (publication date: 15.06.2021), p. 1478-1487.

3 See: R. Socha, *Security and threats – mutual relations*, [in:] *Selected aspects of security research*, (ed.) B. Kaczmarczyk, A. Wawrzusiszyn, Elk 2014; B. Wiśniewski, *Description of Security Systems – a Few Reflections*, "Internal Security" January–June, No 11/2019, Police Academy, Szczytno 2019, pp. 9-20; B. Wiśniewski, *National Security Governance System – a few Remarks and Reservations*, "Security Forum", Volume 6 No 1/2022, WSB University, Dąbrowa Górnicza 2022, pp. 51-60.

4 More: P. Lubiewski, *Hidden dimension of immigration and human rights – consequences for public security*, [in:] Wiśniewski B., Czupryński A., Gikiewicz M. (ed.), *Rationalisation of management of uniformed formations responsible for internal security*, Volume VI, Warsaw 2020.

5 A. Bilal, *Hybrid warfare – new threats of complexity and 'trust as antidote'*, (<https://www.nato.int/docu/review/index.html> (access: 09.10.2023 r.).

organised criminal groups that exploit migrants and organise their smuggling under life-threatening conditions. There is a need to reduce the incentives that lead people to undertake such journeys, which may result in them being refused asylum and having to return to their country of origin. The annex to this document contains European resettlement and relocation programmes. One cannot help but think that this document is optimistic and that its authors are hoping for a situation in which migrants will turn out to be able students and skilled workers needed by the EU economy. The forced relocation of foreigners is reflected in the current asylum and migration pact prepared by the European Commission, which is a proposal to amend EU rules with a 'compulsory solidarity' rule. In short, countries that do not accept migrants will have to pay the equivalent of 20,000 zlotys per person. Speaking at the European Political Community summit in Granada, European Parliament President Roberta Metsola said these changes were a solution that 'protects our borders and is fair to those who need protection, firm with those who do not qualify and tough on the criminal networks that prey on the most vulnerable'. An agreement is expected before the end of the current EP<sup>6</sup>.

## Methodological and methodical assumptions

The aim of this article is to outline the impact of political and structural changes, as well as migration flows, on the

resilience of the Schengen system. The article also outlines the specificities of the functioning of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the use of tools such as the Schengen Information System and the Visa Information System.

This article is an analysis and is based on content analysis and qualitative statistical data analysis. The study also used the historical method to reconstruct the events that led to the challenges of European integration. The research problem has come down to the question: How is the resilience of the Schengen system affected by political and structural changes and migratory movements?

The hypotheses of the text under discussion were formulated as follows:

- The smuggling machine profits from the conflicts at the external borders of the Schengen area.
- Wracked by violence against its own citizens, Europe is fighting an unequal battle to help migrants in need against organised traffickers who seek to destabilise and disrupt a seemingly secure system.
- The Schengen Information System, which operates in countries in the area where internal border controls have been abolished, helps to protect the internal security of these countries.
- EU information systems are still not interconnected, resulting in significant information gaps.
- It is imperative that the EU Travel Information and Authorisation System, originally announced for 2020, is implemented as soon as possible.

<sup>6</sup> Polish Press Agency, *When will the migration pact be funded? EP chief gives date* (access: 06.10.2023 r.).



## Illegal immigration

The Italian Island of Lampedusa lies between Tunisia and Malta. In the month of September 2023 alone, around 6.8 thousand migrants arrived there on 120 boats. Since January 2023, around 126,000 migrants have arrived in Italy by sea, crossing from Tunisia. According to Frontex, 232,350 cases of crossing the external border of the European Union were detected in August 2023 alone<sup>7</sup>. As a result of September's events, France closed its border with Italy and Germany suspended the 'voluntary solidarity' procedure 'until further notice'. Portugal's Secretary of State for European Affairs, Tiago Antunes, said: "One of the main challenges today ...is to overcome the smuggling of human beings. This is a very important dimension of the current migrant crisis" and "smugglers exploit the vulnerability of migrants who risk losing their lives during the sea journey". At the same time, the Portuguese police broke up a gang smuggling illegal migrants and the Portuguese government agreed to take in illegal African migrants arriving in Lampedusa<sup>8</sup>. Spain is also a destination for migrants arriving by sea. From the beginning of January to the end of September, more than 26,000 illegal migrants arrived there, a 13% increase on the same period last year. In one 24-hour period alone, 800 boat migrants arrived illegally in Spain. Their

destinations were the islands of the Canary archipelago, the Balearic Islands and the coasts of Almeria, Valencia, and Murcia. Fernando Clavijo, the regional president of the Canary Islands, accused Spain's central government, Pedro Sanchez, of not doing enough to tackle the growing problem of illegal immigration. Returning to Finland, the most recent case, one cannot help but notice the similarities between the way criminal networks exploit people seeking a better life and the situations that occurred during the 2021 migration crisis, which affected our country as well as Lithuania and Latvia. Finland is a country of about 5.5 million people. More than 87,000 people in the country declare Russian as their mother tongue. Finland is closing its borders due to the influx of migrants, which the Russian Ministry of Interior considers a violation of the rights of Russians living and residing on Finnish territory<sup>9</sup>. Finland has asked Frontex to help resolve the conflict and provide the necessary equipment, such as surveillance systems, all-terrain vehicles, and thermal imaging cameras. Border guards, immigration officials, experts and interpreters are to be sent<sup>10</sup>. The situation of migrants at the Finnish border is ridiculous and abstract. It is obvious that it is completely planned and orchestrated. With temperatures around -20°C, people arrive on bicycles from countries hundreds of kilometres away. It is

7 Polish Press Agency, *Chaos in Lampedusa. 6.8 thousand migrants have already arrived on the island* (access: 14.09.2023 r.).

8 <https://www.gospodarkamorska.pl> (access: 20.09.2023 r.).

9 <https://forsal.pl/> (access: 21.11.2023 r.).

10 See: A. Tavares, W. Kolano, *The phenomenon of migration in the context of threats to the internal security of Portugal and Poland*, "Security Forum" 2022, vol. 6. no.2; A. Tavares, W. Kolano, *The role of Poland in ensuring European Security*, "Security Forum" 2022, vol. 6. no.1.

a mystery where these people obtained these means of transport, since it is logical that someone provided them for the last leg of the journey, for which they paid around 2,500 euros per person (and between 100 and 400 euros per bicycle)<sup>11</sup>. The nearest Russian town is almost 170 kilometres from the Finnish border, and it is almost certain that the criminal organisations took these migrants there by bus and car.

## FRONTEX, SIS, VIS – EU security solutions

The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States became the European Border and Coast Guard Agency – Frontex – in October 2016. The Agency closely monitors and controls the European Union’s external borders. It is also tasked with assisting in the management of migration and protecting the rights under the principle of free movement of persons.

In November 2019, the responsibilities of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency were significantly expanded by a European Union regulation. Frontex’s role has been enhanced with regard to integrated border management, the fight against cross-border crime, search and rescue operations and other situations involving the protection of human life and health. The EU regulation also provides for the establishment of a permanent service of 6,500 officers by 2021, rising to 10,000 by 2027.

When analysing the current tasks to be performed by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, the following should be specified:

- Monitoring the situation,
- Deploying forces on the ground,
- Risk analysis,
- Exposure assessment,
- European cooperation on coastguard tasks,
- Return operations,
- Exchange of information on criminal activities,
- External relations development and management,
- Maintaining constant vigilance and responding rapidly to emerging threats,
- Research and innovation,
- Standards development and training.<sup>12</sup>

SIS, the Schengen Information System, is a computerised database for the control of persons and property. The purpose of the SIS is to determine whether persons or property are currently wanted in the Schengen area or are subject to an entry ban when crossing its borders. It should be noted that the Schengen Information System is the largest and most widely used system for the effective exchange of information on security and border surveillance practically throughout Europe. Thanks to the use of the SIS by countries in the area where internal border controls have been abolished, the protection of the internal security of these countries is at a high level. In 2023, the system was updated with the introduction of

<sup>11</sup> <https://economy.co.uk> (access: 26.11.2023 r.).

<sup>12</sup> Official website of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency <https://www.frontex.europa.eu/language/pl/> (access: 12.11.2023 r.).

the second generation of SIS, known as SIS II, which offers new possibilities for maximising security protection, such as updating information with photos and fingerprints. The system is mainly used by border guards and police to check or enter data on persons and objects. The creation of a single, common database greatly enhances the control work of the services. The system allows checks to be carried out throughout the European Union and the Schengen area. The main users of the Schengen Information System are:

- Police,
- Border services,
- Immigration services,
- Customs authorities,
- Judicial authorities.

The aforementioned institutions cooperate with each other within the European Union as well as in the Schengen associated countries<sup>13</sup>.

VIS, the Visa Information System, is a system containing a database for verifying the data of third-country nationals for the purpose of issuing them with a short-term visa entitling them to enter the Schengen area<sup>14</sup>. On 27 May 2021, European Union updated the VIS Regulation.

Articles 5-7 of the Act on the participation of the Republic of Poland in the Schengen Information System and the Visa Information System (Dz.U. No. 165, item 1170, as amended) unambiguously specify which authorities are entitled

to access the data contained and processed in the Visa Information System. It should therefore be indicated that the right of access to the VIS is granted in Poland:

- Border Guard,
- Police,
- ABW,
- CBA,
- Prosecution,
- Courts,
- Head of the Office for Foreigners,
- Consuls.

Its data may be stored in the VIS for up to five years and, importantly, must be kept intact without the possibility of early deletion<sup>15</sup>. Personal data that may be processed in the VIS include:

- name(s), including mother's family name,
- date, place, and country of birth of the person concerned,
- gender,
- current nationality held, including the nationality the person had at the time of birth,
- the type as well as the number of the document authorising travel. The document must indicate the authority that was authorised to issue it, as well as the date of issue and the date on which the document ceased to be valid,
- the date together with an indication of the place where the application was filed,
- type of visa,

<sup>13</sup> Official website of the European Commission – Schengen Information System [https://european-union.europa.eu/index\\_en](https://european-union.europa.eu/index_en) (access: 13.11.2023 r.).

<sup>14</sup> Council Decision of 8 June 2004 establishing the Visa Information System (VIS) (OJ L 213, 15.6.2004, p. 5-7).

<sup>15</sup> Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay visas (VIS Regulation) (OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, pp. 60-81).

- accurate information about the person who invites or is responsible for bearing any costs related to the maintenance of the applicant during his/her stay,
- main destination, place, and time of intended stay, with detailed indication of arrival and departure dates,
- the boundary to be crossed first,
- current occupation, including employer or school/college name,
- photography,
- fingerprints,
- where a minor is applying for a visa, the first and last names of the minor's parents.

It should be noted that there are exceptions to the taking of fingerprints for the purposes of the Visa Information System. Firstly, fingerprints will not be taken from persons under the age of 12. Another exception is where it is physically impossible to give fingerprints, e.g. when an amputee applies for a visa. Those who travel regularly to the Schengen area do not have to provide fingerprints each time they apply for a visa. Those already in the system can be used within five years<sup>16</sup>.

## Summary

The migrant smuggling machine relies on profits in the form of conflicts at the external borders of the Schengen area.<sup>17</sup> The cultural profile of the average 'refugee', whose ideals are far removed from European culture, is not insignificant.

Terrorism, rape, and violence have been the experience of countries trying to assimilate immigrants. Europe, plagued by violence against its own citizens, is fighting an unequal battle to help migrants in need, which includes organised trafficking to destabilise and create chaos in a system that seemed safe. It is not without reason that mothers with children are among the "young and angry" who try to break through the borders of the European Union. This is a phenomenon designed to hide the true intentions of the organisers of this practice. Humanitarian considerations and a sense of morality dictate that people should help the defenceless, who may have been deliberately placed in this situation. There are dramas and dilemmas on both sides of the conflict. However, it must not be forgotten that the security of the European Union is paramount and indisputable. The Schengen Agreement is an achievement of European civilisation and an asset for its citizens. Criminal organisations involved in the smuggling of migrants undermine this asset and thus harm the citizens of the countries that are part of the treaty structure. It can be argued that the pandemic, which has closed all borders and stopped air traffic, has only delayed the process of migrant invasion in Europe. It has delayed the process of hybrid warfare that has been going on for years with the aim of destabilising and confronting the countries of the European Union.

<sup>16</sup> <https://archiwum.uodo.gov.pl/479/2065> (access 17.11.2023).

<sup>17</sup> See: W. Fehler, K. Cebul, *Migration as a challenge for the European Union and selected member states*, Warsaw 2017; E. Jaremczuk, *Migration and the refugee crisis in Europe*, Ankara 2017.

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# A DIPLOMATIC CHESS GAME IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN: TURKEY, GREECE, AND THE FRENCH FACTOR

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## Abstract

This article critically examines the historical, legal, and geopolitical dimensions of the maritime boundaries conflict between Turkey and Greece, aiming to provide a comprehensive understanding of the intricacies surrounding the dispute and offering insights into potential pathways for resolution. The Turkish-Greek relationship has never been easy, but in the past few years number of incidents increased. The dispute between both countries is not only a territorial conflict. There is a broader geopolitical context involving countries such as France. The disputed maritime boundaries were subject to explorations of the large gas deposits under the seabed of the eastern Mediterranean. The EU also plays an important role in the conflict. Indeed, the EU supports Greece in the disputes between Turkey and Greece, as seen through the EU's criticism and resolutions towards Turkey.

## Key words

Turkey, Greece, France, Mediterranean, Mavi Vatan

## Introduction

Relations between Turkey and Greece have never been easy, but for the past few years the world has witnessed an increased number of incidents involving the air force or navy of both countries. Back at the beginning of this century, there was on average with around 20-30 'incidents' per year. One of the turning points in Greek-Turkish relations was the failed putsch in Turkey in 2016. Following this event, there was a tightening of the foreign policy course by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. All events affect the easternmost Greek islands. Nonetheless, in August 2020, the conflict entered a new phase. Turkey concluded an agreement with Libya on a common maritime border and a special economic zone, which would include inter alia the Greek island Crete. Ankara's aim was to expand the area of its territorial waters in order to locate offshore hydrocarbon deposits around the Greek island of Kastellórizo<sup>1</sup>. Greece opted for this with the establishment of a Greek-Egyptian economic zone<sup>2</sup>.

Significantly, the Turkish-Libyan agreement could also threaten Cyprus' interests, as under the agreement Turkey can claim deposits under the seabed around the island. At the end of August

2020, the Turkish research vessel 'Oruç Reis' escorted by the Turkish navy was exploring the seabed in the disputed waters around the island of Kastellórizo<sup>3</sup>. The Greek side responded with military manoeuvres that also involved French armed forces (Paris took a strong side with Greece). In 2021, Greek-Turkish negotiations took place, which calmed the tense situation but did not resolve the problem, which is likely to rage on<sup>4</sup>.

## Navigating Delicate Ties: Points of tension in the Turkish-Greek Relationship

The relationship between Turkey and Greece cannot simply be reduced to a territorial conflict. The rivalry between the two countries is linked to a much broader geopolitical context involving countries from France to the United Arab Emirates. The initiation of a new crisis between the two countries in 2020 must be sought in the complicated history between the countries<sup>5</sup>.

In historical terms, the memory of almost 200 years of conflict and ethnic cleansing in areas inhabited simultaneously by Greeks and Turks is an important issue. Significant points in the history of both states include the 1919-1922

1 L. Baker, T. Gumrukcu, M. Kambas, *Turkey-Libya maritime deal rattles East Mediterranean*, Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-libya-eastmed-tensions-explain-idUSKBN1YT0JK/> (access: 25.12.2019 r.).

2 M. Mourad, *Egypt and Greece sign agreement on exclusive economic zone*, Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-egypt-greece-idUKKCN25222H/> (access: 6.08.2020 r.).

3 *Turkish ship at centre of Greece row to return to Mediterranean*, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54504123> (access: 12.10.2020 r.).

4 *Turkey-Greece: From Maritime Brinkmanship to Dialogue*, International Crisis Group, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean-turkiye-cyprus/turkey-greece-maritime-brinkmanship> (access: 31.05.2021 r.).

5 R. Czulda, *Grecko-turecki spór na Morzu Śródziemnym*, <https://milmag.pl/grecko-turecki-spor-na-morzu-srodziemnym/> (access: 20.05.2021 r.).



conflict, which became Turkey's founding myth, or Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974<sup>6</sup>.

The dispute over Cyprus has negatively affected Greek-Turkish relations for almost three-quarters of a century. Independence was granted to the island in 1960 under a power-sharing agreement between the Greek and Turkish communities. A Greek was elected president and a Turk was elected vice-president. The government consisted of 10 ministers – seven Greeks and three Turks. The vice-president and ministers had the right to veto the president's decisions. Attempts to change the system to limit the influence of Turks in the political affairs of the country led to a civil war in 1963, which was quelled by United Nations (UN) intervention. Unfortunately, tensions between the two communities did not cease and led to Turkey's occupation of the north-eastern part of the island. As a result of the invasion, a quarter of the Cypriot population was removed from the occupied northern part, where Greek Cypriots made up more than 80% of the population. Less than a few months after the invasion, the Federal Turkish State of the Republic of Cyprus was proclaimed, which in future became the 'independent' Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), recognised only by the authorities in Ankara. These events led to the division of the island along the 180km UN-monitored Green Line<sup>7</sup>.

However, one of the current burning disputes concerns the delimitation of maritime boundaries. Unlike Greece, Turkey has not signed the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which defines, inter alia, the boundaries of the continental shelf, territorial sea and maritime economic zones. Consequently, Turkey considers that most of the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea are on the Turkish continental shelf. Ankara believes that this fact deprives Athens of its rights to the territorial sea or economic zones around these islands. This state of affairs leads to frequent military incidents<sup>5</sup>.

Another element of the conflict is the issue of demilitarisation of the Greek islands of the northern Aegean Sea and the Dodecanese islands, which are subject to the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and the 1947 Treaty of Paris. Turkey claims that Greece is in breach of these treaties. Ankara is contesting the legality of the presence of Greek armoured vehicles on the islands of Lesbos and Samos in September 2022<sup>8</sup>.

Nonetheless, one of the most difficult areas for agreement between the two states remains the issue of the outstanding conflict over the status of Cyprus since the 1960s. In 2021, Ankara decided to reject the idea supported by the UN and the European Union (EU) to formalise the TRCP and the Greek Republic of Cyprus (an EU member) into a single state. Turkey decided to

6 A. Michalski, *Odwilż w relacjach turecko-greckich*, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2023-10-12/odwilz-w-relacjach-turecko-greckich> (access: 12.10.2023 r.).

7 A. Michalski, *Cypr w polityce Turcji*, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2021-10-20/cypr-w-polityce-turcji> (access: 20.10.2021 r.).

8 A. Gautam, *The Greco-Turkish dispute over the Aegean Sea*, Indian Council of World Affairs, [https://www.icwa.in/show\\_content.php?lang=1&level=1&ls\\_id=8622&lid=5627](https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=1&ls_id=8622&lid=5627) (access: 14.11.2022 r.).

place emphasis on persuading the international community to recognise the TRNC's distinctiveness as an independent political entity<sup>5</sup>.

The undoubted migration issue (both countries lie on the route from the Middle East to Europe) is another problem in Turkish-Greek relations. Athens accuses Ankara of deliberately sending illegal migrants from Turkish territory into Greek territorial waters. On the other hand, Turkey believes that resisting the reception of migrants violates the provisions of the migration agreement concluded between the EU and Turkey in 2016<sup>9</sup>.

## Mediterranean Sea Discoveries and the Turkey-Greece Tension

Exploration work has led to the discovery of a number of gas deposits under the seabed of the eastern Mediterranean. The largest of these include: the Leviathan field to the east of Israel (estimated at 450 billion cubic metres of gas and up to 600 million barrels of oil) and the Aphrodite field to the south of Cyprus (estimated at up to 170 billion cubic metres of gas). The extraction of such volumes of gas and oil could prove to be an extraordinary economic opportunity for the region<sup>10</sup>.

One proposed solution is to exploit the Aphrodite field through the cooperation with Egypt. Egypt currently has two gas liquefaction stations to convert natural gas into liquefied natural gas (LNG). The project is to include a pipeline between Cyprus and Egypt. The gas will first be transported via Cyprus to Egypt for liquefaction and then the LNG will be exported to Europe via Egypt. NewMed Energy, together with partners Chevron and Shell, is currently expected to submit plans for the development of this project to the Cypriot government. However, Turkey believes that revenues from the sale of gas should be shared with the TRNC<sup>11</sup>.

Another country that could be a major energy exporter in the Eastern Mediterranean is Israel. The Leviathan gas field is located in Israel's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The EEZ is a body of water where the coastal state has sole rights to the resources in and under it<sup>12</sup>. In 2020, gas from the field was exported to Egypt and Jordan for the first time since its discovery. But the much bigger project for Israel is the proposed EastMed pipeline, which would export Israeli and Cypriot gas to Greece and from there to Europe. Initial calculations estimate that the investment can be completed in 2025<sup>13</sup>.

9 Greece says Turkey is pushing migrants into its waters, <https://www.dw.com/en/greece-accuses-turkey-of-pushing-migrants-into-its-waters/a-59772770> (access: 11.10.2021 r.).

10 A. Rabinovitch and M. Kambas, *Cyprus, Israel seek gas-sharing formula to unlock East Mediterranean energy hub*, Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-cyprus-aphrodite-idUSKBN1180UQ/> (access: 07.05.2018 r.).

11 A. Rabinovitch and R. Bousso, *Aphrodite gas field off Cyprus to be linked to Egypt, NewMed says*, Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/aphrodite-gas-field-off-cyprus-be-linked-egypt-newmed-2023-05-31/> (access: 31.05.2023 r.).

12 United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part V, Article 56

13 A. Bloch and I. Saber, *What's Driving the Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean?*, LAWFARE, <https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/whats-driving-conflict-eastern-mediterranean> (access: 25.01.2021 r.).

Unfortunately, the problematic issue is the attitude of Turkey, which has not ratified UNCLOS and believes that its EEZs are far greater than those under the treaty. The government in Ankara claims that the Turkish EEZ runs closer to Crete and Cyprus. The matter is further complicated by the fact that the TRNC has also designated its own separate EEZ. Surprisingly, the TRNC-designated EEZ extends far to the south-east of Cyprus and includes the Aphrodite deposit. These problems have been known for years, but Turkey reminded us of them by signing an agreement with Libya to demarcate its EEZs. In light of this agreement, a border between the Libyan and Turkish EEZs runs to the south-east of Crete. These zones form a cordon that crosses the Mediterranean Sea and will thus separate Greece from Cyprus and is in the path of the EastMed gas pipeline<sup>14</sup>.

The agreement was declared illegal under UNCLOS and condemned by Greece, Egypt, Cyprus and the EU. The agreement between Greece and Egypt was a response to the Turkish-Libyan agreement, especially in light of recent Turkish seismic surveys around the Greek island of Kastellórizo, which, according to the Turkish-Libyan agreement, lies on Turkey's continental shelf<sup>15</sup>.

## Geopolitical dimension

The events that started to intensify the conflict between Greece and Turkey were initiated by Turkish government, who decided to grant Turkish Petroleum concessions to explore oil and gas fields located around Rhodes and Crete. Furthermore, in 2020, the Turkish government decided to send the research vessel Oruc Reis to the area around the island of Kastellórizo to search for deposits. This act put the Greek navy on alert. Mediation through Germany calmed the situation. However, a few days after the agreement between Greece and Egypt has been signed, the research vessel Oric Reis was already sailing between Crete and Cyprus, with Greek and Turkish warships following it. These events even led to a collision between a Greek ship and a Turkish frigate<sup>16</sup>.

The deal between Turkey and Libya meant that France and Egypt were also caught up in the conflict. The reason was that Turkey shared economic zones with the Libyan government from Tripoli, which is one of the parties involved in the civil war in Libya. As for Egypt, it supports the rival Libyan government in Tobruk led by General Khalifa Haftar. This is because, since 2014, the Egyptian presidency has been held by Marshal Abd al-Fattah as-Sisi, who overthrew the government of

14 H. Kozieł, *Turcja sięga po sporny kawalek gazowego tortu*, parkiet.com, <https://www.parkiet.com/gospodarka-swiatowa/art19754521-turcja-siega-po-sporny-kawalek-gazowego-tortu> (access: 16.09.2020 r.).

15 S. Nowacka, *Znaczenie umowy egipsko-greckiej o delimitacji obszarów morskich dla polityki regionalnej Egiptu*, PISM, [https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/Znaczenie\\_umowy\\_egipskogreckiej\\_o\\_delimitacji\\_\\_obszarow\\_morskich\\_dla\\_polityki\\_regionalnej\\_Egiptu](https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/Znaczenie_umowy_egipskogreckiej_o_delimitacji__obszarow_morskich_dla_polityki_regionalnej_Egiptu) (access: 28.09.2020).

16 T. Tsakiris, *Inflammable Waters: Turkey's Strategic Objectives in the Eastern Mediterranean and the East Med Gas Pipeline (EMGP)*, IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2020, <https://www.iemed.org/publication/inflammable-waters-turkeys-strategic-objectives-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-and-the-east-med-gas-pipeline-emgp/> (access: 12.08.2023 r.).

the Muslim Brothers. The latter maintain close ties with the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNA). The GNA, in turn, is an entity that is in conflict with Libyan General Khalif Haftar. It is noteworthy that Haftar receives support from France, the United Arab Emirates and from Egypt<sup>12</sup>.

On the other hand, France opposed the fact that Turkey is providing the authorities in Tripoli with arms and mercenaries. Interestingly, it was France itself that was involved in setting up this government after the overthrow of Gaddafi in Libya<sup>17</sup>. France decided to send its fleet to the eastern Mediterranean in the summer 2020 and conducted joint manoeuvres with the Egyptian fleet there. France also conducted joint military manoeuvres with the Greek fleet and sent its Rafale jets to Crete<sup>5</sup>. Another aspect that causes tensions between Ankara and Paris is the issue of Syria. While Ankara sees the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the People's Protection Units (YPG) as a threat to national security, France has established direct contacts with these groups mainly because it sees them as an asset and partner in the fight against ISIS<sup>18</sup>.

Importantly, the Americans also exercised jointly with the Greek navy in August<sup>19</sup>. Moreover four F-16 fighter jets

from the United Arab Emirates landed on Crete at the end of August. Despite the fact that this Middle Eastern monarchy does not claim Cyprus' deposits, it wanted to play on Turkey, with which it is in conflict over the Libyan issue<sup>20</sup>.

The dispute between Turkey and Greece in the Mediterranean not only affects the changing dynamics of relations between the two countries, but is also a cause for concern for at least two organisations: the EU and the NATO. The problems between Turkey and Greece are affecting Turkey's relations with the US and the EU. Greece is cleverly exploiting Washington's growing distrust of Ankara by presenting itself as an alternative military cooperation partner and host for US military infrastructure. A US naval base on Crete has existed since 1969 and the 2022 defence cooperation agreement allows access for the US to infrastructure in Greece<sup>6</sup>.

The EU, also plays an important role in the conflict. Athens can count on the EU's support in its disputes with Ankara, as seen in the EU's criticisms and resolutions towards Turkey and in blocking attempts to restart Turkey's accession talks<sup>21</sup>.

Also worth mentioning is the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), established in January 2020 and based in Cairo. This forum brings

17 *France's Macron accuses Turkey of playing 'a dangerous game' in Libya*, <https://www.france24.com/en/20200622-france-s-macron-accuses-turkey-of-playing-a-dangerous-game-in-libya> (access: 22.06.2020).

18 *French-Kurdish talks in northeast Syria likely to anger Turkey*, <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1670181/middle-east> (access: 26.11.2023 r.).

19 L. Jakes, *U.S. Will Base Mammoth Ship in Greece, Near Disputed Territory*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/29/us/politics/greece-turkey-us-navy.html> (access: 29.09.2020 r.).

20 A. Ahronheim, *UAE sends F-16 jets to Crete for joint drills with Greece*, <https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/uae-sends-f-16-jets-to-crete-for-joint-drills-with-greece-639739> (access: 24.08.2020 r.).

21 M. Leigh, *An appropriate European Union response to tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean*, <https://www.bruegel.org/blog-post/appropriate-european-union-response-tensions-eastern-mediterranean> (access: 28.08.2020 r.).

together countries such as Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and Italy (which joined in September by signing the EMGF charter). France is applying for membership, and the United States as well as the EU have applied for observer status. Turkey's non-participation clearly reflects the members' stance towards that country's policies in the region. Ankara regards the EMGF as an illegitimate body that disregards the interests of Turkey and Northern Cyprus<sup>22</sup>.

### Beyond Borders: Turkey's 'Blue Homeland' and France's 'Pax Mediterranean' – Competing Visions in the East Mediterranean

As Turkey began drilling operations in the north-eastern part of Cyprus in Cypriot territorial waters, French President Emmanuel Macron strongly sided with Greece. Macron found Turkey's conduct in the eastern Mediterranean unacceptable and called on European countries to form a strong front against Turkey's aggressive policy.

Turkey's confrontational policy in the eastern Mediterranean stems from the content of the Mavi Vatan doctrine (also known as the "Blue Homeland" doctrine), which was formulated by Admiral Cem Gürdeniz in 2006. However, it was not until the former Chief of Staff of the Turkish Navy,

Admiral Cihata Yayci, that the doctrine was refined to the level of state doctrine. Mavi Vatan in practice means extending Turkey's maritime borders to 462,000 square metres. The designed borders are to be defended by means of diplomatic and military coercion. The idea also aims to reposition the country to the level of a maritime power<sup>23</sup>.

In this respect, the 'Blue Homeland' doctrine is primarily aimed at rejecting Greek and Cypriot claims in the eastern Mediterranean and thus the 'Seville map' (i.e. the map published by the University of Seville confirming the territorial claims of Cyprus), which has been accepted by the EU. The drafters of this doctrine claim that the Montego Bay Convention has no legal significance for Turkey because Turkey has never signed it. They reject the principles of this Convention, considering them ill-suited to the geography of the Mediterranean, particularly because the EEZ boundary of 200 nautical miles is unrealistic in a confined space with numerous islands. As a result, a country like Greece would have a huge maritime area, including sovereignty over islands close to the Turkish coast, such as Kastellórizo. Admirals, while recognising the specificity of the Greek-Turkish border situation, question the application of the principles of the Montego Bay Convention in this case and support the introduction of a special regime in the region<sup>24</sup>.

22 M. Sukkarieh, *The East Mediterranean Gas Forum: Regional Cooperation Amid Conflicting Interests*, Natural Resources Governance Institute, 2021.

23 J. Jabbour, *France vs. Turkey in the EastMed A Geopolitical Rivalry between a „Keeper” of the Old Order and a Challenging Emergent Power*, IFRI, 2021.

24 A. Deriziotis, *The "Blue Homeland" and Erdoğan's Rhetoric: State Doctrine or Populist Narrative?*, *Convergence and Confrontation: The Balkans and the Middle East in the 21st Century* (2021) Article 1 (p. 9–32).

However, this vision of national sovereignty proposed by Ankara and its attempt to achieve hegemony in the Mediterranean is contrary to France's interests in the region. Emmanuel Macron would undoubtedly like to restore France's position as hegemon in the Mediterranean, which Paris considers to be its traditional sphere of influence. In the spirit of the projects initiated by his predecessors (Chirac's Barcelona Process and Sarkozy's Mediterranean Union), President Macron wants to establish a Pax Mediterranean with a regional character. One of the pillars of France's foreign policy is to build a Mediterranean order around political cooperation that revolves around Paris<sup>25</sup>.

Consequently, it was in France's interest to publicly support Greece and Cyprus in their dispute with Turkey over the maritime delimitation. France decided to cool down Turkey's expansionist inclinations. Firstly, France offered to sell Rafale fighters to Greece. Finally, France sent the nuclear aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to the eastern Mediterranean and took part in joint military manoeuvres with Nicosia and Athens. In short, the conflict between Turkey and France is the result of a worldwide shift in the balance of power and the rise of middle states that are going against the *status quo ante*, challenging the European-centric order<sup>26</sup>.

## Fostering Future: Prospects for Turkey-Greece Relations

Greece is considering whether it should give the impression that it has a desire to negotiate on issues such as the right to extend its territorial waters in the Aegean Sea or sovereignty over uninhabited islands like Imia/Kardak, which it believes have been decided in its favour anyway. This approach makes Greece officially focus only on the issue of the delimitation of the continental shelf. However, since 2002, Greece and Turkey have held a series of sixty secret exploratory meetings, which were intended to cover a wide range of issues beyond the continental shelf matter<sup>27</sup>.

Little information from these aborted negotiations has made its way to the press. However, it was said that an agreement to resolve all outstanding issues, including by going to the International Court of Justice, might be achievable<sup>28</sup>. Nonetheless, considerable work has been done by both sides that can serve as a basis for future negotiations. In the meantime, Greece and Turkey are currently working on a new engagement initiative called the Positive Agenda, a joint effort covering issues ranging from health and tourism to entrepreneurship and the environment. This initiative has the potential to build trust and prepare

25 T. C. Tasche, *The Project of a Union for the Mediterranean – Pursuing French Objectives through the Instrumentalisation of the Mare Nostrum*, Dans *L'Europe en Formation* 2010/2 (n° 356), p. 53-70.

26 G. Georgiopoulos, *France stands by Greece over tensions in Aegean Sea: French defense minister*, <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-greece-france-defence-idUKKCN20H0FA/> (access: 23.02.2020 r.).

27 *Turkey, Greece to hold new round of exploratory talks in Athens*, BY DAILY SABAH WITH REUTERS, <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkey-greece-to-hold-new-round-of-exploratory-talks-in-athens> (access: 20.02.2022 r.).

28 *Turkish FM: Taking sea dispute with Greece to International Court an open option*, ekathimerini.com, <https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/247832/turkish-fm-taking-sea-dispute-with-greece-to-international-court-an-open-option/> (access: 22.12.2019 r.).

the parties for negotiations on more contentious issues<sup>29</sup>.

In addition, recent heightened bilateral tensions were muted following the devastating earthquakes that hit Turkey in February 2023 and the tragic train crash in Greece the following month. Both countries supported each other with what showed responsibility in the face of these tragedies. Greece was one of the first countries to send search and rescue teams to Turkey to help decongest and search for survivors. In response, Turkey was quick to express solidarity with Greece after the train disaster, expressing public sympathy. Although little has happened after a similar surge of mutual empathy that initiated 'earthquake diplomacy' in 1999, the current political backdrop provides an inspiring impetus<sup>30</sup>.

Besides, both countries assure that they will cooperate on solving the immigration crisis. Both sides undoubtedly need an extension of the EU agreement on illegal migration which expired in 2021<sup>31</sup>.

Another important aspect is that the European Union needs new gas suppliers, so improving relations between Athens and Ankara may provide an opportunity to expand at least the already existing gas transmission infrastructure to obtain gas from Azerbaijan or Iran, for example, and even from Israel and Egypt in the future.

Nevertheless, the rapprochement process between Ankara and Athens should not be expected to lead to a resolution of long-standing conflicts over maritime borders or the Cyprus issue, which have been entrenched for decades.

## Summary

The problematic raised in the preceding paragraphs raises the question whether Turkey should sign and ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea or there should be a bilateral treaty between Greece and Turkey.

The former evidently seeming the most straightforward solution couldn't be achieved. The reason is that UNCLOS states that islands are the same as a continental landmasses, and are also entitled to an EEZ<sup>32</sup>. UNCLOS is in Ankara's view a matter of safeguarding Turkish national interests because Turkey's sovereignty would be restricted. Indeed, the high concentration of Greek islands along the Turkish coast and thus the Aegean would de facto become a Greek sea, in terms of exploiting its resources.

On one hand Turkey signing and ratifying UNCLOS would provide clear guidelines and protections for its maritime rights and resources. In addition, Turkey would have access to a dispute resolution mechanism that could help resolve the aforementioned conflicts.

29 *Türkiye, Greece agree to further improve ties through positive agenda*, <https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkiye-greece-agree-to-further-improve-ties-through-positive-agenda-181805> (access: 22.03.2023 r.).

30 A. Coşkun, *Rapprochement Between Greece and Türkiye: Seemingly Impossible, Yet Not Unimaginable*, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, <https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/05/13/rapprochement-between-greece-and-turkiye-seemingly-impossible-yet-not-unimaginable/> (access: 13.05.2023 r.).

31 *Greece seeks EU-Turkey migration deal expansion*, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/migration/news/greece-seeks-eu-turkey-migration-deal-expansion/> (access: 25.09.2023 r.).

32 *United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, Part VIII, Article 121

On the other hand, UNCLOS argue that the convention infringes on Turkey's sovereignty by requiring it to share resources and pay royalties for the exploration and exploitation of seabed minerals beyond its continental shelf.

Nevertheless, Turkey is effectively denying itself the benefits and protections offered by this international framework.

The latter is thus the more realistic solution as it could include economic clauses and thus creating some new relations between both countries<sup>33</sup>. Ultimately the issue at hand are the resources.

As stated by Andreas Østhagen in article *Maritime boundary disputes: What are they and why do they matter?*, the maritime space includes sovereign rights to resources which it includes. Further, Østhagen claims that while "States cannot deny passage through their EEZs; they may only deny actors access to marine resources and apply environmental regulations in their maritime zones." Thus delimitations in the maritime space becomes a matter of "reasonable sacrifice" which suggests a division of the overlapping area or a joint sharing, including oil and gas resources or fisheries zones<sup>34</sup>.

In addition, Prosper Weil argues that: "Maritime boundaries, like land boundaries, are the fruit of the will of

States or the decision of the international judge, and neither governments nor judges limit themselves simply to scientific fact"<sup>35</sup>.

In contrast to the proposed solution, today's multipolar world hinders further negotiations or agreements because of the increasing instability on the geopolitical scene. The reason for this is two-fold. First because of the increasing numbers of conflicts in the world and second because the US is slowly losing its position of "world gendarme". Thus allowing countries, such as Turkey, to emerge from a former bi-polar world with a hostile foreign policy favouring its national interest. Indeed, Turkey's foreign policy under Erdogan is increasingly showing elements of Neo-Ottomanism.

For instance, Turkey's decision to turn the Byzantine basilica Hagia Sophia into a mosque<sup>36</sup>. Similarly, the Mavi Vatan doctrine mentioned earlier is the element of Neo-Ottomanism.

Neo-Ottomanism is an irredentist and imperialist political ideology that honours the former Ottoman Empire and promotes greater political engagement of Turkey within regions formerly under the rule of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>37</sup> It promotes the creation of a sphere of influence based on political Islam, which stretches from Qatar, across northern Iraq and Syria, to Libya, and

33 Such as the 2010, Norwegian-Russian agreement on the maritime boundary in the Arctic.

34 A. Østhagen, *Maritime boundary disputes: What are they and why do they matter?*, "Marine Policy" 2020, Volume 120.

35 P. Weil, *The Law of Maritime Delimitation – Reflections*, London, 1989, p. 30-31.

36 M. Ayoub, *Return of the Empire: Why Erdogan Wants to Resurrect the Ottoman State, The national interest*, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/return-empire-why-erdogan-wants-resurrect-ottoman-state-167404> (access: 22.08.2020 r.).

37 E. Wastnidge, *Imperial Grandeur and Selective Memory: Re-assessing Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish Foreign and Domestic Politics*, "Middle East Critique" 2019, 28 (1), p. 7-28.



supporting the Government of National Accord (GNA)<sup>38</sup>.

Erdogan's Neo-Ottomanism is all about projecting Turkey's power beyond its borders by spreading a Muslim Brotherhood-inspired agenda in hotspots such as the Greek waters. Turkey has thus adopted Iran's strategy of using deniable proxy activities to coverup the real nature of its plans<sup>39</sup>.

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38 See: B. Stanicek, *Turkey: Remodelling the eastern Mediterranean – Conflicting exploration of natural gas reserves*, [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652048/EPRS\\_BRI\(2020\)652048\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652048/EPRS_BRI(2020)652048_EN.pdf) (access: 23.08.2023 r.).

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# CONCLUSIONS FROM PRELIMINARY RESEARCH INTO SECURITY AT RELIGIOUS CELEBRATIONS

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## Abstract

Interest in the question of security at religious celebrations and sacred buildings has been growing significantly in recent years. There are many reasons for this state of affairs. These include, on the one hand, the organisational complexity of ensuring security and the lack of widespread knowledge of church structures, and on the other hand, the threats to these celebrations. By virtue of their competences, the issue of security at religious celebrations naturally becomes the object of interest of academic centres and research groups unrelated to such celebrations. One of these organisations is the Institute of Social Security operating within the Social Observatory Foundation. The initiatives undertaken by this institute are of a systemic nature and are conducted mainly in the field of security studies. One manifestation of these initiatives are the annual academic meetings organised in the form of conferences and workshops, as well as participation as members of research groups established for the purposes of exercises organised by Polish rescue and police units. This article is an attempt to initiate a scholarly discussion outside the implementation of academic projects conducted within the framework of research projects. Its aim is to stimulate reflection on the complex nature of the process of ensuring the safety of participants at religious ceremonies, with the main emphasis on the safe attendance of the worshippers participating in them.

## Key words

security, threat, religion, offence, crime, public safety, public order

## Introduction

Religious celebrations are a common social phenomenon during which many religiously motivated people meet. Religious motivation is the result of a striving to satisfy a spiritual need that belongs to the group of psychological needs (secondary, social).<sup>1</sup> It is heterogeneous – it cannot be assigned to a specific category of basic needs.

Numerous religious celebrations take place in Poland.<sup>2</sup> Some of them are national religious events; some are international. National religious celebrations are primarily small or medium-sized. They are held on church premises (masses, funerals, administering sacraments) or in public places outside the church, including public roads (pilgrimages, processions, funeral processions). A feature of small or medium-sized national religious celebrations is that their organisation accords with the accepted customs for their staging. This is clearly visible during religious celebrations that use public roads in a special way.

A church organiser who is familiar with the local community and the institutions functioning there often organises religious ceremonies or other collective events of a religious nature based on accepted norms rather than on the applicable regulations. Formal violations (lack of specific agreement on the use of roads with the appropriate road manager) usually do not result in danger. However, it should be noted that

such informal conduct, although it may not have negative consequences in normal circumstances, may contribute to endangering participants of a religious ceremony in a difficult situation.<sup>3</sup>

A difficult situation forces a departure from the structure of ordinary activities in order to achieve a goal that has previously been achieved without any problems. Sticking to customs may result in a clergyman, who previously knew what to do based on acquired behaviour, beginning to make mistakes in the event of a new threat that could place worshippers in danger – as was the case on the occasion of the Łowicz pilgrimage mentioned elsewhere. It is worth noting here that the authority of the erring clergyman caused the pilgrims, regardless of the advice of the Police, to continue to attempt pilgrimages despite the threat posed by the pandemic. Interestingly, third-party groups of believers (e.g. Catholic associations from Podkarpacie) did not see the police's behaviour as concern for the safety of the faithful, but as repression.

It seems right that in a situation where a clergyman's attention is – often understandably – particularly absorbed in religious matters, he should appoint a person responsible for the safety of participants in a religious ceremony. Such a person, who is a type of safety or security manager, should have both appropriate qualifications (knowledge, skills, and experience) and psychological qualities (stress resistance and the ability to draw

1 More: *Bezpieczeństwo uczestników zgromadzeń religijnych*, eds. B. Wiśniewski, A. Prędecka, J. Bryk, A. Szela, Warsaw 2016; *Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria – Badania – Praktyka*, eds. A. Czupryński, B. Wiśniewski, J. Zboina, Józefów 2017.

2 More: B. Wiśniewski, G. S. Sander, *Zagrożenie, kryzys i sytuacja kryzysowa – jako uwarunkowania życia współczesnego człowieka*, „Bezpieczeństwo i Technika Pożarowa” 2016, No 41, p. 13-14.

3 More: *Bezpieczeństwo uczestników zgromadzeń...*

the clergyman's attention to important security issues). Such a person should have the ability to cooperate with non-church entities ensuring external security for religious ceremonies. It is worth noting that where religious celebrations are particularly large or their dimension is international, cooperation between the Church and the police, and also with other uniformed organisations – local police, emergency services – brings definitely positive effects.

By law, the Church is the independent host and organiser of religious celebrations. However, both the Church and its members, participants of religious gatherings, will benefit from the fact that security is handled by people who are appropriately prepared, who follow formal rules and who cooperate, to the extent necessary, with other bodies to help the Church ensure the safety of participants in religious celebrations.

## Methodological assumptions

The process of conducting the research for this article involved both theoretical and empirical research methods.

In this context, it should be noted that, according to the literature on the subject, a method is „a consciously applied course of action leading to achieving the intended goal”<sup>4</sup> and „a repeatable and effective way of solving a general research problem.”<sup>5</sup>

From the point of view of the effectiveness of the research process, the author's use of the qualitative and quantitative methods used in the social sciences was important.

- During the research, the author used:
- inductive reasoning, in which general statements are derived from detailed information,<sup>6</sup> which allow the formulation of new statements;
  - analysis, which is a research procedure consisting in dissection of the whole into its components or isolation of individual elements of the whole in order to learn about the whole; thanks to knowledge of these individual parts,<sup>7</sup> the identification of the scope of projects that make up the process of ensuring the safety of participants in religious ceremonies is made possible;
  - generalisation used to isolate features and repeatable phenomena occurring during these celebrations.

## Security at religious celebrations – state or process?

Many definitions of this concept can be found in the literature on the subject.<sup>8</sup>

The level of security is influenced by many factors which, due to their importance, impact, and effects, can be divided into several groups. Adopting these criteria, these factors can be arranged in four groups as determinants: basic, signalling, effect, and accompanying and

4 Ibidem.

5 L. Sołoma, *Metody i techniki badań socjologicznych*, Olsztyn 2002, p. 27.

6 M. Cieślarczyk, *Teoretyczne i metodologiczne podstawy badania problemów bezpieczeństwa i obronności państwa*, Siedlce 2009, p. 46.

7 R. Podgórski, *Metodologia badań socjologicznych. Kompendium wiedzy metodologicznej dla studentów*, Bydgoszcz-Olsztyn 2007, p. 74.

8 B. Wiśniewski, *System bezpieczeństwa państwa. Konteksty teoretyczne i praktyczne*, Szczytno 2013, p. 37.

design, forming a logical, consecutive whole.<sup>9</sup>

Safety at religious ceremonies may be considered as the state of an absence of threat to the course of the gathering, as well as the state of an absence of threat, of peace and confidence for the participants at the ceremony, which is the totality of the worshippers participating in such celebrations of religious nature. This state is free from destructive factors that pose a threat to general and public safety.<sup>10</sup> Such threats are threats to the internal security of the state. This security, as understood by the state, is an important element of the internal security of the state, the importance of which is closely related to the social and cultural importance of the religious life of Poles. If safety understood in this way is the work of human behaviour, then its product is a safe celebration and the safety of all its participants, especially the priest and the faithful.

The safety of religious celebrations is a requirement that determines the necessity to meet religious needs. The sense of security that occurs when security requirements are met is a state in which the situation is perceived by the person participating in it as being free from threats.

This security may take the form of a specific security process related to the desired activity of those participating in a religious gathering. Referring to the activity of such people, we can distinguish those that are reactive (clergy

and worshippers – participants in the ceremony) and proactive (organiser – the Church, services subordinate to the Church and non-church organisations and institutions whose purpose is to ensure safety in the place where the faithful are gathered). Because the security process is a complex and multi-entity activity, it is based on cooperation between individual elements of the security system.

Taking the above into account, it is reasonable to state that the basis of the security process is properly coordinated and synchronised collective action taking the form of cooperation between all entities that can help – including those that facilitate or enable – to ensure that religious celebrations are not threatened or at least reduce the effects of any threat. The security process should be efficient. For a complex collective operation to be effective and economic, it must be properly organized, including being properly planned. Operational planning is based on setting the goals for anticipated events and performing a risk analysis.<sup>11</sup> Anticipation and risk analyses are related to the degree of certainty regarding predicted phenomena, their nature, strength, and the effects of the measures used. Uncertainty is a source of failure for future actions, limits rational decision-making, and arouses fear, which – when applied to the participants at a celebration – is a potential source of panic behaviour in the crowd.

9 B. Wiśniewski, *Praktyczne aspekty badań bezpieczeństwa*, Warszawa 2020, p. 16.

10 More: B. Wiśniewski, T. Zwęgliński, *Wybrane problemy bezpieczeństwa dużych skupisk ludzkich innych aniżeli zgromadzenia publiczne i imprezy masowe*, „Zeszyty Naukowe Collegium Witelona” 2022, No 43(2), p. 92.

11 More: *Wyzwania, szanse, zagrożenia i ryzyko dla bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP o charakterze wewnętrznym*, eds. R. Jakubczak, B. Wiśniewski, Szcztyno 2016.



## Practical aspects concerning the safety of religious celebrations

Religious celebrations are specific meetings of many people with a religious goal, which is prayer, getting closer to the Absolute, which is God, and participation in a religious community.

There is no doubt that when it comes to the safety of religious celebrations, we are talking about a social group characterised by:

- the presence of more than two people;
- the occurrence of interactions between its members;
- the awareness of belonging to a specific group;
- preference for the same or similar system of values, symbols, and attitudes;
- having an internal structure that determines the positions and social roles of interconnected people;
- the creation of norms, specific values, rules of conduct and patterns;
- the behaviour of group members and their compliance.

It is in the generally understood social interest that actions taken to ensure the safety of participants at religious ceremonies are, above all, feasible but also carried out efficiently. Feasibility depends on situational and dispositional capabilities. Situational opportunity is created by the environment in which the religious ceremony is performed. Other conditions accompany particular types of religious meetings which can be divided according to the following criteria:<sup>12</sup>

- availability of places where religious gatherings may take place;

- accessibility of the gathering for its participants;
- characteristic use of places for religious meetings;
- types of buildings where religious gatherings are held;
- cultural significance of places and facilities used for religious gatherings;
- size of the religious gathering;
- the degree of organisation of the participants of the religious gathering;
- level of threat to religious gatherings;
- scale of interest in religious gatherings.

Situational potential is also created by the social environment; here, mainly caused by the reactive participants of the ceremony, often unprepared to demonstrate appropriate behaviour in the face of potential threats.

Dispositional capacity is created by knowledge, skills, efficiency, and strength, as well as the motivation of members of the organisational, management, and medical staff. Following from the conduct of this research and in the opinion of the experts interviewed, it can be concluded that all entities responsible for the safety of participants in religious ceremonies must be properly prepared. This preparation should take the form of realistic exercises resembling the conditions anticipated in the action plan.

Rational preparation for religious ceremonies must be accompanied by an awareness of potential threats, including their causes and effects as well as their frequency of occurrence, which allows for risk management and, consequently, for making the security team more resistant to any threat such that it cannot develop from being potential to real in

12 B. Szacka, *Wprowadzenie do socjologii*, Warszawa 2003, p. 183–188.

form. Research shows that these threats are numerous, have a diverse nature and can be classified as threats to both general and public security.

Taking the above into account, it is right to recognise that the essential determinants of the safety of religious celebrations include the type of religious meeting, the profile of its participants, and threats to the safety of both the celebrations and their participants.

In the organisation of security at religious ceremonies, it is possible to identify three stages: a preparation stage (including defining a clear goal of the operation, planning consisting in defining the tasks for individual bodies cooperating with each other, preparing the security and medical services of the Church and the equipment, i.e. tools and rooms that these services will use); an implementation stage (actions, including cooperation, in accordance with the plan); and a control stage (assessment of the implementation of the tasks and the degree to which the goal was achieved, as well as drawing conclusions).

Properly organised religious celebrations require close cooperation between the organiser, which is the Church, and external bodies.

Cooperation is mainly based on mutual exchange of information regarding both preparations and the current situation during the religious gathering. According to experts, large religious ceremonies are preceded by the creation of interdisciplinary teams, which include representatives of the voivode, his subordinate institutions, and a representative of the Church. It is good practice to appoint a representative of the Church

from among people who understand the essence of security operations. It would be advisable for such a person to be the equivalent of the security manager of the given religious gathering. Such a person not only represents the Church, but also has appropriate knowledge, skills, and experience related to the safety of public gatherings, including mass events. According to most experts, it is advisable for the security manager to understand the specific nature of the activities of the institutions with which the Church is cooperating in ensuring the safety of a religious gathering.

Safety problems for participants in the celebrations in question are mainly related to cooperation. In the context of the above, it should be noted that the smaller the religious gathering, the lower its rank and media importance, the less effectively can the cooperation between security bodies be assessed. In extreme cases, there is a lack of cooperation.

Lack of cooperation occurs when the Church as the organiser of a religious gathering does not inform the relevant organisations that should receive this information by law (e.g. the obligation to request permission for the use of a public road in a special way).

Failure to provide information about a planned religious gathering or the lack of required arrangements often results either from a clergyman's ignorance of the need to take such steps or from the belief that such arrangements are not necessary because in a given local community there is consent or custom for this, and that there is no other way of performing the religious activity. Often, arrangements are made, but not on a formal basis,

rather in unofficial conversations held between the clergyman and a representative of the institution responsible for road safety on a given public road.

The source of problems for bodies cooperating in the sphere of security at religious celebrations is the clergyman's belief that he himself will be able to perfectly ensure the safety of the religious gathering he is leading.

It is often the case that clergymen do not want to delegate their powers regarding the safety of a religious gathering to another person competent in this area. The lack of preparation of the clergyman to act in a situation where there is a threat and the failure to organise security for a religious gathering result in the reluctance of non-church entities to cooperate with them. The biggest problem occurs when a clergyman tries to impose his will on external bodies in the belief he is infallible.

The above problem could be solved if the clergyman had the support of a security manager with appropriate knowledge, skills, and experience in ensuring security. Such a person, being on the one hand a member of a religious community representing the Church, would, on the other hand, also understand the external bodies cooperating with the Church.

## Concept of safety at religious celebrations

Contemporary conditions for the safety of participants at religious ceremonies are extremely complex and require thorough research.

As the basis for this research, a concept may be adopted that can be

perceived as a product taking into account logically related elements connected to:

- medical, sanitary, and hygienic requirements;
- requirements from the realm of public safety and order;
- public security requirements;
- obligations of the organisers;
- possibility of support from state institutions;
- possibility of support from non-governmental organisations.

It is obvious that this concept should be based on the findings that: the safety of participants at religious ceremonies is mainly determined by the nature of the ceremonies and the risks associated with them, the legal requirements applicable to their organisation, and the possibility of support for the organisers of these ceremonies from state institutions and non-governmental organizations, in particular:

- the safety of religious celebrations is closely related to the level of uncertainty, threats, and risks associated with their organisation;
- the essential determinants of the safety of religious ceremonies are their type, the profile of the participants, and threats to the safety of participants;
- organisation of national religious celebrations involves those regulations related to entrusting responsibility for ensuring security to the Church, and in the case of international celebrations to state institutions responsible for internal security;
- previous experience related to ensuring the safety of participants at

religious ceremonies indicates the possibility of using solutions employed during the organisation of public meetings and mass events to the extent specified by the sources of generally applicable law and those regulating the issues of relations between the state and the Catholic Church;

- the concept of ensuring the safety of participants at religious ceremonies should be based on the applicable legal framework and include proposals for solutions in the areas of medical, sanitary, and hygienic security, public safety and order, general security, as well as support for the organisers' activities originating from state institutions and non-governmental organisations.

The concept should pay particular attention to the necessity of appointing a person to the position of security manager who would have broadly understood competences to manage security as part of the religious ceremony. Moreover, attention is drawn to the importance of the proper organisation of activities undertaken to ensure security and the need to cooperate between the Church Party – as the organiser – and non-Church Parties representing state institutions and non-governmental organisations.

It should be remembered that well-organised joint operations (cooperation) bear the hallmarks of teamwork; this contributes not only to the achievement of the intended effect, but also produces a synergistic effect, thanks to which collective action may be considered successful, because the effects of the actions exceed those envisaged.

A well-organised team activity carried out in this way gains the value of success, and thus influences the building of respect for the Church institution and the institutions and organisations supporting it, deepens social trust, contributes to an improvement in the sense of security and an increase in the level of real security, which in all respects is valued and socially desirable.

## Conclusions

Religious celebrations are special types of gatherings, and their safety is closely related to the level of uncertainty, threats, and risks associated with their occurrence. To ensure the safety of religious celebrations, they should be properly organised and based on a risk analysis aimed at the greatest possible reduction of any uncertainty. The action plan should take into account cooperation between all properly prepared bodies that are important for the safety of religious celebrations.

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# EVOLUTION OF POLISH MILITARY MISSIONS ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE POLISH MILITARY CONTINGENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE IN AFGHANISTAN. PART 1

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## Abstract

The Polish Armed Forces (Polish Armed Forces) have been participating in military missions since 1953. By 2023, Polish Armed Forces soldiers had actively participated in 92 missions around the world. These missions were of an observational, peace-keeping, humanitarian, police, war, stabilization, and training nature. A series of two articles will present the basic principles of NATO, UN and EU military missions, the history of selected Polish military missions, the idea of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), and the evolution of the Polish Military Contingent of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF PKW) in Afghanistan. The articles will also include the results of scientific research by G. Piątkiewicz obtained for his doctoral dissertation entitled. "Socio- Occupational Inclusion of International

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Soldiers in Afghanistan,” presenting the characteristics of Polish soldiers participating in the 9th quota of the PKW ISAF in Afghanistan. The first article presents the basic premises of military missions and the history of selected Polish military missions.

## Key words

Military missions, Polish Military Contingent, Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, Afghanistan, international security



## Introduction

The development of the Polish army is the only way to ensure the security not only of its citizens, but also of Europe as a whole. Safety for the state is one of the greatest values, it constitutes its strength, thanks to which it is perceived as a stable and trustworthy international partner. The current events on Poland's eastern border are the biggest test for Polish soldiers since the mission in Afghanistan. The Polish Military Contingent of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan ended their duty on December 04, 2014. A large part of the public has no knowledge of the successes, sacrifices, hardships, and price Polish soldiers had to pay for serving in the structures of the International Security Assistance Force<sup>1</sup>.

The Polish Armed Forces, as the most important link in the state defense system, participate in the implementation of defense policy and national security. The primary function of the Armed Forces is to protect the independence of the state and its territory. According to the military oath, "I, a soldier of the Polish Army, swear to serve faithfully the Republic of Poland, to defend its independence and borders. Guard the Constitution, uphold the honor of the Polish soldier, defend the military banner. For the cause of my Homeland in times of need, spare neither your own blood nor your life.

So help me God", Polish soldiers are obliged to make boundless sacrifices for the Fatherland. On the basis of the quoted oath, the tasks and role of Polish soldiers could be defined, if it were not for the fact that in addition to carrying out tasks on the territory of the country, they also take an active part in military missions around the world.

The Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland have been participating in military missions since 1953. Until 2023, they actively participated in 92 missions of different nature, all over the world<sup>2</sup>. These missions were of an observation, peacekeeping, humanitarian, police, war, stabilization, and training nature. Foreign military missions are carried out especially during times of emergencies in countries where the political and military situation is unstable. In many cases, this is the only effective way to ensure the safety of the civilian population, provide humanitarian aid, rebuild state structures, resolve existing armed conflicts, or stabilize the situation in the country on an ad hoc basis<sup>3</sup>. It should be noted that if it were not for the consistent and systematic expansion of the Armed Forces, as well as the permanent presence of U.S. troops in Poland, perhaps today the country would be in a situation where NATO countries would be carrying out mandated tasks<sup>4</sup>, on a military mission basis.

1 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Międzynarodowe Siły Wsparcia Bezpieczeństwa.

2 *Misje*, <https://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/misje> (access: 20.09.2023 r.).

3 J. Barcik, *Europejska Polityka bezpieczeństwa i obrony. Aspekty prawne i polityczne*, Bydgoszcz–Katowice 2008, p. 117.

4 Zadania mandatowe: nałożone na kontyngenty wojskowe prawne zobowiązania, celem ich realizacji.

## Basic assumptions of military missions

The most important and largest international organizations established by law are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). These organizations are involved in and responsible for, among other things, preparing, planning, and carrying out military international missions.

Based on the available literature, the definition of a military mission is presented as follows “an extremely important task to be fulfilled by representing a state or organization for a special purpose in a foreign country”<sup>5</sup>. The fundamental purposes of military missions abroad include:

- fulfilling allied commitments and military cooperation;
- defense of national interests against external threats by eliminating sources of crises and extinguishing conflicts;
- building a stable security environment;
- preventing humanitarian disasters and responding to situations that violate human rights;
- strengthening international security institutions and organizations<sup>6</sup>.

Two basic types of missions can be distinguished, i.e. a special (peacekeep-

ing) mission and a military (stabilization) mission. Special (peacekeeping) mission is a selected, appropriately chosen, and prepared group of civilian experts and soldiers, sent by one of the countries that are part of the organization, for a specified period of time to the other country. The main idea of a special mission is to conduct negotiations on specific issues or perform tasks under agreements between states<sup>7</sup>. A prerequisite for conducting a special mission is the consent of the host state.<sup>8</sup>

Military (stabilization) mission, on the other hand, are military contingents that, by definition, are sent to the region of operation at the invitation of the other country (this principle did not apply, for example, in Iraq and Afghanistan). This type of mission is aimed at fulfilling strictly defined objectives and advisory, auxiliary, or combat tasks. The military contingent performs the tasks received, among other things, in a controlling or peacekeeping manner<sup>9</sup>. Military missions are multifaceted in nature, with economic, social, cultural, and political activities also integrated into their structure. Therefore, due to their diverse nature, and different objectives, a detailed division can be made. Eight types have been distinguished, and these are presented in table 1.

5 A. Karwowski (red.), *Leksykon PWN*, Warsaw 1972, p. 718.

6 <https://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/misje/> (access: 21.09.2023 r.).

7 E. J. Osmańczyk, *Encyklopedia ONZ i stosunków międzynarodowych*, Warsaw 1986, p. 34.

8 See: M. Feltynowski, M. Zawistowski, *Threats related to the use of unmanned systems in emergency services*, “Safety & Fire Technology” 2018, Volume 51, p. 138-149.

9 R. Bierzanek, J. Symonides, *Prawo międzynarodowe publiczne*, Warsaw 2008, p. 171-172.

**Table 1.** Types of military missions.

MILITARY MISSIONS		
Lp.	Type	Target
1.	<b>Commission</b>	aims to investigate, control, and supervise certain activities in foreign territory
2.	<b>Observational</b>	aims to observe, monitor activities, and inform the public about their progress
3.	<b>Peaceful</b>	aims at peacekeeping, peacemaking, forcing peace and peace building
4.	<b>Humanitarian</b>	is aimed at providing assistance to the population in difficult situations, such as as a result of warfare or natural disaster
5.	<b>Police</b>	police officers take part in it
6.	<b>War</b>	activities conducted in the territory covered by the state of war, forces take part in combat
7.	<b>Stabilization</b>	is aimed at peacekeeping, in addition to military tasks, includes political, economic, social, and cultural issues, civil-military cooperation is key
8.	<b>Training</b>	mission to train local uniformed services to carry out operations in their own areas.

Źródło: Opracowano na podstawie G. Piątkiewicz, *Inkluzja Społecznozawodowa żołnierzy International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) w Afganistanie*, Krakow 2013, p. 38.

It often happens that military missions, depending on the situation, occurring in a country carry out tasks combining two types of missions, for example, on the basis of a stabilization and training mission. Such an example is PKW ISAF in Afghanistan. It was a mission that had a peacekeeping-warfare character, which was due to the complicated nature of the mission.

The Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland carry out tasks outside the

country within the structures of organizations: NATO, UN, and the EU. According to NATO's treaty provisions, military missions have the task of mitigating, preventing, reducing, and ending hostilities that occur between or within states. NATO's mediation is aimed at restoring and maintaining peace, through peaceful, organized, and guided intervention, using military, police, or civilian personnel<sup>10</sup>. Since the 1990s, the North Atlantic

<sup>10</sup> W.E. Gliman, D.E. Herold, *Peacekeeping Challenges to Euro-Atlantic Security*, Roma 1994, p. 21.

Alliance has been the largest and most important element influencing the stabilization of the geopolitical situation in the Euro-Atlantic region. The development of NATO has contributed to participation in a number of peacekeeping operations under the leadership of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the UN. The course taken by NATO has contributed to the assumption of responsibilities that go beyond the Washington Treaty<sup>11</sup>. The additional responsibilities can be mainly classified as increasing the alliance's range of tasks by, among other things, conducting missions outside the territory of member states. With this approach, NATO naturally evolved and unprecedentedly went beyond the typical activities of a collective self-defense organization, thus assuming the role of a collective security organization. This was expressed in the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation of November 08, 1991. To make NATO's broader activities with countries outside the alliance as effective as possible, international cooperation was expanded, particularly through the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EACP)<sup>12</sup>. In 1992, NATO became involved in supporting peacekeeping operations carried out by the UN or OSCE. As a result of these decisions, the scope of NATO's military tasks once again expanded by, among

other things, intensifying its involvement and support of the UN or OSCE (so-called "Peacekeeping"). NATO's continued evolution has contributed to the official adoption of a new term: Peace Support Operation (PSO)<sup>13</sup>. This term defines all types of military activity while supporting the UN or OSCE. It can include NATO's direction of operations, preparation, commitment of dedicated forces and resources also Alliance's current capabilities.

The United Nations has the legal ability to take action using military, economic, as well as political tools. The UN can carry out the imposed actions independently, that is, it does not matter who is a party to the conflict (member or non-member states)<sup>14</sup>. Thanks to this, in order to restore peace, the Security Council at any time can take action appropriate to the situation at hand. It is important that the states that are part of the UN member structures are obliged to immediately abandon actions taken in self-defense and to submit to the recommendations of the Security Council when it decides to do so<sup>15</sup>.

The European Union, on the other hand, is an organization that can organize operations in areas that include rescue and humanitarian missions, peacekeeping, as well as armed crisis management missions (including peacemaking, the so-called Petersberg missions). The EU carries out its missions within the framework of the Treaty on

11 See: *United Nations Peacekeeping Operation. Principles and Guidelines*, New York 2008.

12 [www.ms.gov.pl/EUSEC,RD,Congo,\(EU,Mission,for,security,reform,in,the,Democratic,Republic,of,Congo\),29553.html](http://www.ms.gov.pl/EUSEC,RD,Congo,(EU,Mission,for,security,reform,in,the,Democratic,Republic,of,Congo),29553.html) (access: 20.04.2022 r.).

13 *AJP-3.4.1 Peace Support Operations*, <http://www.osrh.hr/smvo/Library/ajp-3.4.1.pdf> (access: 24.04.2022 r.).

14 J. Menkes, *Prawnomiędzynarodowe uwarunkowania powoływania i działania misji ONZ*, Warsaw 1993, p. 11.

15 L. Łukaszuk, A. Skowroński, *Międzynarodowe prawo pokoju i bezpieczeństwa*, Warsaw 1999, p. 224.

European Union. The treaty, in a way, constitutes a constitution for the member states and implies in Article III-210 an expansion of the catalog to include military advisory and support missions, conflict prevention, armed missions directed at post-conflict stabilization, and disarmament activities. The EU has also agreed to participate in operations to combat and fight terrorism in all member countries, as well as third countries<sup>16</sup>. Since 2003 the EU has actively participated in military and civilian operations, an important component of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), including the IRINI mission. This mission is carried out from Italian territory. The headquarters is located in Rome while the tasks of ensuring monitoring of illegal smuggling of, among other things, people and weapons are carried out by the Polish Military Contingent from the Sigonella base located in Sicily.

## History of selected Polish military missions

The subject of the participation of Polish soldiers in foreign missions since their inception in 1953, in the civilian environment has aroused a lot of negative emotions. The mission that aroused the most controversy was the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. In conducted

surveys on the legitimacy of the participation of NATO soldiers in the ISAF mission, there was a noticeable gradual decline in public support for this mission<sup>17</sup>. However, when in mid-2021 NATO completely withdrew troops from Afghanistan, there was a great deal of talk in the media and among the public indicating that the decision had been made too hastily. As it turned out, the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan led to the fact that the Afghan government is only built on paper and is unable to provide security for the Afghan people. In addition, radical Taliban militant groups have seized power in Afghanistan. At the moment there is total lawlessness, human rights do not apply, and 15.3 million people suffer from hunger<sup>18</sup>. There is no denying that current events in Afghanistan make one reflect on whether the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan the right decision was. In turn, there is no denying that for the Polish Armed Forces, the mission in Afghanistan was a kind of springboard, thanks to which the Polish Army significantly increased its combat capabilities.

However, before discussing the evolution of the Armed Forces on the example of the ISAF military mission, Table 2 shows the history of selected foreign military missions in which Polish soldiers have participated.

16 A. Demkowicz, *Integracja Europy zachodniej w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa i obronności od EWO do WEPBiO*, Toruń 2007, p. 191-192.

17 G. Piątkiewicz, *Inkluzja Społecznozawodowa żołnierzy International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) w Afganistanie*, Kraków 2021, p. 78-80.

18 <https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/afganistan-dwa-lata-po-przejeciu-wladzy-przez-talibow-w-kraju-panuje-glod> (access: 01.10.2023 r.).

**Table 2** Military missions of the Polish Armed Forces

Lp.	Period	Place of operations	Mission name	Mission Objective	Number of soldiers	Personal losses incurred
1.	since 1953 until 1995	Korea	<b>UN NNSC</b> Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission	<b>COMMISSION</b> Overseeing compliance with peace provisions and supporting military doctors at the Polish Red Cross hospital in North Korea.	1065	<b>3 soldiers, including 3 of-ficers</b>
2.	since 1954 until 1976	Vietnam Laos Cambodia	<b>UN ICSCIC</b> International Commission for Supervision and Control Indo China.	<b>COMMISSION</b> Control of the regrouping of troops, vigilance of border lines, control of the process of releasing prisoners of war, supervision of ports and airports for the supply of weapons to parties to conflicts.	2500	no
3.	since 1968 until 1970	Nigeria	<b>UN OTN</b> Observers Team to Nigeria (International Observers Group)	<b>OBSERVER</b> investigating the legitimacy of genocide charges against the Nigerian government.	5	no
4.	1973 to 1976	Vietnam	<b>UN ICCS</b> International Commission for Control and Supervision.	<b>COMMISSION</b> Control of compliance with the cease-fire in the South Vietnamese area, control of the complete withdrawal of US troops and their allies, dismantling of military bases, supervision of the transfer of prisoners of war by the warring parties.	650	no

Lp.	Period	Place of operations	Mission name	Mission Objective	Number of soldiers	Personal losses incurred
5.	1973 to 1979	Egypt	<b>UN UNEF II</b> Second United Nations Emergency Force.	<b>PEACEKEEPING</b> To carry out logistical tasks in support of the mission's operational units stationed in the buffer zone located east of the Suez Canal.	11067	no
6.	since 1974 until 2009	Israel Syria	<b>UN UNDOF</b> United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UN Separation of Forces Surveillance Force).	<b>PEACEKEEPING</b> Protection of civilians and UN staff, patrolling the designated buffer zone, separating Israeli and Syrian troops, and maintaining out-posts.	9540	<b>1 soldier, of which 1 non-commissioned officer</b>
7.	since 1988 until 1990	Iran Iraq	<b>UN UNIIMOG</b> United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (United Nations Military Observer Group)	<b>OBSERVER</b> Performing oversight of compliance with the cease-fire and the withdrawal of all forces beyond internationally recognized borders.	45	no
8.	since 1989 until 1990	Namibia	<b>UN UNTAG</b> United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UN Transition Assistance Group for Namibia)	<b>PEACEKEEPING</b> Transportation of people, construction materials, equipment, and food to the camp and peacekeeping positions, securing the operation of camps and vehicles of multinational troops, Management of the Central Supply Depot.	373	no

Lp.	Period	Place of operations	Mission name	Mission Objective	Number of soldiers	Personal losses incurred
9.	since 1990 until 1991	Afghanistan Pakistan	<b>UN OSGAP</b> Office of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Pakistan  (Office of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Pakistan)	<b>OBSERVER</b> Assistance in implementing policy solutions and activities to improve the quality of life of the civilian population.	2	no
10.	since 1990 until 1991	Saudi Arabia	<b>UN RIP</b> Operation Desert Storm  (Operation Desert Storm).	<b>HUMANITARY</b> Securing coalition forces during Operation Desert Shield.	393	no
11.	since 1991 until 1993	Afghanistan Pakistan	<b>UN UNGOMAP</b> United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan  (UN Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan)	<b>OBSERVER</b> Overseeing compliance with agreements on resolving the situation in Afghanistan, investigating, and reporting possible violations of any of the agreements' provisions.	1	no
12.	since 1991 until 1992	Cambodia	<b>UN UNAMIC</b> United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia  (United Nations Preparatory Mission in Cambodia)	<b>OBSERVER</b> Developing the premises and preparing the ground for the country's first democratic elections.	2	no



Lp.	Period	Place of operations	Mission name	Mission Objective	Number of soldiers	Personal losses incurred
13.	since 1991 until 2003	Kuwait Iraq	<b>UN UNICOM</b> United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (United Nations Observer Mission in Iraq and Kuwait)	<b>OBSERVER</b> conducting surveillance along the Iraq-Kuwait border to deter violations and hostile actions.	56	no
14.	since 1991 until 1993	Iraq	<b>UN UNGCI</b> United Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq (United Nations Guard contingent in Iraq).	<b>POLICY</b> Ensuring a safe working environment for civilian components of the program and during the distribution of food and medical supplies by humanitarian organizations.	62	no
15.	since 1991 to -----	Western Sahara	<b>UN MINURSO</b> United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara)	<b>OBSERVER</b> observance of ceasefire.	27	no
16.	since 1991 until 1998	Iraq	<b>UN UNSCOM</b> United Nations Special Commission (United Nations Special Commission)	<b>OBSERVER</b> Monitoring the implementation of the provisions on the disarmament of Iraq from weapons of mass destruction.	8	no

Lp.	Period	Place of operations	Mission name	Mission Objective	Number of soldiers	Personal losses incurred
17.	since 1992 until 2009	Lebanon	<b>UN UNIFIL</b> United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon).	<b>PEACEKEEPING</b> Monitoring the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, Restoration of international peace and security, Helping the Lebanese government restore effective power.	9000	<b>7 soldiers, of which 1 officer</b> 6 non-commissioned officers
18.	since 1992 until 1995	Croatia Bosnia and Herzegovina Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) Macedonia	<b>UN UNPROFOR</b> United Nations Protection Force (United Nations Protection Force).	<b>PEACEKEEPING, OBSERVER</b> Convoying humanitarian aid transports, Patrolling the designated area, Ensuring the safety of the civilian population.	3867	<b>7 soldiers, including: 2 officers</b> 3 non-commissioned officers 2 ranks
19.	since 1995 until 1996	Croatia	<b>UN UNCRO</b> United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (United Nations Operation Restore Confidence)	<b>PEACEKEEPING</b> Assistance with the implementation of an economic agreement, monitoring of the borders between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, assistance with the delivery of humanitarian aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina through Croatian territory, and supervision of the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula.	1245	no

Lp.	Period	Place of operations	Mission name	Mission Objective	Number of soldiers	Personal losses incurred
20.	since 1992 until 1993	Cambodia	<b>UN UNTAC</b> United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (United Nations Interim Administration in Cambodia)	<b>PEACEKEEPING</b> activities related to defending human rights, organizing, and holding elections, maintaining order and security related to the return of refugees and rebuilding infrastructure in Cambodia.	1254	no
21.	since 1994 until 2009	Georgia	<b>UN UNOMIG</b> United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia)	<b>OBSERVER</b> Supervise the implementation of ceasefire and military separation agreement between opposing parties, observe the activities of the peacekeeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Patrolling security zones, Monitoring the withdrawal of forces of the Republic of Georgia from the Kodori Valley.	26	no
22.	since 1994 until 1994	Haiti	UN MNF Multinational Forces (Multinational Force)	<b>PEACEKEEPING</b> Restoring stability in Haiti.	56	no

Lp.	Period	Place of operations	Mission name	Mission Objective	Number of soldiers	Personal losses incurred
23.	since 1995 until 1996	Tajikistan	<b>UN UNMOT</b> United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (United Nations Observer Mission in Tajikistan)	<b>OBSERVER</b> Supervision of the implementation of the Agreement on Temporary Ceasefire and Termination of Other Hostile Activities on the Tajik Afghan border and inside the country for the duration of the settlement talks.	24	no
24.	since 1995 until 1996	Bosnia and Herzegovina	<b>NATO IFOR</b> Implementation Force (international military forces)	<b>PEACEKEEPING</b> securing elections in September 1996, Ensure the security of civilians and international forces, demilitarize the subordinated region. Staffing of checkpoints and checkpoints, humanitarian aid support.	931	no
25.	since 1996 until 2004	Bosnia and Herzegovina	<b>NATO SFOR</b> Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Stabilization forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina)	<b>PEACEKEEPING</b> Identifying threats to public order and advising law enforcement agencies on their ability to deal with these threats, Assisting law enforcement personnel in carrying out their duties.	3260	no

Lp.	Period	Place of operations	Mission name	Mission Objective	Number of soldiers	Personal losses incurred
26.	since 1999 until 1999	Albania	<b>NATO AFOR</b> NATO's Albanian Force (humanitarian aid mission to refugees)	<b>HUMANITARY</b> Building tent camps, distributing supplies to refugees and exiles, and ensuring camp security.	140	no
27.	since 1999 until now	Kosovo	<b>NATO KFOR</b> Kosovo Force (NATO international peace-keeping force).	<b>PEACEKEEPING</b> Ensuring public safety and order, Stopping the resurgence of conflict within Kosovo, Enforcing the implementation of the agreements under which the conflict ended.	3000	no
28.	since 2001 until 2003	Macedonia	<b>NATO PMC Allied Harmony</b> Polish Military Contingent (Polish Military Contingent „Allied Harmony“).	<b>PEACEKEEPING</b> Protecting European Union and OSCE observers and patrolling the designated area as part of the Field Liaison Teams.	50	no
29.	since 2002 until 2007	Afghanistan	<b>NATO PMC Enduring Freedom</b> Polish Military Contingent Enduring Freedom (Polish Military Contingent „Enduring Freedom“)	<b>PEACEKEEPING, COMBATTING</b> Reconstruction of the base's infrastructure, airport, and the city, Demining the area around the base, securing coalition troops in the event of a chemical attack, logistical security of Polish and international troops.	1340	no

Lp.	Period	Place of operations	Mission name	Mission Objective	Number of soldiers	Personal losses incurred
30.	since 2003 until 2008	Iraq	<b>NATO</b> <b>Iraqi Freedom</b> („Iraqi Freedom“)	<b>COMBATTING, STABILIZATION</b> overseeing the restoration of order and security, rebuilding and securing infrastructure, protecting important civilian and military points, patrolling designated areas, assisting in the training of Iraqi Security Forces, detecting, and destroying weapons of mass destruction and arsenals of other types.	15700	<b>22 soldiers, including 6 officers</b> 8 non-commissioned officers 8 terraced  <b>150 injured</b>
31.	since 2004 until 2004	Greece	<b>NATO</b> <b>Distinguished Games</b> („Noble Games“).	<b>HUMANITARY</b> Chemical protection of the Athens Summer Olympics.	52	no
32.	since 2004 to ----	Bosnia and Herzegovina	<b>EU</b> <b>EUFOR Althea</b> European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (European Union Forces)	<b>PEACEKEEPING</b> Ensuring the security of the population and protecting the borders.	5850	no
33.	since 2005 until 2006	Pakistan	<b>NATO</b> <b>SWIFT RELIEF</b> („Rapid Relief“)	<b>HUMANITARY</b> Construction of drinking water intakes, providing humanitarian aid,  Reconstruction of damaged infrastructure.	140	no

Lp.	Period	Place of operations	Mission name	Mission Objective	Number of soldiers	Personal losses incurred
34.	since 2005 until 2017	Mediterranean Sea	<b>NATO</b> <b>ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR</b> („Sustained Effort”).	<b>STABILIZATION</b> Monitoring ships and inspecting them, if necessary, Preventing smuggling of people and goods, preventing terrorism.	664 (sailors only)	no
35.	since 2006 until 2006	Congo	<b>EU</b> <b>EUFOR</b> European Union Force (European Union Forces)	<b>PEACEKEEPING</b> Protecting parliamentary and presidential elections.	136	no
36.	since 2006 until 2017	Estonia Lithuania Latvia	<b>NATO</b> <b>PMC Orlik</b> Polish Military Contingent Orlik (Polish Military Contingent „Orlik”)	<b>PEACEKEEPING</b> protection of the airspace of the Baltic States	600	no
37.	as of 2007 until 2014	Afghanistan	<b>NATO</b> <b>ISAF</b> International Security Assistance Force (International Security Assistance Force)	<b>PEACEKEEPING, COMBATTING</b> Providing security and support to civilians, working with the Afghan National Army, patrolling, and controlling, training the Afghan army and police, Helping to rebuild the country's infrastructure, Reconstruction and demining of areas around the bases.	28000	<b>44 were killed, including 4 officers</b> 15 non-commissioned officers 24 ranks 1 civilian employee  <b>361 injured</b>

<b>Lp.</b>	<b>Period</b>	<b>Place of operations</b>	<b>Mission name</b>	<b>Mission Objective</b>	<b>Number of soldiers</b>	<b>Personal losses incurred</b>
38.	as of 2008 until 2009	Chad	<b>EU EUFOR</b> European Union Force (European Union Forces)	<b>PEACEKEEPING</b> Cooperation with the civilian population and local authorities, Securing humanitarian convoys.	730	no
39.	as of 2013 until 2014	Small	<b>EU EUTM Mali</b> European Union Training Mission in Mali (European Union training mission to Mali)	<b>TRAINING</b> Training of Malian soldiers in logistics and Participation in mine protection of the base.	20	no
40.	as of 2014 until 2017	Central African Republic	<b>EU EUFOR CAR</b> European Union Force (European Union Forces)	<b>PEACEKEEPING</b> Patrolling designated areas in Bangui, training and assisting local police forces in the methods of conducting criminal proceedings and investigative activities.	110	no
41.	as of 2014 to ----	Afghanistan	<b>NATO RSM</b> Resolute Support (Training, Advice and Support)	<b>TRAINING</b> Preparing the command of the Afghan Security Forces to lead and manage independently and professionally in a way that effectively provides security in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,	900	no



Lp.	Period	Place of operations	Mission name	Mission Objective	Number of soldiers	Personal losses incurred
42.	as of 2016 until 2018	Kuwait	<b>NATO OIR</b> Operation Inherent Resolve (Military intervention against the Islamic State of Iraq)	<b>TRAINING</b> conducting reconnaissance by F-16s in support of international coalition troops.	150	no
43.	as of 2016 to ----	Iraq	<b>NATO OIR</b> Operation Inherent Resolve (Military intervention against the Islamic State)	<b>TRAINING</b> advising and training the staffs and subunits of Iraqi special forces.	60	no
44.	as of 2017 to ----	Latvia	<b>NATO eFP</b> enhanced Forward Presence (enhanced Extended Presence)	<b>OBSERVER</b> A real increase in NATO's defense and deterrence capabilities on the eastern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance	170	no
45.	as of 2017 to ----	Romania	<b>NATO eFP</b> enhanced Forward Presence (enhanced Extended Presence)	<b>OBSERVER</b> A real increase in NATO's defense and deterrence capabilities on the eastern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance	230	no

Lp.	Period	Place of operations	Mission name	Mission Objective	Number of soldiers	Personal losses incurred
46.	as of 2018 until 2020	Italy	<b>EU</b> <b>EU SOPHIA</b> European Union (European Union military operation)	<b>PEACEKEEPING</b> Carry out activities to reduce illegal smuggling of people and goods to Europe, support Libyan naval security forces in training and implementation of activities to reduce illegal immigration	400	no
47.	As of 2019 to -----	Lebanon	<b>UN</b> <b>UNIFIL</b> United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon).	<b>PEACEKEEPING</b> Protecting civilians, monitoring the Israeli Lebanese border, supporting the Lebanese government in maintaining peace and security	200	
48.	as of 2020 to -----	Italy	<b>EU</b> <b>EU IRINI</b> European Union (European Union military operation)	<b>PEACEKEEPING</b> Enforcing the UN arms embargo, using air, satellite, and naval assets	62	
49.	as of 2020 to -----	Turkey	<b>NATO</b> Adapting the Means of Strengthening the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.	<b>PEACEKEEPING</b> Increasing the presence of airborne warning systems, activity of naval forces and conducting reconnaissance activities	80	no

Źródło: Opracowano na podstawie G. Piątkiewicz, *Inkluzja Społecznozawodowa żołnierzy...*, p.38-48.

Analyzing the table presented, it should be noted that Polish soldiers participated in military missions on all continents. The most dangerous ones include Afghanistan,

Iraq, Lebanon, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Syria, and Korea. In the above-mentioned missions, 83 Polish soldiers and one military employee were killed.

## Summary

The participation of Polish soldiers in missions, during which they repeatedly took part in combat operations tasked with, among other things, eliminating weapons depots and terrorist training centers, undoubtedly influenced the professionalism of the Polish Army, thus contributing to the security of Poland. Currently, Polish soldiers are also taking care of the protection of Poland's eastern border, using, among other things, the experience gained outside the country. The next article, which is a continuation of the scientific considerations undertaken, will present the evolution of the Polish Armed Forces on the example of the ISAF military mission.

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# LEADERSHIP IN TIMES OF CRISIS

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## Abstract

Crisis (greek: krisis) means a turning point, a breakthrough; decisive moment; a qualitative change of a system or in a system. In the theory of crisis, the system considered is an organism, an institution, an organization, including the society<sup>1</sup>. In the objective sense, it means „breaking” the existing system, consisting in changing its structure or function, or both elements together. In the ontological sense, however, a crisis is the cumulation of accumulated conflicts in various areas of social life. Conflicts, however, are ubiquitous and embedded in the very structure of society<sup>2</sup>. The term „crisis” has also a pragmatic meaning from a legal and organizational perspective. It is usually assumed that the crisis does not have to pose a significant threat to the security of a given entity in order to occur. However, it is important that it constitutes a challenge to take remedial steps in a situation that constitutes a violation of the basic values and interests of a given entity, generally recognized as worth being protected and defended. Hence, new challenges constantly appear, forcing both theoreticians and practitioners in the field of management to analyze existing situations, search for new solutions and implement various innovative preventive and stabilizing actions. This is where the role of leadership and the way it is performed in an organization becomes visible, which is what this article is about.

## Key words

Leadership, crisis, Covid-19, epidemic, organization

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1 See: *Słownik wyrazów obcych*, Warsaw 1980, s. 401.

2 R. Wróblewski, *Zarys teorii kryzysu, zagadnienia prewencji i zarządzania kryzysami*, Warsaw 1996, p. 10.

## Introduction

A crisis is one of the cycles in which society and economy function, and therefore affects all organizations operating within them. As often as not, a crisis is a set of events that disrupt regular functioning, occurring at an unspecified time and often leading to unforeseen events.<sup>3</sup> A crisis is a time that requires managers to make, often controversial, decisions; conduct activities in an undefined environment, and the decision-making process itself differs significantly from the standard one.<sup>4</sup> Very often, a crisis forces a manager to take risky actions and decisions that cover the entire sphere of life, both of the organization and the private functioning of the decision-maker. For this reason, it is necessary to continuously monitor the changes taking place, and the first signals of a crisis situation may be noticed in case of appropriate actions in the field of control and monitoring of tasks and processes, as well as an appropriate approach to enterprise management<sup>5</sup>. Possible to be noticed symptoms of the crisis include both financial aspects (decrease in profitability, increase in debt, loss of accounting liquidity, difficulties in financing current and development activities) and non-financial aspects (irrationality in employee's behaviour, intra-organizational conflicts, fear, resistance to changes,

crisis of means and methods of action, tension, struggle for power, undermining the authority of management)<sup>6</sup>. We should also bear in mind the diversity of crisis situations, which can be divided depending on the adopted criterion: according to the pace and duration of the crisis (sudden and chronic), according to the place and cause of the crisis (internal and external), according to the effects of the crisis (destructive and creative), according to the causes of crisis (real and virtual)<sup>7</sup>. The causes of the crisis may be various, from internal ones, eg. inappropriate strategy, employment, financial, technological, and organizational issues; to external ones, such as: social and legal changes, modification of the competitive environment or health aspects, like epidemics. Regardless of the typologies mentioned above, a crisis has three clearly defined phases: symptoms, escalation, and de-escalation. Therefore, theoretical assumptions regarding crisis management are widely developed and new solutions related to managing the threats resulting from crisis are proposed. Nevertheless, new challenges constantly arise, forcing both management theorists and practitioners to analyze existing situations, search for new solutions and implement various innovative preventive and stabilizing actions.

3 See: M. Feltynowski, M. Langer, *The role of EASer project in enhancing search and rescue teams performance*, "Safety & Fire Technology" 2019, Volume 53, Issue 1, p. 130-143.

4 M. Feltynowski, M. Zawistowski, *Threats related to the use of unmanned systems in emergency services*, "Safety & Fire Technology" 2018, Volume 51, p. 138-149.

5 M. Michałowska, D. Stankiewicz, W. Danielak, *Zarządzanie sytuacją kryzysową w przedsiębiorstwie, Współczesny kryzys finansowo-gospodarczy. Istota, przebieg i konsekwencje*, „Zeszyty Naukowe Polskiego Towarzystwa Ekonomicznego w Zielonej Górze” 2015, No. 2, p. 112.

6 Ibidem.

7 Ibidem.

## Leadership in organization

This is where the role of leadership and the way it is performed in the organization becomes visible. Appropriately developed and directed leadership – leadership behaviours are of the key importance for an organization operating in times of crisis, but also before it. Therefore, it is not surprising that attempts are justified to determine what type of leaders and what their behaviours are desired by organizations that have to operate in crisis conditions.

Following the above line of thought, we should first clarify who a leader is and how he should behave. This task, however, turns out not to be easy, even though in recent years the importance of the leadership phenomenon has increased significantly due to its popularization in many organizations that have recognized the role of leaders as an effective way of integrating organizational success factors and management functions. Leadership is an extremely interesting and multi-faceted phenomenon described in very different ways in the research literature.

One of the earliest and most general approaches is to view leadership as a process of influencing people aimed at achieving a goal<sup>8</sup>. Among the theories describing leadership, the main ones mentioned were: the theory of leadership traits – R. Blake and J. Mouton; the leadership style depending on the situation – F.E. Fiedler; situational leadership – P. Hersey and K. Blanchard;

emotional intelligence as a key feature of a leader – D. Goleman; leadership brand – D. Ulrich and N. Smallwood; as well as many other less popular concepts. Over the years, all theories regarding the essence of leadership have pointed to various aspects of this phenomenon, somehow automatically completing each other's deficiencies.

According to R. Griffin, leadership is nothing else but the leadership function, which, together with three other functions, such as planning, decision-making and organizing and controlling, makes up the process of managing an organization. Leadership itself is a set of processes used to induce organizational members to cooperate in the interest of the organization<sup>9</sup>. Leadership is therefore an integral part of the management process, but although there is a difference between management and leadership and these are slightly different concepts in modern organizations, the concept should be integrated with each other<sup>10</sup>. The leadership process involves setting organizational goals and providing far-reaching support to the activities of team members and the entire organization in achieving its goals. Therefore, it is about the influence of a leader who brings out in people everything that is necessary to achieve success. In case of treating leadership as a personal characteristic, the emphasis is on the personal characteristics attributed to leaders. The source of leadership is not necessarily a formal position in the organizational hierarchy but may be a position based on

8 R. M. Stogdill, *Leaders, membership, and organizations*, „Psychological Bulletin” 1950, No. 25, p. 3.

9 R. Griffin, *Podstawy zarządzania organizacjami*, Warsaw 1996, p. 45-50.

10 J. Stoner, R. Freeman, D. Gilbert, *Kierowanie*, Warsaw 1997, p. 21.

positive interactions such as sympathy, admiration, mutual respect, and trust. This strictly concerns the personality of the leader, his charisma, skills, but also competences that make other individuals want to follow the path indicated by the leader and create similar features in themselves.

## Theoretical aspects of the crisis

Referring such a perceived leadership to periods of crisis, the most important aspect is defining the fact of the crisis and assessing the degree of threat it brings. Such measurement may be based on various determinants and causative factors, however, the most important include the period of time in which the crisis-generating aspects are defined, the level of threat or the area they will cover.<sup>11</sup> In relations to the above issues, as part of the organization's activities, crisis management systems are designed in such way that they have a specific structure and answer the questions about the purpose of the activity, the direction of action, the entities covered by this activity and the instruments used within it. It will be up to leaders to recognize the identified threats as significant enough to be taken seriously by the organization<sup>12</sup>. It should also be remembered that crisis conditions seem to generate uncertainty at a level that usually means an adaptation strategy, which is tantamount to investing in specific capabilities<sup>13</sup>. The proper

selection of these capabilities is also the domain of leadership.

It is also worth emphasizing that the traditional approach to crisis management is based on the assumption that crisis management means waiting for the situation to deteriorate and then limiting the damage. A slightly more modern approach assumes that the set of organizational action plans should always be regulated, and managers should think about possible future events and be prepared to deal with the uncertainty in which they will perform their roles. Therefore, crisis management emphasizes the need to anticipate and prepare the organization to deal with problems of regular internal and external stresses, serious threats to the reputation, profitability, or life of the organization.

A crisis is sometimes defined as „a serious shock in an organization that is widely commented on in the media, and curious people influence the issue on ordinary activities and may have an impact on political, legal, financial and governmental organizations”. However, the crisis does not appear suddenly and is often a warning signal indicating potential problems. The crisis has an interesting parallel with the biological model. For example, Gowne Zalz-Hiro and Pratt suggested that crisis may be a mechanism similar to the process of birth, growth, maturity and decline, or the passing of death. In Chinese, the word „Vijay” (WEIJI) is equivalent to the word „crisis” and means risk and

11 A. Fellner, M. Feltynowski, R. Fellner, *Przygotowanie nawigacyjne bezzałogowych statków powietrznych do operacyjnych działań straży pożarnej*, „Zeszyty Naukowe SGSP” 2021, Volume 3, Issue 79, p. 51-82.

12 M. H. Bazerman, M. D. Watkins, *Zagrożenia do przewidzenia*, Gliwice 2006, p. 202.

13 H. Courtneym, J. Kirkland, P. Viguerue, *Strategia w warunkach niepewności*, [w:] *Zarządzanie w warunkach niepewności*, Gliwice 2006, p. 37.



opportunity<sup>14</sup>. In this perspective, crisis, along with appropriate leadership in the organization, is the embodiment of Sun-Tzu's words that „in the midst of chaos there is also an opportunity”.

Therefore, the crisis itself can be perceived as an opportunity both to verify the system – to change it, including to enrich it with solutions that have not been taken into account so far or seemed unrealistic to implement. The beginning of the path to dealing with the crisis can be found in three basic slogans: „reducing the likelihood of disruptions, shortening their duration and limiting their impact on key products and services”<sup>15</sup>. Reducing the negative impact on the organization's activities requires, in the first phase, defining the elements influencing their formation and excluding them from the system. It may mean shortening their duration (depending on the type of crisis) or reducing the problems we face.

## Transformational leadership

Transformational leadership involves individuals, leaders and followers who take their morality and motivation to higher levels through mutual engagement. It is therefore based on strongly interconnected and interdependent learning and mutual enrichment while achieving goals. This encourages taking up the challenge of self-improvement. It should be remembered that perfection is not given to man, therefore the only thing one can and should expect from

himself is progress. Leadership implementing the transformation function forced by the crisis can also be understood as a process of influencing others by achieving goals that become common and desirable. For this reason, the leader is the embodiment of the will of the team and his efforts should be aimed at achieving the common vision through cooperation based on adopted values and goals. Leadership is considered here in the context of a group. True leadership attracts others and cannot be based on manipulation, instructing or commanding. The most important area of a leader's influence on other participants of the organization is inspiring them and stimulating to survive in difficult times.

The inspiration comes from, among others, what the leader does and what he represents – the leader's attitudes and thinking patterns are key here. Of particular importance here will be the enthusiasm, creativity, entrepreneurship, sensitivity and perseverance of the leader, with which he should somehow infect others by shaping building patterns and attitudes in them. In addition, it will concern such issues as: the way of acting, making decisions, behaviour towards others, self-improvement and support of others, etc. Through inspiration and stimulation that energize employees, they can achieve better results both individually and as part of a team. As J.M. Burns pointed out, „the ultimate test of moral leadership is its ability to transcend the demands of

14 M. Karimi Mehr, R. Jahanian, *Crisis Management and Its Process in Organization*, “Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences” 2016, Vol 7 No 5, p. 143-148.

15 H. Hamidovic, *An Introduction to Crisis Management*, “ISACA Journal” 2012, Volume 5, p. 1.

countless everyday needs, desires and expectations”<sup>16</sup>.

Leadership should therefore motivate employees and discover their potential and stimulate to overcome barriers related to politics, bureaucracy or limited organizational resources, as well as eliminate the weaknesses and use the employee’s strengths. Leaders inspire and stimulate others to achieve better results that make a specific situation of the organization better. By motivating and inspiring, a transformational leader releases positive energy in his or her colleagues to act, and also awakens the need to inspire, stimulate and motivate. In general, this means showing faith in employees, propitiating them, engaging them, enriching them, and shaping their attitudes<sup>17</sup>. Through their enthusiastic actions, a culture of success and perseverance is shaped in the organization. Stimulating and inspiring are most often achieved by appealing to various types of needs and strengthening the desire to meet them. During the COVID-19 pandemic, these elements were usually fulfilled by redefining the organization’s mission and a new vision of its functioning. These elements must be appropriately adapted to the employees of a given organization. A leader cannot ignore the need for recognition, greater responsibility and influence, achievements or the need for self-fulfillment that are alive among his employees.

In the context of self-fulfillment and the related process of self-improvement,

leadership should aim at intellectual stimulation, understood, among others, as enriching and shaping others through interactions focused on learning from each other and transfer of knowledge and experience. The essential element here is an appropriate organizational culture based on mutual trust and improvement. Employees with the sense of leadership should be willing to develop the competences of others, what is closely related to building commitment and atmosphere conducive to changes for good done by leaders. Moreover, it is associated with the progress of system thinking, including, among others, the good of entire organization. Leadership is also about bringing people together, gaining their trust and making people want to unite and get involved. This is closely related to the vision and development of a strategy that directs the energy of the entire team and facilitates increased concentration on the assumed goals. During the COVID-19 pandemic, it is the appropriate expenditure of energy in the organization, not time management, that has become the focus of attention, because „the richest, happiest and most productive life is characterized by the ability to fully engage in the current challenge, but also to periodically break away from it and the search for renewal”<sup>18</sup>. The COVID-19 pandemic was undoubtedly a phenomenon that had a destructive impact on work psychology. Leadership during the pandemic was focused mainly on the development

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16 J. M. Burns, *Leadership*, New York 1978, p. 46.

17 J. Kotter, *Leading Change*, Boston 1996, p. 7-10.

18 J. Loehr, T. Schwartz, *The Power of Full Engagement: Managing Energy, Not Time, Is the Key to High Performance and Personal Renewal*, The Free Press 2003, p. 12.

of employees' intellectual capital in a mobilizing and integrating way. The vision of success created by the leader is an important support for the actions and efforts undertaken by employees to achieve goals and meet challenges. Transformational leadership particularly requires that the vision takes into account the interests of the organization's participants, is understood by them and, preferably, created by them, so that their motivation will always be stronger. In this context, extensive team communication and extensive cooperation between group members are necessary, which includes not only dialogue on developing common goals, understanding their importance for themselves and the organization, but also communicating their own passions and values. This allows better mutual understanding of each other and more effective cooperation in achieving goals and enriching each other.

Even the type of leadership that seems to require the highest level of leader awareness may manifest itself naturally, regardless of the formal higher position in relation to other team or group participants. The basis for the initiation and development of transformational leadership is the leader's emotional intelligence, enabling him to find and strengthen bonds with the group. This symbiotic interaction occurs when positive emotions emerge, which are then developed and expressed through enthusiasm, determination, zeal, or passion. Achieving harmony

and consonance between the leader and the group result from the leader's highly developed emotional intelligence, which is the key to effective and efficient leadership<sup>19</sup>.

Good transformational leadership also requires special social competences, related primarily to communication, but also to appropriate social sensitivity. It is worth noting that a true leader also plays the role of a mentor, which means that he does not seek to lead others. However, he dynamizes the development process of others, inspiring and activating intrinsic motivation to achieve set goals. One of his main tasks is to create an appropriate atmosphere that makes the employee strive to take up new challenges, despite internal doubts or fears. Observing a true leader in action stimulates the intrinsic motivation to become equally independent, active, and enthusiastic about one's endeavors. Moreover, it is necessary for the leader to present to employees the connection between their work and the company's mission and goal<sup>20</sup>. In this case, the leader does not strive for commands and prohibitions, but for effective partnership in achieving goals. Leadership aims to accelerate changes taking place within the organization. It activates various needs and ambitions in people and has a positive effect on their motivation. It stimulates action, strengthens and tightens the bonds of cooperation, appreciates, and rewards the contribution made and taking one's own initiative. Transformational leadership does not accept the status quo

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19 D. Goleman, R. Boyatzis, A. McKee, *Primal Leadership: Realizing the Power of Emotional Intelligence*, Boston 2002, p. 14.  
20 K. Murray, *Communicate to Inspire. A guide for leaders*, Warsaw 2014, p. 40.

but emphasizes the role of striving for positive changes as well as pays great attention to vision, values, and motivation<sup>21</sup>. The basic area of influence of leadership on individuals includes cooperation, communication, taking care of the atmosphere between group participants and striving to achieve the set goal together. The purpose of leadership understood in this way is for the leader to play three basic roles: recognizing the need for change, creating a new vision, institutionalizing the change<sup>22</sup>.

## Summary

During the COVID-19 epidemic, organizations, in fact, had no influence on eliminating the phenomenon in the long-term perspective. Therefore, current activity meant shaping a specific profile of adaptation to the current situation, doing it in a reactive, sometimes revolutionary way. This resulted basically from the nature of the phenomenon itself and the diversity of reactions of the authorities of individual state entities. It should be emphasized that in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, many organizations chose the defensive option, trying not to give way to their competitors and to protect their own organization against the negative impact of the epidemic situation (56%). However, a large part of the organization (26%) chose the offensive variant, introducing innovations and breakthrough solutions

intended to change the competition system<sup>23</sup>. Therefore, it will not be surprising that, in fact, the most appropriate leadership style in times of great turmoil turned out to be transformational leadership. To sum up, it should be said that an organization, that wants to survive a period of crisis and compete with others, must find a way to engage the minds of almost every employee and that is why it is necessary to place great emphasis on the selection, development, and maintenance of strong leaders at every level of the organization<sup>24</sup>.

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21 Ibidem.

22 N. M. Tichy, M. A. Devanna, *The Transformational Leader*, “Training & Development Journal” 1986, No. 40, p. 2732.

23 P. Renjen, *The perseverance of resilient leadership: Sustaining impact on the road to Thrive*, <https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/economy/covid-19/sustaining-resilient-leadership-covid-19.html/#end-note-sup-27> (access: 03.05.2022 r.).

24 B. Minchington, *Role of leadership in employer branding*, “HR FUTURE” 2011, No. 7, p. 16.

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# ETHIOPIA'S CIVIL WAR AND HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

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## Abstract

Ethiopia as a country has a history of internal conflict. This is partly due to the form of government that exists in the country. The country has a history of civil war in 1974, and the Tigrayan conflict is another conflict that hinders the country's stability and disturbs its peace. Ethiopia is facing an internal conflict between the authorities and the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front. The conflict is ethnically motivated. Civilians are suffering because of the decisions of the authorities and the geography of the country. Ethiopia is also facing a humanitarian crisis caused by a cyclical weather phenomenon called 'El Niño'. The periodic droughts it brings are taking their toll on all African countries.

## Key words

TPLF, EHRC, OLA, UNHCR, civil war, rebel, conflict, state of emergency

## Introduction

Ethiopia is the second largest country in Africa. It is a federal parliamentary republic. In its early decades, the country was a monarchy with dynastic imperial power. The Ethiopian monarchy finally collapsed in the 1970s under the influence of all-Ethiopian coups. There are currently 80 ethnic groups in Ethiopia, whose representatives speak 88 languages.

On 11 October, the 2019 Nobel Committee announced Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed as the 100th recipient of the Peace Prize. He received the award in recognition of his work for peace in the Horn of Africa, in particular for his landmark reconciliation with neighbouring Eritrea. In his acceptance speech, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali said: *"I sincerely believe that peace is a way of life and war is simply a form of death"*. He is currently Africa's youngest leader. He came to power in April 2018 on a wave of political change. It came after three years of protests by the Oromo and Amhara peoples against the rule of the minority Tigrean military-business elite, in power since 1991. They forced the Ethiopian government to agree to reforms. Ahmed became the driving force behind the process<sup>1</sup>.

In 2019, the Prime Minister decided to form a new party. The Tigray People's Liberation Front did not agree to join the new party, leaving it outside the government. In a country made up

of ten regions with considerable autonomy, a conflict broke out in Tigray. The local authorities in this northern town considered the Prime Minister's policies to be risky. Officials spoke of unfair accusations of corruption and marginalisation.

In September 2020, regional elections were held in Tigray despite the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and open opposition from the authorities. On 3 November, Addis Ababa declared the elections illegal and the Tigray People's Front Liberation a terrorist organisation<sup>2</sup>. The organisation had been one of the most influential parties in Ethiopia since 1991. The conflict began in November after the government launched a military operation against the region where Tigray is based, and after rebel troops seized a military base in the regional capital and attempted to seize weapons.

Tigrayans are one of the ethnic groups living in Ethiopia. They make up about 7 per cent of the country's 109 million people but are richer and more influential than people in other, larger regions of Ethiopia<sup>3</sup>. The authorities in Addis Ababa were concerned, were trying to create independent military structures. Tigray began to fight against their own country. The conflict prevented farmers from sowing their fields, and the city and its inhabitants' fell victim to famine. A six-month national state of emergency was declared. Public services in Tigray almost ground to a halt.

1 [https://pism.pl/publikacje/Pokojowa\\_Nagroda\\_Nobla\\_dla\\_premiera\\_Etiopii](https://pism.pl/publikacje/Pokojowa_Nagroda_Nobla_dla_premiera_Etiopii) (access: 09.10.2023 r.).

2 Tigray People's Liberation Front – Ethiopian political grouping and formerly a guerrilla movement. Until late 2019, it was the most influential element of the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front.

3 <https://tvn24.pl/swiat/etiopia-tigray-premier-abiy-ahmed-zachod-regionu-zdobyty-4748995> (access: 09.10.2023 r.).



Health and education services<sup>4</sup> were disrupted, fuel and electricity were in short supply, and thousands of people faced starvation<sup>5</sup>.

## Methodological and methodical assumptions

The purpose of this article is to present the phenomenon of civil war and humanitarian crisis in Ethiopia. The article also outlines the determinants of ethno-political conflict and the impact of recent situations on citizens' levels of security.

The following implementation methods were used to achieve the adopted objective of the paper:

- A historical method for reconstructing the events that led to such a serious humanitarian crisis,
- A legal method to present the norms of international and national law related to the issue in question,
- An attempt was also made to identify the interests and objectives of the parties.

The hypotheses of the text under discussion were formulated as follows:

- Ethiopia's conflict is driven by deep-rooted ethnic divisions,
- On a number of occasions, the Ethiopian armed forces have violated international law by using armed drones to carry out blind attacks without a specific military target. In particular, Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

- At the height of the war, repression also affected many ethnic Tigrayans living in other parts of Ethiopia. Those with links to the administration or the armed forces were arrested, while the rest did not leave their homes for fear of persecution. The scale of the terror was carefully concealed by the authorities, who effectively controlled the flow of information about the war for many months,
- It is not only the civil war in Ethiopia that is a problem, but also the very low rainfall that is not helping the situation in the country. The extreme hunger and destruction caused by the ongoing conflict is not making things any better for anyone living there,
- A joint project between Ethiopia and China called 'The Dam' could cause serious ecological damage. The filling of the reservoir and the operation of the dam represent a major intervention in the ecosystem of the Nile River Basin.
- Because of its location, Ethiopia may in the future have a dispute not only within its own community, but also with the land of the Pharaohs. The Blue Nile rises in Ethiopia, joins the White Nile in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, and then flows through the Nubian Desert into Egypt.

## Conflict and ethnic divides

Ethiopia's conflict is driven by deep-rooted ethnic divisions. In the 1970s and 1980s, guerrillas from the Tigrayan

4 A. Fellner, M. Feltynowski, R. Fellner, *Przygotowanie nawigacyjne bezzałogowych statków powietrznych do operacyjnych działań straży pożarnej*, „Zeszyty Naukowe SGSP” 2021, Volume 3, Issue 79, p. 51-82.

5 See: E. Cieślak, K. Czernichowski, B. Ndiaye, *Afryka Subsaharyjska Potencjał, problemy i możliwości dla Polski*, Warsaw 2020.

People's Liberation Front (TPLF) played a key role in fighting the communist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam. After his overthrow in 1991, they became the dominant faction in the country, nominally in coalition with parties representing ethnic groups: Oromo, Amhara, and the peoples of the southern region<sup>6</sup>.

Non-governmental cyber security watchdog NetBlocks has reported that people in the Tigray region have been cut off from the internet. The people of Tigray were convinced that it was the federal authorities who had cut telephone and internet services. The government in Addis Ababa claimed that the Tigray People's Liberation Front was behind the shutdown<sup>7</sup>.

At least 54 people were murdered in a massacre that took place on Sunday 1 November 2020 in Welega West Zone, Guliso District, in the troubled Oromiyaa region of Ethiopia. The victims were mainly Amharic women, children, and elderly people. The rebel Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) was behind the crime. Three villages were attacked, and the crime took place on the grounds of a school in Gawa Qanqa. According to the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), the perpetrators targeted the Amhar ethnic group. At least 600 civilians were killed. In the months that followed, the conflict spread to other regions of the

country siding with the government or the TLFW (which was supported by the Oromo Liberation Army, among others)<sup>8</sup>.

On 12 November 2020, the UNHCR reported that 14,500 children, women and men had fled to Sudan in search of safety, exceeding its capacity to provide assistance<sup>9</sup>. For its part, UNHCR called on all parties to respect the safety of all civilians in Tigray. In Ethiopia, fighting in Tigray approached the Shimelba refugee camp, home to 6,500 Eritrean refugees, raising fears of mass displacement from the camp. UNHCR is preparing to receive refugees who have already arrived at Hitsats camp, 50 kilometres away, and is considering further relocation options in the region<sup>10</sup>. There have also been air strikes by the government air force on Mekelle, the capital of the rebel held Tigray region. Losses and damage are unknown. Tigray authorities accused the government of bombing a dam and a sugar factory. Despite growing pressure from African and European governments, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is unwilling to accept international mediation in the internal conflict. *"We say give us some time, it will not take forever. It will be a short-term operation,"* said Redwan Hussein, spokesman for the government's Tigray crisis team, adding that Prime Minister Abiy had not asked any country for

6 *PISM, the African Union and the UN towards the crisis in Ethiopia*. [https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/Unia\\_Afrykanska\\_i\\_ONZ\\_wobec\\_kryzysu\\_w\\_Etiopii](https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/Unia_Afrykanska_i_ONZ_wobec_kryzysu_w_Etiopii) (access: 21.09.2023 r.).

7 <https://defence24.pl/sily-zbrojne/etiopia-naloty-w-regionie-tigray> (access: 21.09.2023 r.).

8 <https://tvn24.pl/swiat/etiopia-tigray-premier-abiy-ahmed-zachod-regionu-zdobyty-4748995> (access: 21.09.2023 r.).

9 The UN's main refugee agency was created in the aftermath of the Second World War to assist Europeans displaced by conflict in countries where they sought asylum.

10 <https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing-notes/humanitarian-crisis-deepens-amid-ongoing-clashes-ethiopia-tigray-region> (access: 27.09.2023 r.).

help in resolving the conflict. More air strikes hit the region the following day. There were 'precise, surgical operations from the air' around the regional capital Makalle, the Ethiopian authorities said. Prime Minister Abiy wrote on Facebook that after the ultimatum expired on Tuesday, 'the final decisive law enforcement action will be taken in the coming days'. The leaders of Tigray, a rebellious region in northern Ethiopia, have yet to comment.

In 2021, a massacre took place at an Ethiopian Orthodox Church temple – information was limited due to the conflict in the region and the ban on journalists. The war, which has been going on for almost three months, is rooted in the separatist ambitions of the local government in Tigray. "A *second reason for the clashes is bitterness over the marginalisation of the Tigrayan people, who once dominated Ethiopia's ruling coalition*", Vatican News pointed out. On 13 September there was another attack on Mekelle<sup>11</sup>. This time Ethiopian forces used armed drones. The strikes were not aimed at specific military targets and were most likely indiscriminate, which in itself is a violation of international law (Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court)<sup>12</sup>.

On 22 September 2022, regular Eritrean troops crossed the border into Ethiopia and invaded Tigray. A week earlier, government drones had bombed the residents of Mekelle, the provincial capital. Tigrayan authorities called on residents to prepare for a long and difficult struggle to defend their

hometown. On 23 September, the Desta International Hotel was hit. One person was confirmed dead. The civilian population, left to fend for themselves, needed all kinds of assistance. Thousands of internally displaced people (IDPs) in neighbouring Amhara and Afar states were being assisted. Representatives of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated at the time that 16 million people across Ethiopia were in need of aid. The government in Addis Ababa has imported drones from a number of sources. The main one is the United Arab Emirates, but also (on a much smaller scale) Iran and China. In September 2021, an An-124 carrying Chinese Wing Loong or Yao-Ying drones landed on the tarmac at Harar Meda airport after taking off from Chengdu and stopping in Islamabad. Iranian aircraft have also been spotted. The Boeing 747s and Il-76s carried Mohajer-6 drones, which have also recently been used by Russia in the war in Ukraine.

On 25 October 2022, peace talks were held to agree on the details of a ceasefire between the parties. The talks were held in Pretoria. "The two parties to the conflict in Ethiopia have formally agreed to a cessation of hostilities and to systematic, orderly and coordinated disarmament", former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo told the African Union envoy. This was not the end of the peace process, he said. "The implementation of the agreement signed today is critical to its success", Obasanjo said, adding that the process would be monitored and

11 <https://polskieradio24.pl/5/1223/artykul/2664214> (access: 27.09.2023 r.).

12 <https://www.konflikty.pl/historia/czasy-najnowsze/wojna-w-tigray-erytrea-rozpoczela-inwazje> (access: 28.09.2023 r.).

supervised by the African Union High Level Group<sup>13</sup>.

The Ethiopian Prime Minister added a few words of his own, saying in a statement: *“Our commitment to peace remains unwavering and our commitment to work together to implement the agreement is equally strong”*. The European Union also expressed its approval of the signed agreement in a press release on 22 December, writing that it “congratulates the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front on the signing of the Agreement for a lasting peace through a permanent cessation of hostilities and the subsequent statement by the Senior Commanders on the conditions for its implementation. The EU also commends the African Union High Level Panel for its successful mediation leading to these agreements, which represent an important step towards peace and reconciliation in Ethiopia. After the signing of the ceasefire, war crimes began to come to light, including the massacre at the Mirab Abaya camp in southern Ethiopia<sup>14</sup>. Some 2,500 men and women were held in the camp, along with soldiers, including members of the Ministry of Defence. Some of the detainees had previously participated in peacekeeping operations as members of Ethiopian contingents sent to Sudan and elsewhere. The government considered them a particular threat to the state because they were Tigrayan. All were arrested on suspicion of sympathising with the Tigrayan

People’s Liberation Front. At the height of the war, the repression also affected many ethnic Tigrayans living in other parts of Ethiopia. Those associated with the administration, or the armed forces were arrested, while the rest did not leave their homes for fear of persecution. The scale of the terror was carefully concealed by the authorities, who effectively controlled the flow of information about the war for months. Washington Post journalists reached witnesses to the massacre in Mirab Abaya. According to their accounts, guards rounded up 83 prisoners on 21 November and prepared to execute them. About eighteen people, including at least one woman, carried out the crime. Some of the prisoners were executed, while those who tried to escape were murdered by local civilians armed with machetes. According to WaPo, the authorities used cars equipped with loudspeakers to urge the population to kill the refugees, who were allegedly captured on the battlefield and responsible for the deaths of government soldiers. Many bodies were later found near the church of Saint Gabriel, where the refugees had probably hoped to find shelter<sup>15</sup>. The victims included a cross-section of professionals who had previously served in the Ethiopian armed forces. Another crime against Tigrayans took place at the Wondotika camp near Auasa in the south of the country, where guards murdered five detainees. The soldiers there were mostly former members of special units.

13 <https://tvn24.pl/swiat/etiopia-tigray-porozumienie-o-zaprzestaniu-dzialan-wojennych-6190937> (access: 06.10.2023 r.).

14 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/press/press-releases/2022/12/22/etiopia-statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu> (access: 05.10.2023 r.).

15 <https://www.konflikty.pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/etiopia-masakry-tigracyjkow-obozach-koncentracyjnych> (access: 09.10.2023 r.).

2023 Gun battles and mass protests have erupted in parts of Amhara, Ethiopia's second largest region, following a decision to centralise regional security forces across the country's 11 states. The federal government announced the policy last Thursday with the aim of building a "strong centralised army". Residents of several towns in Amhara responded with protests, and some units of the regional security forces refused to disarm and clashed with the federal army. The US Embassy alert also reported "heavy exchanges of fire involving heavy weapons" in 'several areas of the region', including the towns of Kobo, Woldia and Sekota. Gunfire has also been reported in recent days in the towns of Debre Birhan, Dessie, Debre Tabor and the regional capital, Bahir Dar. Elsewhere, protesters burned tyres and blocked roads, while banks and shops were closed. The Amhara regional government responded by imposing a curfew and blocking mobile internet services in some areas, including the popular tourist city of Gondar. The regional capital was bombed, including the main hospital.

One of the more internationally recognised figures is WHO Director-General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus<sup>16</sup>. Speaking at a WHO briefing, he said he had been informed that his uncle had been killed by Eritrean troops in Ethiopia. *"I spoke to my mother, and she was really devastated because*

*he was the youngest in the family and he was almost the same age as me, a young uncle"*. The WHO director-general added that he was "not in good shape" because of the news and expressed hope for a tentative peace deal between Ethiopia and the warring TPLF.

## Summary

The Council of the European Union, in its conclusions of 23 April 2023, expressed its support for the Agreement for a lasting peace through a permanent cessation of hostilities concluded on 2 November 2022 between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front<sup>17</sup>. The importance of Ethiopia as a strategic partner of the European Union in this region of the world was also taken into account.

Human rights experts are concerned that the perpetrators of hundreds of civilian deaths in the latest fighting in Ethiopia's two-year war will not be brought to justice and punished<sup>18</sup>.

It is not only the civil war in Ethiopia that is a problem, but also the very low rainfall that is not helping the situation in the country. The extreme hunger and devastation caused by the ongoing conflict is not helping anyone living there.

Because of its location, Ethiopia may in the future have a conflict not only within its own community, but also with the land of the Pharaohs. The Blue Nile

<sup>16</sup> Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus was elected as WHO Director-General for a five-year term by WHO Member States at the seventieth World Health Assembly in May 2017. In doing so, he was the first WHO Director-General to be selected from a number of candidates by the World Health Assembly and the first person from the WHO African Region to head the world's leading public health agency.

<sup>17</sup> <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8610-2023-INIT/pl/pdf> (access: 21.10.2023 r.).

<sup>18</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52022IP0351&from=EN> (access: 21.10.2023 r.)

rises in Ethiopia, joins the White Nile in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, and then flows through the Nubian Desert into Egypt.

Ethiopia is known as 'Africa's water tower' because of its position on the map and the dams built across its territory to harness the abundant rainfall<sup>19</sup>.

In 2011, the authorities announced the project, in collaboration with China, and its name is the 'Great Revival Dam'. The 155m high and 1.8km wide structure will be built 30km from the Sudanese border. Its artificial reservoirs will hold 75 billion m<sup>3</sup> of water. The dam's power plant is expected to have a capacity of 6.45 GW. The project is expected to meet Ethiopia's domestic energy needs (today 66% of the population has no access to electricity, one of the highest rates in the world). It will also enable Ethiopia to earn around \$0.5 billion a year by selling surplus electricity abroad. The dam is also highly symbolic, as a sign of Ethiopia's growing importance in the region<sup>20</sup>.

The project is also likely to cause ecological damage. Filling the reservoir and operating the dam is a major intervention in the ecosystem of the Nile Basin.

Ethiopia has faced drought more than once in its history. This is because the whole of Africa is geographically

vulnerable to drought. There were two such disasters in the early twentieth century. 1913 and between 1990 and 1993<sup>21</sup>. At that time, crops failed due to lack of rainfall because the region's level of education was not the highest. At the time, about 80% of the population was engaged in subsistence farming. Difficult access to health care and education, and animal-borne diseases. These include the tse-tse fly. It transmits African trypanosomiasis, commonly known as African sleeping sickness, to animals and humans. Locusts and red-winged blackbirds also regularly destroyed crops. In 1960, infant mortality in this part of the world was the highest in the world.<sup>22</sup>

No improvement in the 2000s. In 2016, two years of erratic rainfall and drought, exacerbated by the El Niño phenomenon<sup>23</sup>, wreaked havoc. Crops were destroyed and water sources dried up. Over 14 million people lost access to safe drinking water<sup>24</sup>.

The 2023 drought affected the southern and eastern parts of Ethiopia, following five consecutive poor rainy seasons. Pastoralists, who were severely affected by the 2016-2017 drought and the resulting locust invasion, have lost 6.85 million sheep since the end of 2021<sup>25</sup>.

19 T. Marshall, *więźniowie geografii, czyli wszystko co chciałbyś wiedzieć o globalnej polityce i geopolityce*, Poznań 2020.

20 [https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/Tama\\_Wielkiego\\_Odrodzenia\\_w\\_Etiopii\\_konflikt\\_o\\_Nil\\_bliski\\_rozwiazania](https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/Tama_Wielkiego_Odrodzenia_w_Etiopii_konflikt_o_Nil_bliski_rozwiazania) (access: 22.10.2023 r.).

21 See: M. Meredith, *A history of modern Africa Half a century of independence*, Warsaw 2014.

22 See: J. Vilmer, *Peace without freedom in Eritrea: causes and consequences of the Ethio-Eritrean rapprochement*, "Journal of Eastern African Studies" 2021, 15(01).

23 The El Niño phenomenon is a periodic disturbance of the Earth's thermal equilibrium that alters the circulation of air masses. It occurs on average every 2 to 7 years. It can last from 6 to 18 months.

24 <https://unicef.pl/co-robimy/aktualnosci/news/kryzys-o-ktorym-sie-nie-mowi-zmiany-klimatyczne-zabijaja-dzieci-w-afryce> (access: 22.10.2023 r.).

25 <https://forsal.pl/swiat/aktualnosci/artykuly/8680549,susza-w-etiopii-11-mln-osob-jest-zagrozonych-glodem.html> (access: 22.10.2023 r.).

According to the latest report from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 811 million people worldwide are hungry. In 2020, hunger will affect more than 418 million people in Asia, more than 280 million in Africa and 60 million in Latin America and the Caribbean. This is an increase from 2019 of 46 million people in Africa, nearly 57 million in Asia and about 14 million in Latin America and the Caribbean<sup>26</sup>.

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# THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE DESTRUCTION OF UKRAINE'S ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

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## Abstract

Russian attacks on Ukraine's electricity infrastructure have had a serious impact on Ukrainian society. Disruptions in electricity supply have endangered health and life, restricted access to education, worsened the economic situation and led to environmental degradation. These attacks were part of Russia's military and political strategy to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The lack of electricity had a major impact on the economy which translated into an impoverished society. The consequences of energy supply disruptions were also one of the important causes of internal and external migration. These attacks were part of Russia's extensive military and political campaign to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, stir up anti-government sentiment and fracture the morale of the Ukrainian people. Their effects will be felt for many years after the war ends.

## Key words

war, energy, society, Ukraine, Russian Federation

## Introduction

The Special Military Operation conducted by the Russian Federation in Ukraine began 4 hours after the disconnection of Ukraine's power system from the power systems of the Russian Federation and Belarus<sup>1</sup>. This was a planned disconnection caused by the transition to an isolated mode of operation of the Ukrainian system in preparation for its future synchronisation with the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO-E). Russian shelling of power plants and transmission networks had been taking place since the first weeks of the aggression, but the first targeted attack on Ukraine's energy infrastructure took place on 11 September 2022. According to the Ministry of Energy, this was one of the most indiscriminate attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure – both power plants, high-voltage substations were attacked. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians were consequently left without electricity in the Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Sumy and Donetsk regions. Eight hundred and seventeen settlements and 7978 transformer stations remained without electricity, totalling some 667,600 consumers. At the same time, in some areas emergency rescue work was complicated or impossible due to the intensification of hostilities, mine clearance, the emergence of new damage

to electricity networks<sup>2</sup>. A month later, General Sergei Surovikin, known in the media as the 'butcher of Syria', the 'cannibal' or 'General Armagedon', took command of the Russian invasion forces. On 10 October 2022, prompted by a lack of progress and military successes and in revenge for damage to the bridge linking Russia to Crimea<sup>3</sup>, the Russian Federation began systematic, massive shelling with rockets, missiles and kamikaze drones of Ukraine's energy infrastructure which did not lead to a total black out, but caused a serious destabilisation of the work of the power grid and daily blackouts lasting several to several hours in all regions of the country. The targets of most of the shelling were nodal elements of the transmission infrastructure. A statement released by Ukrainian transmission infrastructure operator Ukrenergo shows that between 10 October 2022 and 10 February 2023, the Russian Federation carried out 14 missile and 17 drone massed attacks on the Ukrainian energy system. As a result, more than 40% of the energy infrastructure was affected. All major thermal and hydroelectric power plants suffered damage and the Ukrenergo Dispatch Centre was forced to reduce electricity consumption by 50%. For four months an average of up to 12 million Ukrainians were left without electricity every hour. The energy services managed to repair more than 10,000 kilometres of transmission lines

1 *Ukraina całkowicie odłączyła się od systemów energetycznych Rosji i Białorusi*, <https://www.ukrinform.pl/rubric-economy/3411390-ukraina-cakowicie-odacza-sie-od-systemow-energetycznych-rosji-i-biaorusi.html> (access: 11.05.2023 r.).

2 *Davaite vzhe pislya viini: stan enerhetychnoi infrastruktury Ukrainy ta maibutnie haluzi*, <https://delo.ua/energetics/davaite-vze-pislya-viini-stan-energeticnoyi-infrastrukturi-ukrayini-ta-maibutnje-galuzi-404840> (access: 04.04.2023 r.).

3 *Putin, drink in hand, blames Ukraine for Russia's bombing of its energy infrastructure: "Who started it?"*, <https://www.businessinsider.com/putin-drink-in-hand-blames-ukraine-for-russia-bombing-infrastructure-2022-12?r=US&IR=T> (access: 24.04.2023 r.).

damaged by the attacks. Of the 43% of energy infrastructure facilities destroyed, around 70% were partially repaired<sup>4</sup>. From the start of the war until February 2023. The Russian Federation carried out 255 successful attacks on 112 elements of critical electricity infrastructure, 77% of which occurred during the months with the lowest temperatures, i.e. October 2022 – February 2023<sup>5</sup>. Massive attacks on critical infrastructure began in autumn and continued with great intensity through the winter months. The course of the average temperature can be illustrated by its measurement in Cherkasy (a town near the geographical centre of Ukraine) in December – for a typical day it ranges from a maximum of 0°C to a minimum of -6°C. The perceptible daily conditions can be described as poignantly cold and slightly windy<sup>6</sup>.

## The social impact of attacks on electricity infrastructure

Triggered by attacks on critical infrastructure by Russia, the lack of electricity has had a severe impact on Ukrainian society, leading to disorganisation and social isolation. The efficient functioning of the electricity infrastructure is crucial for the provision of social services such as healthcare, education, transport, communication, access to clean water or wastewater treatment. In addition, electricity plays a vital role in the

maintenance of other infrastructure systems, such as the supply system for gaseous or liquid fuels, the transport of which over long distances requires the use of electricity to power technical equipment. Consequently, disruptions to electricity supply affect both people directly and indirectly through impacts on other energy-dependent infrastructure. Uninterrupted Russian attacks on energy infrastructure have worsened living conditions, with frequent power cuts regularly plunging much of Ukraine into darkness throughout the winter season. WHO Regional Director for Europe Dr Hans Henri P. Kluge, in a communiqué on 21 November, said: “Half of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is damaged or destroyed. This is already having knock-on effects on the health system and people’s health. Simply put, this winter will be about survival. The WHO has so far verified 703 attacks on hospitals since the war began nine months ago. This is a violation of international humanitarian law and the rules of war. Continued attacks on health and energy infrastructure mean that hundreds of hospitals and health facilities are no longer fully operational – they lack the fuel, water, and electricity to meet basic needs.”<sup>7</sup>. The power shortage posed a particular threat to infants placed in incubators, people undergoing intensive care with life support equipment and those requiring constant access to

4 *Enerhetychnyi front 365 Dniv Nezlamnosti*, [https://ua.energy/energy\\_front\\_365.html](https://ua.energy/energy_front_365.html) (access: 04.05.2023 r.).

5 *Енергоатом оприлюднив інфографіку ударів РФ по об'єктах електроенергетики*, <https://kosatka.media/category/elektroenergiya/news/energoatom-oprilyudniv-infografiku-udariv-rf-po-ob-yektah-elektroenergetiki> (access: 23.05.2023 r.).

6 *Czerkasy (Ukraina) pogoda w grudniu*, <https://meteoatlas.pl/ukraina/czerkasy-67109/pogoda-w-grudniu> (access: 24.09.2023 r.).

7 *Winter in Ukraine: people's health cannot be held hostage*, <https://www.who.int/europe/news/item/21-11-2022-state-ment---winter-in-ukraine--people-s-health-cannot-be-held-hostage> (access: 21.08.2023 r.).

oxygen. Insufficient power supply prevented the operation of medical equipment such as ventilators, defibrillators, infusion pumps, dialysis machines and others. Patients in critical condition or requiring constant care were at risk of death or serious complications. Power shortages also hampered patient transport, delivery of medicines and medical supplies, and communication between medical facilities, and increased the risk of infection and disease through lack of access to clean water, sanitation, and hygiene<sup>8</sup>. Inadequate supply also hampered the storage and distribution of vaccines and other biological products, undermining vaccination, and infectious disease prevention programmes. Contaminated water and the inability to maintain cleanliness increased the risk of water-borne diseases such as diarrhoea, cholera, typhoid, and others<sup>9</sup>, and the lack of communication caused by power cuts resulted in a loss of access to patients' medical records. The destruction of elements of the electricity infrastructure also affected food storage and refrigeration, increasing the risk of food poisoning and long-term health problems related to foodborne pathogens. The lack of heating in homes during the winter prompted people to seek alternative sources of heat, such as burning wood or coal in non-designed and makeshift appliances, which was associated with an increased risk of carbon monoxide

poisoning and fires. Typically, the source of heat in Ukrainian homes is not electrical appliances, but disruptions to the electricity supply caused disruptions to heating systems based on solid, liquid, or gaseous fuels, while hypothermia is particularly dangerous for the elderly, children, and people with chronic illnesses. As a result of the full-scale invasion, the education process took place mainly online or in hybrid form. The scarcity of electricity limited the students' ability to interact with their classmates and with their teachers, which affected the quality of education and possibly the mental health of young people<sup>10</sup>. Many children did not regularly participate in school activities both physically and remotely. Schools and other educational facilities could not function properly, lighting, heating, and even basic equipment such as computers and projectors were becoming unusable. In the era of the COVID-19 pandemic, many schools in Ukraine switched to remote teaching, but without electricity after the outbreak, students were unable to use computers, tablets, or smartphones, making it impossible for them to participate in classes even remotely. Many educational materials available online without electricity meant that students were unable to access them<sup>11</sup>. The destruction of electricity infrastructure, shelling, and fear of it also had an impact on mental health – increasing stress and anxiety, which in turn

8 *Wojna w Ukrainie, działania Lekarzy Bez Granic*, <https://lekarze-bez-granic.pl/ukraina/> (access: 23.07.2023 r.).

9 *Ukraina: przerwy w dostawie prądu destrukcyjnie wpływają na życie ludności cywilnej tuż przed Bożym Narodzeniem*, <https://www.amnesty.org.pl/ukraina-przerwy-w-dostawie-pradu/> (access: 23.07.2023 r.).

10 Overview of the current state of education and science in Ukraine in terms of Russian aggression (as of January 2023), Kyiv 2023.

11 *Russia's war in Ukraine threatens students daily and forces teachers to improvise*, <https://theconversation.com/russias-war-in-ukraine-threatens-students-daily-and-forces-teachers-to-improvise-196773> (access: 08.08.2023 r.).

affected students' ability to learn. Where children could reach educational facilities they had to move to them in the dark and school rooms were not heated. The energy shortage was also a handicap for teachers, who found it difficult to prepare and deliver lessons, as well as to communicate with pupils and parents. Russian military actions targeting Ukraine's energy infrastructure are part of a military and political strategy aimed at undermining Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, fomenting anti-government sentiment, and breaking the morale of the Ukrainian people. The Russian attacks have had parallel negative consequences for the economic, social, and humanitarian situation in Ukraine<sup>12</sup>. The electricity shortage caused by the hostilities has also affected the economy and thus the standard of living of the Ukrainian people. Most households in 2022 had expenditures that could not meet their basic consumer needs<sup>13</sup>. Electricity blackouts were a factor generating a change in market conditions, leading to an increase in the prices of goods and services and unemployment. In particular, the prices of food, fuel, medicines, and other consumer products increased significantly. Data from the National Bank of Ukraine shows that in March 2023, inflation was 21.3%

year-on-year<sup>14</sup>. Ukraine has registered 5.3 million IDPs and up to 8 million Ukrainians who have left the country as of January 2023<sup>15</sup>. As early as November 2022, the director of Ukraine's largest private energy company DTEK, Maksim Timchenko, suggested: "People should consider leaving the country to reduce the demand on the power grid. Even if it is only for three or four months"<sup>16</sup>. What impact the attacks on Ukraine's electricity infrastructure have had on migration is difficult to assess exactly, as there are no clear statistics on this. Nevertheless, many people have left their homes and family to escape the effects of lack of electricity, heating, basic services, and armed conflict. Head of the Norwegian Refugee Council Jan Egeland predicting the exodus of the Ukrainian population said: "Right now, all over the country, people are facing a grim choice: flee or freeze"<sup>17</sup>. During the peak of the raids in December and January, Ukraine's electricity deficit increased by as much as 30%. The entire society, administration, industry, and business were obliged to reduce energy consumption. In Kiev, supermarkets and shopping malls abandoned street lighting and reduced shop window lighting. In Lviv region, lighting of building facades and operation of fountains was banned. During the curfew, street

12 *Rosyjska bezsilność – piętnaście ataków na ukraińską infrastrukturę energetyczną*, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2023-03-10/rosyjska-bezilnosc-pietnascie-atakow-na-ukrainska-infrastruktura> (access: 03.06.2023 r.).

13 *World Food Programme, Multisectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) 2022: Food Security Findings*. March 2023.

14 National Bank of Ukraine, *Inflation Report April 2023*, Kyiv 2023.

15 *Ukraine Emergency Situation Report #17*, <https://www.unfpa.org/resources/ukraine-emergency-situation-report-17-15-march-2023> (access: 18.09.2023 r.).

16 *Ukraine: la multiplication des attaques russes menace de plus en plus le système énergétique*, <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/europe/20221120-ukraine-la-multiplication-des-attaques-russes-menace-de-plus-en-plus-le-syst%C3%A8me-%C3%A9nerg%C3%A9tique> (access: 23.07.2023 r.).

17 *Ukraine: People cut off from aid face extreme suffering as winter conditions worsen*, <https://www.nrc.no/news/2022/november/ukraine-people-cut-off-from-aid-face-extreme-suffering-as-winter-conditions-worsen/> (access: 26.08.2023 r.).

lighting was switched off, except for road and critical infrastructure. The illumination of advertisements, signs, shops, and offices after working hours was also banned. In the Crooked Horn, Poltava and Ternopil regions, entrepreneurs violating the energy-saving regime were fined by law enforcement<sup>18</sup>. The prospect of power outages in winter has led to the prioritisation of energy supply to critical sectors and facilities. Ukraine's main efforts were directed at ensuring energy supply to hospitals and health facilities. Another area prioritised was the provision of power to critical city services. The provision of electricity to ensure the proper operation of water and sewerage services was crucial for public health and to avoid environmental disasters<sup>19</sup>. The Ukrainian authorities also focused their energies on ensuring power supply for telecommunication services and the operation of financial institutions. Lack of energy hampered rescue operations when critically needed – lack of water in the water supply made firefighting ineffective and lack of access to light made it difficult to reach those trapped under tumours. The lack of electricity has also affected the environment, especially in terms of waste generation and the release of pollutants into the environment. Damage to municipal facilities or lack of energy supply has resulted in the discharge of raw, untreated sewage containing bacteria, viruses and dangerous substances into soils, surface water and groundwater, the effects of which will be felt by society for decades.

18 *Totalna ekonomiiia svitla v Ukraini: yaki zakhody vzhyyvaiut po oblastiakh*, [https://antikor.com.ua/articles/584580-totalnaja\\_ekonomija\\_sveta\\_v\\_ukraine\\_kakie\\_mery\\_predprinimajut\\_po\\_oblastjam](https://antikor.com.ua/articles/584580-totalnaja_ekonomija_sveta_v_ukraine_kakie_mery_predprinimajut_po_oblastjam) (access: 23.04.2023 r.).

19 *Важлива інформація щодо якості води*, <https://vodokanal.kiev.ua/news/vazhлива-%D1%96nformacz%D1%96ya-shhodo-yakost%D1%96-vodi/> (access: 24.08.2023 r.).

## Summary

Russian attacks on Ukraine's electricity infrastructure have caused serious social, economic and humanitarian consequences. Disruptions in electricity supply, worsened the living conditions of millions of Ukrainians, reduced the level of medical and educational services, and the lack of heating in winter prompted victims of the aggression to seek alternative sources of heat, with an increased risk of accidents and fires. The lack of electricity had a major impact on the economy which translated into an impoverished society. The consequences of energy supply disruptions were also one of the important causes of internal and external migration. These attacks were part of Russia's extensive military and political campaign to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, stir up anti-government sentiment and fracture the morale of the Ukrainian people.

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# DETERMINANTS OF SAFE EVACUATION OF LARGE PRODUCTION FACTORIES

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## Abstract

In the realm of workplace safety, this article investigates the pivotal factors that underpin the safe evacuation of employees in large production factories. Addressing the complexities of industrial environments, the article explores the indispensable role of tailored emergency preparedness plans. It delves into the significance of employee training programs, emphasizing the need for continuous education to instill effective response protocols. The article also sheds light on the crucial aspect of clear and efficient communication systems, elucidating their role in disseminating timely instructions during emergencies. Furthermore, it examines the integration of cutting-edge technology, such as mobile applications and VR/AR mapping, in enhancing evacuation procedures. The strategic design of evacuation routes and the establishment of well-equipped safe zones are scrutinized as essential elements in ensuring a swift and secure evacuation process. Additionally, the collaborative efforts between factories and local emergency services are highlighted, showcasing the importance of coordinated responses. By reviewing these determinants, the article provides valuable insights into creating resilient and safe evacuation strategies, ultimately safeguarding the lives of employees and promoting a secure industrial work environment.

## Key words

evacuation, production factories, emergency preparedness plans, safety measures.

## Introduction

Ensuring the safety and well-being of employees in large production factories is a paramount concern for both employers and regulatory bodies. With the inherent risks associated with industrial environments, having robust and effective evacuation procedures in place is not just a legal requirement but also a moral obligation. The ability to swiftly and safely evacuate all personnel during emergencies, be it fires, chemical spills, or other hazardous incidents, is contingent upon a multifaceted approach that encompasses meticulous planning, continuous training, advanced technology integration, and seamless coordination with local emergency services.

In this context, this article delves into the intricate web of determinants that govern the safe evacuation of large production factories. Evacuation preparedness extends far beyond mere compliance; it is about instilling a culture of safety, fostering awareness, and equipping employees with the knowledge and tools necessary to respond effectively in high-pressure situations. Through a comprehensive exploration of key factors, this article seeks to shed light on the nuanced strategies and methodologies that factories can employ to ensure a swift, organized, and secure evacuation process.

Large production factories, often sprawling complexes with numerous departments and diverse operations, demand tailored emergency preparedness plans. These plans must be meticulously crafted, taking into account the specific risks associated with the materials used,

machinery employed, and the layout of the facility. Moreover, they should be dynamic documents, evolving in response to changes in the industrial landscape and advancements in technology. Such preparedness plans serve as the bedrock upon which a safe evacuation strategy is built, providing a structured framework for employees to follow during emergencies.

Beyond the written guidelines, the human element plays a pivotal role in the successful execution of evacuation procedures. Employee training and awareness programs are crucial components of any evacuation strategy. Regular drills and simulations not only familiarize employees with evacuation routes and assembly points but also cultivate a sense of preparedness and confidence. These initiatives instill in employees the understanding of their roles and responsibilities, ensuring a collective and organized response during emergencies. The article will delve into the importance of these training programs, emphasizing their role in enhancing overall safety awareness within the workforce.

Additionally, the advent of technology has ushered in a new era of possibilities in the realm of workplace safety. Integrating advanced technologies such as smart sensors and mobile applications can significantly enhance evacuation procedures. Real-time monitoring systems can detect anomalies, triggering automatic alerts and facilitating quicker response times. Mobile apps equipped with geolocation services can provide employees with personalized evacuation routes and real-time updates, empowering them with instant information at

their fingertips. The article will explore the innovative technologies reshaping the landscape of factory evacuations and highlight their practical applications.

Furthermore, the layout and design of evacuation routes and safe zones within factories are pivotal in ensuring a swift and orderly evacuation. Well-marked, obstruction-free evacuation routes, coupled with strategically positioned safe zones equipped with fire-fighting equipment and medical supplies, are indispensable elements of an effective evacuation plan. The article will underscore the importance of meticulous planning in this regard, outlining best practices and considerations for designing efficient evacuation pathways and safe zones within industrial complexes.

Collaboration with local emergency services forms another linchpin in the safe evacuation framework. Establishing clear communication channels and coordination protocols with fire departments, medical facilities, and other relevant authorities can significantly enhance the factory's emergency response capabilities. Joint drills and training exercises with these external agencies foster mutual understanding and seamless collaboration, ensuring a harmonized response effort during actual emergencies. The article will delve into the nuances of such collaborations, emphasizing their role in bolstering the overall resilience of large production factories.

In essence, this article serves as a short review, shedding light on the multifaceted determinants of safe evacuation in large production factories.

By dissecting the intricate interplay of preparedness plans, employee training, technology integration, efficient layout design, and collaborative efforts with local emergency services, this article aims to provide valuable insights for factory managers and safety professionals. As industrial landscapes continue to evolve, staying ahead of the curve in terms of evacuation strategies is not just a choice but a necessity—a commitment to the safety and well-being of the workforce that forms the backbone of the industrial world.

### **Defining evacuation. A strategic lifesaving endeavor in industrial contexts**

In the intricate landscape of industrial safety, evacuation emerges as a pivotal and carefully orchestrated process, representing a lifeline during moments of crisis within large production factories. Evacuation, in its essence, embodies a systematic and strategic approach aimed at promptly and securely relocating individuals from potentially perilous environments to designated safe areas in the event of emergencies. It serves as a tangible manifestation of preparedness, representing the culmination of comprehensive planning, clear communication, and structured procedures meticulously designed to safeguard lives and minimize injuries amidst imminent danger. Evacuation procedures are not mere protocols; they are dynamic strategies rooted in the fundamental principle of protecting the workforce, ensuring their well-being, and mitigating

risks effectively. Polish laws governing workplace safety and evacuation procedures are primarily outlined in the Labor Code<sup>1</sup> and further specified in regulations<sup>2</sup>. Compliance with these regulations is mandatory for all businesses, regardless of size or industry, and non-compliance can result in severe penalties and legal consequences.

Evacuation, in various contexts, refers to the organized process of relocating individuals from a potentially hazardous environment to a place of safety during emergencies. In the realm of workplace safety, it signifies the structured and systematic movement of employees away from danger, utilizing predetermined pathways and safe zones. From a military standpoint, evacuation involves the strategic withdrawal of forces from hostile territories to preserve manpower and resources<sup>3</sup>. In the context of natural disasters, it denotes the prompt removal of residents from areas prone to calamities, such as hurricanes or floods, mitigating the risk of harm<sup>4</sup>. Considering these definitions, evacuation can be universally defined as a carefully planned and coordinated effort to ensure the safety and well-being of individuals by guiding them away from imminent threats toward designated secure locations, emphasizing the importance of clear communication, well-marked routes, and mutual support among evacuees.

Evacuation, within the sphere of industrial safety, is not merely a procedural task; it embodies a strategic and lifesaving endeavor crucial for the well-being of employees during emergencies. The main determinants of ensuring a safe evacuation in large production factories are rooted in meticulous planning and proactive measures. Comprehensive emergency preparedness plans, tailored to the specific risks of each factory, form the bedrock of a successful evacuation strategy. Employee training and awareness programs play an equally vital role, fostering a culture of preparedness and confidence among the workforce. Clear communication channels are indispensable, guiding individuals with precision and timeliness. The integration of technology, such as smart sensors and mobile applications, enhances evacuation efficiency. Thoughtfully designing evacuation routes and safe zones ensures an organized and swift movement of individuals to secure areas. Collaboration with emergency services, marked by clear communication protocols and joint drills, cements a unified response effort. The synergy of these determinants orchestrates a comprehensive and effective approach, transforming evacuation from a set of procedures into a strategic and lifesaving initiative within the industrial landscape.

1 Act of 26 June 1974 *Labor Code* (Dz.U. //Journal of Laws/ of 2014, item 1465), Article 207.

2 Act of 24 August 1991 *on fire protection* (Dz.U. //Journal of Laws/ of 2022, item 2067).

3 Army Techniques Publication No. 4-02.13. Headquarters Department of the Army. Washington, DC, 30 June 2021, p. 12.

4 *Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa*, Warszawa 2008, p. 40.

## Comprehensive Emergency Preparedness Plans. Safeguarding the heart of industrial safety

In the dynamic and high-stakes environment of large production factories, the foundation of a secure and efficient evacuation process rests upon the meticulous construction of Comprehensive Emergency Preparedness Plans. These plans are not mere documents, they are living, breathing roadmaps that navigate employees through the labyrinth of potential hazards during emergencies, be it a fire outbreak, chemical spill, or any other critical incident<sup>5</sup>. Standards like Environmental Management Systems (ISO 14001)<sup>6</sup> and Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems (ISO 45001)<sup>7</sup> is a useful tools for creating such plans.

The first step in crafting an effective emergency preparedness plan is a thorough risk assessment<sup>8</sup>. Factories are diverse entities, ranging from manufacturing plants dealing with volatile chemicals to assembly lines operating complex machinery. Understanding the specific risks associated with the materials used, machinery present, and the layout of the facility is paramount. A 'one-size-fits-all' approach simply won't suffice. Instead, plans must be tailored to the unique challenges posed by each factory, ensuring that responses are

finely tuned to the intricacies of the industrial processes.

Static plans are destined to fail in the face of ever-evolving industrial landscapes. Comprehensive Emergency Preparedness Plans need to be dynamic, constantly adapting to accommodate changes in technology, workforce, and regulations. Regular reviews and updates are essential to keep pace with advancements and to incorporate lessons learned from past drills and real-life incidents. This adaptive approach ensures that the plan is always relevant and effective, regardless of how the factory environment transforms over time.

While expertise from safety professionals is invaluable, the insights of the employees who navigate the factory floor daily are equally important. Employees often have unique perspectives on potential risks and challenges specific to their roles. Incorporating their input in the planning process not only enriches the plan but also fosters a sense of ownership and responsibility among the workforce. Employees who actively contribute to the creation of the plan are more likely to internalize its protocols, leading to a more effective response during emergencies.

Creating Comprehensive Emergency Preparedness Plans (CEPP) documentation is a critical step in ensuring the safety and resilience of large production factories. This documentation serves as a comprehensive guide outlining procedures, protocols, and strategies to be

5 R. Gates, *Be prepared for disasters*, "Occupational Health & Safety" 2015, p. 50-51.

6 PN-EN ISO 14001:2015-09 *Systemy zarządzania środowiskowego. Wymagania i wytyczne stosowania*.

7 PN-ISO 45001:2018-06 *Systemy zarządzania bezpieczeństwem i higieną pracy. Wymagania i wytyczne stosowania*.

8 M. Bienias, K. Czerniak, T. Ewertowski, *Preparation of an enterprise for emergency situations and their better communication*, "Informatyka Ekonomiczna" 2019, 3(53), p. 9-22.

implemented in the event of emergencies, ranging from natural disasters to industrial accidents. Below is a suggested structure for CEPP documentation:

1. Executive Summary:

- Overview of the purpose and importance of the Comprehensive Emergency Preparedness Plans.
- Brief summary of key components and objectives.

2. Introduction:

- Background information on the factory and its operations.
- Regulatory context and compliance requirements.
- Statement of commitment to safety and emergency preparedness.

3. Risk Assessment:

- Detailed analysis of potential hazards and risks associated with the factory's operations.
- Identification of vulnerabilities and potential consequences of emergencies.

4. Emergency Response Team:

- Formation and roles of the emergency response team.
- Contact information for key personnel.
- Chain of command and communication protocols.

5. Emergency Procedures:

- Specific procedures for various types of emergencies (e.g., fire, chemical spill, natural disaster).
- Evacuation procedures, including designated routes and assembly points.
- Shelter-in-place protocols.

6. Evacuation Plans:

- Evacuation maps with clearly marked exit routes and safe zones.

- Procedures for assisting individuals with disabilities during evacuation.

- Coordination with local authorities for large-scale evacuations.

7. Communication Protocols:

- Methods of communication during emergencies (e.g., alarms, intercom systems, mobile applications).
- Protocols for internal and external communication, including with emergency services.

8. Training and Drills:

- Schedule and details of regular training sessions for employees.
- Documentation of emergency drills, including scenarios and outcomes.
- Continuous improvement strategies based on drill evaluations.

9. Equipment and Resources:

- Inventory of emergency equipment (e.g., first aid kits, firefighting equipment).
- Procedures for maintenance and regular checks of emergency resources.

10. Community Engagement:

- Collaboration with local emergency services and community organizations.
- Information-sharing initiatives to enhance overall community preparedness.

11. Documentation Review and Updates:

- Schedule for periodic review and updates of the CEPP documentation.
- Process for incorporating lessons learned from drills and real emergencies.

Comprehensive Emergency Preparedness Plans stand as the bedrock of industrial safety. Tailored to the specific risks of each factory, embracing technological advancements, incorporating employee insights, and subjected to regular simulations, these plans are not just documents stored on shelves; they are dynamic tools that empower factories to safeguard their most valuable asset – their workforce. By investing in the creation and continuous improvement of these plans, factories pave the way for a safer, more secure future, where every employee can confidently navigate the challenges of emergencies, emerging unscathed and resilient.

## Employee training and awareness. Fostering a culture of safety

The significance of employee training and awareness cannot be overstated. This multifaceted component forms the backbone of a resilient industrial safety framework, geared towards cultivating a vigilant and prepared workforce. The strategic design of training programs goes beyond routine procedural learning, delving into the intricacies of emergency preparedness, evacuation protocols, and the adept use of safety equipment. Regular drills and simulations, integral to these initiatives, serve as immersive experiences, enabling employees to not only comprehend theoretical concepts but also apply them in real-time scenarios. These practical exercises not only validate the effectiveness of emergency procedures but also instill a profound

sense of confidence among employees, empowering them to respond decisively and efficiently during actual crises.

Moreover, employee training and awareness extend far beyond the procedural domain. These initiatives incorporate comprehensive education on specific workplace hazards, offering a nuanced understanding of potential risks associated with the manufacturing processes. By arming employees with knowledge about the intricacies of their work environment, these programs contribute significantly to the creation of a safety-conscious culture. This heightened awareness transforms employees into proactive participants in their own safety, fostering a collective commitment to identifying, reporting, and mitigating risks.

Employee training and awareness programs are diverse and tailored to the specific needs and risks of the workplace. Here are several types of training and awareness initiatives commonly implemented in large production factories:

1. **Emergency Response Training.** Teaches employees how to respond effectively in various emergency situations, including fires, chemical spills, and natural disasters. Covers evacuation procedures, first aid techniques, and the use of emergency equipment.
2. **Evacuation Drills.** Conducts simulated evacuations to familiarize employees with evacuation routes, assembly points, and safe zones. Enhances the speed and efficiency of evacuation procedures during real emergencies.

3. **Fire Safety Training.** Focuses on preventing, detecting, and responding to fires. Includes training on the proper use of fire extinguishers, evacuation procedures, and techniques for minimizing fire hazards.
4. **Chemical Safety Training.** Informs employees about the safe handling, storage, and disposal of hazardous chemicals. Provides guidance on using personal protective equipment (PPE) and understanding chemical labels.
5. **First Aid and CPR Training.** Equips employees with basic first aid skills and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) techniques. Trains designated personnel as first aid responders to provide immediate assistance in medical emergencies.
6. **Health and Safety Orientation.** Introduces new employees to workplace health and safety policies, procedures, and expectations. Covers general safety rules, reporting mechanisms, and the location of emergency equipment.

Employee training and awareness emerge not merely as obligatory routines but as dynamic tools shaping a culture of safety within large production factories. By nurturing a workforce equipped not only with the know-how of emergency protocols but also with a profound understanding of workplace risks, these initiatives become instrumental in creating an environment where safety is not just a protocol but a shared responsibility, ensuring the well-being of every individual within the industrial landscape.

## Clear communication channels. Pinnacle of safety infrastructure in large production factories

The diverse array of communication mediums, ranging from traditional intercom systems and alarms to modern digital messaging boards and cutting-edge mobile applications, embodies the complexity and sophistication required for effective communication in the modern industrial milieu. Each channel, uniquely tailored to its purpose, plays a pivotal role in transmitting crucial instructions, raising alarms, and providing guidance, particularly during evacuation procedures. The goal is clear – to ensure that every employee is not only made aware of the unfolding situation, but is also equipped with the knowledge and understanding needed to respond swiftly and effectively.

Precision in communication is non-negotiable, as the efficacy of evacuation efforts hinges on the clarity and immediacy of information dissemination. Alarms, with their blaring urgency, convey the need for immediate action, while digital interfaces provide nuanced instructions, creating a layered approach to communication. This precision is not just a matter of operational efficiency but serves as a testament to the commitment to the safety and well-being of the workforce.

Beyond their instrumental functionalities, these channels serve as more than conduits for transmitting information; they are the catalysts fostering the development of a robust



safety culture within the factory. They contribute to an environment where trust is built on the reliability of information, and employees feel empowered and confident in their ability to respond to unforeseen challenges. In the grand orchestration of emergency protocols, Clear communication channels transcend being operational tools; they become the pillars supporting a collective commitment to safety, ensuring that the workforce stands united, well-informed, and ready to navigate the complexities of emergency situations.

These communication channels are not just components of the safety infrastructure; they are the connective tissue binding together the various elements that safeguard the well-being of every individual within the vast expanse of the factory floor. As technology continues to advance, the evolution of communication channels will remain integral to the ongoing enhancement of safety measures, creating a resilient and adaptive safety infrastructure that mirrors the ever-evolving landscape of large production factories. The commitment to fostering a culture of safety through seamless communication is not just a regulatory requirement but an ethical responsibility, ensuring that the workforce is not only productive but, more importantly, secure in their work environment<sup>9</sup>.

## Utilizing technology. Revolutionizing safety measures

The paradigm shift towards embracing cutting-edge technology is not just a trend but an imperative response to the evolving challenges of ensuring a secure work environment. From smart sensors to sophisticated monitoring systems, the utilization of technology has become synonymous with a proactive and adaptive approach to safety<sup>10</sup>.

One of the primary arenas where technology leaves an indelible mark is in the realm of evacuation procedures. The integration of advanced communication tools, such as mobile applications, allows for real-time alerts and personalized guidance during emergencies. These applications provide employees with dynamic information about evacuation routes, safe zones, and the unfolding situation, fostering a more informed and responsive workforce<sup>11</sup>. Moreover, the advent of smart sensors enables the continuous monitoring of environmental conditions, identifying potential hazards and triggering automated alarms, facilitating swift and targeted responses.

The augmentation of technology extends beyond real-time communication to the strategic design of evacuation routes. Advanced mapping and simulation software allow for the creation of dynamic and optimized evacuation pathways. These pathways are not static but adapt in response to the specific

9 V. Q. Nguyen, H.T. Vu, V.H Nguyen. K. Kim, *A Smart Evacuation Guidance System for Large Buildings*, „Electronics” 2022, No 11.

10 C.I. Nwakanma, F.B. Islam, M.P. Maharani, J.M. Lee, D.S. Kim, *Detection and Classification of Human Activity for Emergency Response in Smart Factory Shop*, „Applied Sciences” 2021, No 11.

11 U. Atila, Y. Ortakci, K. Ozacar, E. Emrullah Demiral, I. R. Karas, *SmartEscape: A Mobile Smart Individual Fire Evacuation System Based on 3D Spatial Model*, „Isprs International Journal Of Geo-Information” 2018, vol.7, No.6.

nature of an emergency, guiding individuals away from danger with precision. Additionally, the incorporation of technology in designing evacuation routes includes features such as augmented reality, providing visual cues that enhance situational awareness, especially in low-visibility conditions.

Furthermore, technology plays a pivotal role in training initiatives. Virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) technologies offer immersive training experiences, allowing employees to simulate emergency scenarios in a controlled environment. These simulations not only enhance the retention of emergency procedures but also instill a level of confidence and preparedness that is invaluable during real crises. The gamification of training modules, enabled by technology, adds an element of engagement, making the learning process more interactive and enjoyable<sup>12</sup>.

The utilization of technology in safety protocols is not without its challenges, ranging from initial implementation costs to concerns about data security. However, the long-term benefits far outweigh these challenges. Beyond immediate safety concerns, technology contributes to data-driven insights, allowing for the continuous improvement of safety protocols based on real-time information and historical trends.

The paradigm of utilizing technology in large production factories is not just about adopting the latest gadgets; it is a fundamental shift towards a more proactive, adaptive, and holistic

approach to industrial safety. The fusion of technology with safety measures is not an augmentation but a symbiosis, where the precision of sensors, the immediacy of communication tools, and the immersive nature of training technologies converge to create a resilient safety ecosystem. As technology continues to evolve, its role in industrial safety will remain pivotal, shaping a future where the workforce operates in an environment that is not only productive but, above all, secure and well-prepared for any unforeseen challenges.

## Evacuation routes and safe zones. Blueprinting safety

The meticulous design of evacuation routes and safe zones emerges as an art and science that goes beyond mere physical infrastructure. These components form the backbone of a comprehensive safety strategy within large production factories, outlining a navigational roadmap for employees to swiftly and safely traverse in the face of emergencies. Evacuation routes are not mere paths; they are dynamic lifelines intricately woven into the layout of the factory, a choreography of exit points strategically positioned to guide individuals away from potential hazards with precision.

The design of these routes requires a keen understanding of the factory's layout, operational nuances, and potential risks. Advanced mapping and simulation technologies have revolutionized this process, allowing for the creation

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<sup>12</sup> R. Lovreglio, A Review of Augmented Reality Applications for Building Evacuation, *17th International Conference on Computing in Civil and Building Engineering*, Tampere 2018; J. Cavalcanti, V. Valls, M. Contero, D. Fonseca, *Gamification and Hazard Communication in Virtual Reality: A Qualitative Study*, „Sensors” 2021, 21(14).

of optimized evacuation pathways that adapt in real-time based on the nature of the emergency<sup>13</sup>. Augmented reality features further enhance situational awareness, providing visual cues that aid in navigation, particularly in conditions of low visibility.

Safe zones, strategically positioned along evacuation routes, serve as sanctuaries amid the chaos. These areas are equipped with essential resources, including firefighting equipment, first aid supplies, and communication devices. The design of safe zones considers not only their physical proximity to evacuation routes but also factors in their capacity, accessibility, and resilience. These zones are not just designated spaces; they are islands of safety designed to provide employees with a temporary haven to regroup, assess the situation, and await further instructions.

The significance of meticulous design extends beyond the physical realm. It encompasses clear and comprehensive signage, ensuring that evacuation routes and safe zones are easily identifiable even in high-stress situations. This visual communication is a critical component, especially when time is of the essence.

Designing evacuation routes and safe zones transcends being a blueprint for physical structures; it is a strategic endeavor that encapsulates the very essence of industrial safety. It requires a synthesis of technological innovation, architectural precision, and a deep understanding of human behavior in emergency situations. As large production

factories continue to evolve, so too must the design of evacuation pathways and safe zones, creating an environment where safety isn't just a concept but a tangible and dynamic reality, ensuring the well-being of every individual within the vast expanse of the factory floor.

## Collaboration with emergency services. Forging Partnerships

Collaboration with emergency services stands as a linchpin, exemplifying a proactive and community-oriented approach to safeguarding lives and infrastructure. This collaborative endeavor extends beyond mere regulatory compliance; it represents a strategic partnership between the factory and local emergency services, a symbiosis designed to optimize response efforts in the face of unforeseen challenges.

At the heart of this collaboration lies the establishment of clear and efficient communication channels between the factory and emergency service providers. Joint planning sessions, regular meetings, and the development of standardized communication protocols ensure seamless coordination during emergencies. The aim is not just to inform emergency services of potential risks within the factory but to create a reciprocal understanding of each other's capabilities and limitations, fostering a relationship built on mutual trust and respect.

The collaboration extends to the staging of joint drills and exercises, where factory personnel and emergency service responders simulate various

13 A. Ramon, A. B. Rodriguez-Hidalgo, J. T. Navarro-Carri, B. Zaragoza, *A methodology for evacuation route planning inside buildings using geospatial technology*, "Data Management and Security" 2013, p. 155-166.

emergency scenarios. These simulations serve as invaluable training opportunities, allowing both parties to familiarize themselves with the factory layout, evacuation procedures, and potential hazards. The insights gained from these exercises contribute to the continuous improvement of emergency response plans, making them more robust and adaptive.

Collaboration with emergency services involves the development of contingency plans that outline specific roles and responsibilities for both the factory and emergency responders. This strategic alignment ensures that, in the event of a crisis, everyone is operating from the same playbook, minimizing confusion and optimizing the efficiency of response efforts.

Beyond the operational aspects, this collaboration also emphasizes community engagement. The factory becomes an active participant in local emergency planning initiatives, contributing resources, expertise, and support to broader community safety endeavors. This not only strengthens the factory's ties with the community but also enhances the overall resilience of the region to potential industrial incidents.

In instances where an emergency transcends the capabilities of the factory and local emergency services, collaboration with emergency services enables the establishment of a tiered response system that may involve regional or national resources. The ability to seamlessly integrate into larger emergency response frameworks ensures a comprehensive and adaptive approach to crisis management.

As technology advances, collaboration with emergency services also explores the integration of smart technologies, such as real-time monitoring systems and predictive analytics, to enhance the accuracy and speed of emergency response. The exchange of data between the factory and emergency services allows for a more informed and targeted deployment of resources, minimizing the impact of emergencies on both human lives and the surrounding environment.

The success of this collaboration hinges on transparent communication, joint training initiatives, and a shared commitment to fostering a resilient and secure environment. In a world where the unforeseen is inevitable, the strength of the collaboration between large production factories and emergency services becomes a beacon of preparedness, ensuring that, when the need arises, the response is swift, coordinated, and effective.

## Summary

This article delves into the intricate web of safety measures within large production factories, specifically focusing on the pivotal aspects of evacuation and emergency preparedness. Titled „Determinants of Safe Evacuation in Large Production Factories,” the article navigates through various facets, encapsulating the essence of industrial safety in a world where potential hazards are ever-present. The article begins by highlighting the critical role of Comprehensive Emergency Preparedness Plans as the foundation of

a resilient safety strategy. These plans, tailored to the unique risks of each factory, go beyond procedural outlines, encompassing risk assessments, roles, and responsibilities, and regular training sessions.

The article then delves into the significance of employee training and awareness, emphasizing the cultivation of a safety-conscious culture through ongoing education and immersive drills. It underscores the vital role of clear communication channels as the lifeline during emergencies, detailing how various mediums, from alarms to mobile applications, contribute to the clarity and immediacy of information dissemination. The exploration of utilizing technology unveils the transformative impact of smart sensors, monitoring systems, and virtual reality in enhancing safety measures.

A substantial section is dedicated to the evacuation Routes and safe zones. It outlines the dynamic nature of evacuation routes, utilizing advanced mapping and simulation technologies to create optimized pathways. Safe zones are portrayed as not just physical spaces but as strategic sanctuaries equipped to provide temporary shelter amid chaos.

Collaboration with emergency services underscores the importance of forging partnerships beyond regulatory obligations. Clear communication, joint drills, and community engagement emerge as key components, ensuring a seamless integration of efforts between the factory and local emergency services.

In essence, this article paints a holistic portrait of safety excellence in large production factories, portraying

evacuation and emergency preparedness not as isolated components but as interwoven threads in the fabric of industrial safety. It advocates for a proactive and community-oriented approach, where collaboration, ongoing training, and the judicious use of technology converge to create an environment where safety is not just a protocol but a shared commitment. As the industrial landscape continues to evolve, this holistic approach becomes paramount in fostering resilience, adaptability, and, above all, the well-being of the workforce within the expansive confines of large production factories.

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# PERCEPTION OF THE NATIONAL TOWARDS SECURITY SYSTEM FRANCE (HEXAGON)

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## Abstract

Security is an extremely important issue for the individual, society, and the country. Relys to provide protection against threats such as crime, terrorism, war, and diseases, accidents, or natural disasters. The security system of France is a big measure on the protection of citizens, because it is the value of life for the French most important. However, it should be remembered that security is not only a personal or state feeling but priority for the entire earth. Territorial protection is in the background, but isn't that what should be priority? What priorities are the most important to the French? What is the reason for their attitude nowadays? What are France's relations with Ukraine and Russia in the event of a conflict?

## Key words

Security, Threat, Nation, France, Priorities, History

## Introduction

What is the definition – safety<sup>1</sup>? Nothing more than a process, or a state in which we as individuals, as citizens, and as a society have no sense of hazards. This definition, like any other, is exposed to changes in the context of the era, in this case, paying attention to the interwar period, where in fact safety was the highest priority, everything would be lost. National security is a matter known from the beginning, as in the case of the Bible, when the first men, Adam, and Eve, were left to themselves on condition of observance of the principle from God – not to pluck the apple. The rule was broken, so along with this came a fear of possible danger. The human impulse was a desire to hide from God and remain in the state of security that was there at the time.<sup>2</sup> It was so important. Faith is for believers a refuge of peace and security, for it is said:” In peace I will lie down and fall asleep, for you alone, LORD, make I live safely<sup>3</sup>” which means that despite the threats that lie in wait for us, faith strengthens us in the belief that nothing with God in our hearts threatens us. In Ancient Egypt – how was the national security issue perceived? The above thought assured an army, which in turn consisted of highly trained and armed men. The Egyptian army consisted of many troops thanks to its numerous supplies. She was also involved in the construction of various towers, such

as wall defenses, that were supposed to prevent attacks from enemies. What did the situation look like in Ancient Greece? Well, very similarly, an impeccably trained army, consisting of citizens (soldiers) in city-states such as Sparta and even Athens. The Greeks, in contrast to the Egyptians, were known for their perseverance, discipline and zeal to fight. Ancient Rome was provided by the army, which was very well organized and equipped with weapons. It consisted of various branches, such as legit, cohorts, and manipulations. The Romans also built various fortifications, such as defensive walls and forts, to prevent attacks from enemies. In ancient China, national security was provided by the imperial army, which was organized hierarchically and consisted of various troops such as front and rear guards and regular and reserve troops. They also built various bastions, such as the Great Wall of China, to prevent attacks by enemies.

## Methodological and methodical assumptions

In preparing this essay, extensive research methods were used, allowing an in-depth observation of the French security system. The paper relied mainly on the analysis of white papers and national literature. When considering the current socio-political context in France, it was necessary to take into account issues of history, social tensions,

1 See: R. Zięba (ed.), *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe po zimnej wojnie*, Warsaw 2008.

2 M. Feltynowski, M. Zawistowski, *Threats related to the use of unmanned systems in emergency services*, “Safety & Fire Technology” 2018, Volume 51, p. 138-149.

3 <http://biblia-internetowa.pl/Ps/4/9.html> (access: 22.09.2023 r.).



migration, perception, science, social design and political change, which in turn influenced the approach to the security system at the time. As for the White Paper aspect, it provided us with a lot of solid data on security strategy, while the literature allowed us to understand the development and evolutionary history of a particular system. The country's history, as in the case of other countries, has had a great impact on the formation of national security policy. Social conflicts, migration and terrorism are important elements in the study of understanding security in France. In summary, the research methodology adopted allows for a comprehensive understanding of the French national security system, taking into account many social, political and historical aspects.

## From Global Threats to Personal Well-being

National Security is one of the most important issues today<sup>4</sup>. With technological development, globalization, and the increasing risk of terrorism and armed conflicts, this issue is becoming increasingly important for every country.<sup>5</sup> In our era, the above value is a global issue, and its protection is the task of the whole society. National Security includes a wide range of issues. It concerns both defense against external attacks and defense internally. In the case of an external threat, it is most often about border protection,

defense against aggression from other countries, and protection against terrorism and a cyberattack. Internal threats mainly concern criminal activities such as drug trafficking, smuggling, domestic terrorism, and corruption. Today's national security is particularly threatened by the development of new technology and increasing cybercrime. Cyberattacks on state institutions and private ones are becoming more frequent and technologically advanced. They may lead to the leakage of confidential information and the loss of control over critical infrastructure, such as power plants, telecommunications, and transport systems. Therefore, today, protecting cyberspace is as important as protecting borders or defending against terrorism. Another threat to national security is armed conflict. These days, wars are no longer just about one country or region, they are increasingly global. Conflicts in the Middle East and Africa have an impact on situations throughout the world. Therefore, the protection of peace and stability in the world has become one of the most important tasks for international organizations such as the United Nations or NATO. In addition to external and internal threats, national security is also threatened by climate change and related natural disasters. Global warming, changes in rainfall, and rising levels are just some of the factors that can lead to conflict, migration, or the loss of critical infrastructure.

4 W. Kitler, *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe RP, Podstawowe kategorie, Uwarunkowania, System*, Warsaw 2011, p. 15-36.

5 See: M. Feltynowski, M. Langer, *The role of EASeR project in enhancing search and rescue teams performance*, "Safety & Fire Technology" 2019, Volume 53, Issue 1, p. 130-143.

The Swiss political scientist Daniel Frei distinguished 4 types of security perception<sup>6</sup>:

- Insecurity state – when there is a large threat, and the perception is correct,
  - The state of obsession – when there are small threats, and the perception is as large,
  - State of false security – when there is a serious threat, but it is seen as small
- Security status – when there is a slight threat, and the perception is correct<sup>7</sup>.

Today, when many threats lurk at every step, paying attention to different types of safety is crucial for maintaining health and well-being. So, what kind of security do we have? The first is personal safety, which every person should feel in his daily life, it is about protection from violence, theft, health risks, and other risks. Safety and personal protection can be guaranteed by the use of appropriate protection measures, such as alarm systems, surveillance cameras, and lighting, as well as by avoiding dangerous situations and places. The second type is financial security. In XXI, the issue of money is extremely important, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic, when the prices of each product have increased dramatically. Ensuring financial safety is really important, so the question arises, how to achieve it? So, you should manage your finances in such a way as to avoid any debt, dispose of money responsibly, and, in the case of black hours (such as job loss), have savings and security. Safety cybernetics is the third type of security mentioned.

The year 2023 is connected with the fact that every individual, older or younger, has an internet connection in greater or lesser ways. From year to year, technology is developing more and more, and in the following years, avoiding technology will be impossible, so it is important to use the Internet. The use of the Internet is associated with many threats, including hacking, theft, fraud, viruses, and even violence. It is important to use strong passwords, avoid the use of cameras, and avoid suspicious sites on the Internet through any links or methods, including the use of tools. Health safety has been growing since the COVID-19 pandemic introduced many restrictions that were to serve only our safety. Any risks should be avoided, such as illness, infection, accidents, or other unpredictable situations. These are, of course, almost impossible to achieve even when using all the latest medical methods. We can help reduce the risk through regular medical examinations, healthy eating, physical activity or avoiding any dependencies. It is also worth taking care of your mental health through visits to the psychologist, talking to friends or the lack of the above-mentioned addictions. Of course, there are many types of security, and they could be exchanged for hours, but in scientific terms, we distinguish only three types of safety, and these are:

- Due to the area it covers: global – regional, international – national,
- Due to the attitude to the area of the state: internal – external,

<sup>6</sup> Prof. dr hab. Daniel Frei (1940–1988), Swiss political scientist, academic teacher at the University of Zurich, international security theorist, member of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

<sup>7</sup> D. Frei, *Sicherheit, Grundfragen der Weltpolitik*, Stuttgart 1997, p. 17–21.

- Due to the field in which it occurs: ecological – social, economic – information, physical – cultural, social – military, energy – political.<sup>8</sup>

Security is a matter that we have been taught since childhood, but it is not really that important, even though it is an important element. Students in schools should acquire knowledge about safety through classes and training in outposts. Security concerns not only military issues but also economic, social, technological, social, economic, etc. In schools, you should not only teach the basic things related to security, but, because it is only theoretical knowledge, visual classes should be conducted because, for the young mind, the exercises work best. In schools, they should discuss issues such as cybersecurity, international policy, and emergency management (e.g., success, accidents, fires, earthquakes). In addition, the science of national security should be conducted in an interdisciplinary manner with other fields of science, such as geography, history, politics, and mathematics. Such a perspective allows students to understand the complexity of issues related to national security and their impact on everyday life. The science of safety is crucial in the case of shaping a person or also shaping civic attitudes because learning about a given definition helps in thinking, “What can be done for yourself, for family, for friends, and for the nation within security?” The safety of our loved ones should be our top priority. Even the simplest actions, such as the science of road regulations, are able to improve

knowledge of this safety. It is important that in schools, the teaching of the subject of national security be conducted in an objective manner, independent of politics and propaganda. Unfortunately, in the XXI century, it is difficult to avoid the elderly passing along their own personal policies along with expressions of intolerance towards others.

## France’s Evolving Security Landscape

After understanding the tested definition, is it worth explaining what a national security system is?<sup>9</sup> The simplest definition may be that it is a community of institutions, procedures, activities, and tools for the protection of national interests and values, as well as ensuring the safety of every area of social life. The actions concerned are aimed at ensuring the security of the state, society, land, territory, and, of course, the citizens of a given country against all threats, internal or external. National security is the absolute minimum, but at the same time, it is also the most important element of the functioning of any country in the world. Of course, a given process requires constant monitoring of the situation and, at the time of danger, an immediate response to the danger posed. Another important element of the national security system is threat analysis. The modern world is very unpredictable and changeable, as each of us could already notice in any situation: wars (the situation on the eastern border of Poland), epidemics (COVID-19), etc.

8 <https://szkolnictwo.pl/szukaj,Bezpiecze%C5%84stwo> (access: 24.09.2023 r.).

9 <https://zpe.gov.pl/a/system-bezpieczenstwa-narodowego---ogolna-charakterystyka/D10Rh2ZnC> (access: 24.09.2023 r.).

Threats to security come from various sources, such as terrorism, epidemics, etc., cyberattacks, wars, armed conflicts, or ordinary political conflicts in the national arena. Such situations force the security system to conduct uninterrupted analysis and monitoring of the situation.

France is a country located in Western Europe, bordering countries such as Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Monaco, Spain, and Andorra. After Russia, it is the largest country in Europe. Its area is 551 695 km<sup>2</sup>, and it stretches from the Mediterranean coast to the Alps and the Pyrenees. The capital is Paris, which is known all over the world through numerous monuments such as Notre Dame Cathedral, the Eiffel Tower, or the Louvre. French wines, cheeses, and perfumes are products known for their precision, diligence, or simply good taste. French history is no less interesting than Polish history; this country has experienced such events as the French Revolution (May 5, 1789–November 9, 1799), which led to the uprising. It was the above-mentioned republic that introduced the three most important rules for this state: freedom, equality, and brotherhood. In the years 1940–1944, the above country struggled with the Vichy regime, which divided the inhabitants by some factors introduced by The Germans, but the national conflict was quickly resolved<sup>10</sup>. France is also one of the founders of the European Union, and he actively participates in political and

economic organizations internationally. The stretching of a helping hand by a given country is something on the agenda, as can be seen in the situation of the current war in Ukraine, through the supply of raw materials, humanitarian aid, or military aid. Contemporary France has a very well-developed economy that is based on tourism and trade. Science is extremely important to citizens, so it is not surprising that a nation has a very well-developed educational sector, with numerous universities or artistic schools at the forefront. What France looks like as a democracy is based on the Constitution, which clearly states that it is an indivisible state with a democratic and social republic at its head. There is a multi-party block system, which means that on the ground more than three political parties may be in force in a country and the main parties in France are:

- Revolutionary Communist League (Ligue communiste révolutionnaire),
- Workers' Fight (Lutte Ouvrière),
- Workers Party (Parti des travailleurs).<sup>11</sup>

In this nation reigns the presidential system, that is, a form of government in which power is divided between the president and the parliamentary system. Of course, the president, who is elected for a five-year term, is currently in this position, Emmanuel Macron's. The president has a representative function and is responsible for politics internationally, he is the formal chief commander of the army and has the right to issue decrees and countersign laws. The

<sup>10</sup> <https://www.polskieradio.pl/39/156/artykul/1168361,rzad-vichy-%E2%80%93-ratunek-dla-kraju-czy-hanba> (access: 24.09.2023 r.).

<sup>11</sup> <https://encyklopedia.pwn.pl/haslo/Francja-Partie-polityczne;4574117.html> (access: 30.09.2023 r.).

most important decisions in the country are made by the head of state. Legislative power, in turn, belongs to the bicameral parliament, including the National Assembly, which has 577 deputies, and the Senate, which has 348 deputies. The courts are divided into general military administrative courts and accounting courts. The law is based on the Constitution V of the Republic of 1958, which is still in force today and is the highest legal act in the whole country.

“New internal security strategy” (Novella Strategic de Securitate Interference in the Security Strategy) was announced in February 2021 by the current president, Emmanuel Macron. What strategy was actually announced? This is a strategy that aims to counteract any new potential threat, such as further terrorist attacks, or cybercrime, which is the most common danger in the XXI century. The new strategy assumes an increase in the number of police officers and more, because of the security services. Strengthening border control is also an inseparable element because it is there that many illegal things happen, including human trafficking. Another important element is the public’s awareness of the public about the authorities and the security services, because of French citizenship he believes that police officers only prevent crime, but do not believe that such services exist to help a country live better and safer. This approach of the French has been created for several years, through various types of violence used by people who are trying to avoid it. The awareness of

society is to be introduced through various types of lectures, dialogues, or a new partnership approach to solving problems by officers. As part of this strategy, it is also planned to increase the funds allocated to fight against organized crime and cybercrime.

France’s new security strategy is based mainly on five priorities, and these are:

- Knowledge and prediction,
- Prevention,
- Deterrence,
- Protection,
- Intervention.

Each priority covers France’s internal and external security. One can expect that the greatest emphasis and the greatest hopes are placed on knowledge and prediction, since it is considered that “Knowledge must be delivered as early as this possible decision-makers, military commander, and persons responsible for security internal and civil affairs to go from forecasts to action”<sup>12</sup>. For this purpose, it is planned to coordinate the interview within which the function of the coordinator for matters is guaranteed, an interview that, of course, falls under the authority of the president. The second priority, that is, prevention, connects all diplomatic tools, through economy, military, and culture, into one whole. This function consists of an immediate reaction upon the appearance of any threats to national security. France does not use nuclear weapons or tools, because it is the ultimate guarantor of its independence. Territorial protection and protection

12 *Le livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale* (p. 14–16), ([www.defense.gouv.fr/livre\\_blanc/les\\_conclusions\\_\\_1/le\\_livre\\_blanc\\_1\\_integrale/le\\_livre\\_blanc\\_1\\_integrale\\_\\_1](http://www.defense.gouv.fr/livre_blanc/les_conclusions__1/le_livre_blanc_1_integrale/le_livre_blanc_1_integrale__1)), (access: 24.09.2023 r).

of the public are the most important priorities for the French, because safety, including the country, insists on internal security to ensure the protection of civilians. Human life is the most important thing, and the above country shows it perfectly at every step. The citizens of this beautiful country can boast of empathy and respect for the other man, which in present times is a rarity, at least in their everyday lives. Intervention, on the other hand, refers to the external security of the country through the requirement of armed forces. The security and protection system of France is very extensive and aims to provide, as the name suggests, protection against threats of any kind. The basis of this strategy is to ensure the territorial integrity and security of citizens, as has already been mentioned. France has an extremely well-developed armed force, which includes a land army, navy, and air force, and participates in missions for peace within NATO and beyond. French security forces such as the police gendarmerie or Special Services are responsible, as in any other country, for ensuring internal security. For the past few years, France has changed its defense strategy, because it has focused on asymmetric threats. (With a broad sense asymmetric threats should be understood as a struggle in the public sphere, information struggle, and, hitting the opponent's weak point, unfair fight, and threat of using weapons mass destruction), such as transnational organized crime or very international terrorism is popular today<sup>13</sup>. The government actively supports and helps

its state develop cooperation in the European arena, as part of the initiative of the Association of European Nations. 1949 was the year of France's accession to NATO, or NATO for short, and it has since been one of the five member states with permanent membership in the UN Security Council. The North Atlantic Alliance is extremely important in French foreign policy, because it mostly fills this country with a wide range of benefits, but also with commitments. In any other organization, there is no one-sided action. As a result of the above situation, France takes part in missions and operations whose aim is to combat and respond to any armed conflict, stabilize the situation in countries in crisis, and ensure the protection of member states. Another benefit can be the fact that the organization enables the development of cooperation with other countries (partners), and, in times of crisis, reaches out and stabilizes the national situation. Despite reaching out a helping hand, thanks to cooperation, France gains new experiences, new technology, knowledge, and fashion, which increase the development of a given country. One thing is Europe's stability and security, which are really crucial for the interests of any state, including France, of course. As it was before the aforementioned, nothing works unilaterally, so the above country must comply with certain obligations to the organization, such as supporting a defense initiative and maintaining adequate protective capacity. Money in these times is very important, and so France also contributes

13 <https://ine.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/INE.zagrozeniaasymetryczneiichwplyw.pdf> (access: 18.09.2023 r.).

financially to the NATO budget. If it is about summarizing the relationship between France and NATO, it is a North Atlantic alliance that offers many benefits in the form of security, stability, and development, but at the same time it requires certain obligations and behaviors on the part of France. As we have known for several years, The North Atlantic Alliance is not the only partner of France, and another important organization is The European Union, which, like NATO, provides a wide range of benefits. One of the positives is access to the single market, which of course allows easier trade with other European countries, which unfortunately can also bring losses and various types of dangers, such as the possibility of introducing terrorists to a given country. The European Union boosts the competitiveness of French companies, so the motivation is still greater. In addition, you can often hear about common policies in many areas, such as, for example, health or environmental and cultural protection in a given area. France, as it is known to be one of the largest European countries, plays a really important role in making some decisions, especially regarding the future. At the same time, the above Organization requires certain obligations, such as, for example, achieving European policy objectives, respecting the internal market, and respecting all the rules. Another task on the part of France is to respect values, the rule of law, and democracy – priorities for the citizens of the Union. As in the case of NATO, the European Union requires a financial contribution from France.

## Priorities, Principles, and Global Standing

In the French White Paper, five strategic priorities are presented. In addition, they have been ordered in a hierarchical way, that is, in order from the most important to the least important, which, however, does not mean that the last point does not have high weight:

- Territorial protection of the state and citizens of France, and guarantee the duration of the necessary functions of the State. France and other countries face many dangers on a daily basis, starting with terrorism, through pandemics, and ending with cyberattacks. Avoiding any threats is extremely difficult, if at all possible. The internal and external security of a country is a priority to protect the citizens, and as was mentioned before for the French, human life is highlighted. The above country invests a lot of funds, security services, and education in a given field at a very high level to ensure only effective protections,
- Guaranteeing the common security of Europe and the North Atlantic. France plays a high role in NATO and strives to maintain stability in its own territory. The country is involved in a number of military operations and peacekeeping missions to ensure the avoidance of any conflict or spread of other threats. France is also one of the initiators of The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which aims to enable the EU to effectively respond to crises, conflicts and threats. This country seeks to create European armed forces and strengthen the

EU's military capabilities. During the armed conflict in Ukraine, it was involved in many dialogues with Russia in order to increase security in the area,

- Stabilization of the neighborhood of Europe. France shall organize such activities by developing dialogues with countries at risk, as in the case of Russia in the conflict with Ukraine, or talks in North Africa and the Balkans. The country is involved in initiatives to stabilize its neighbors through, for example, the peace process in Syria, negotiations with Iran on a nuclear program, and the fight against terrorism in Africa's North and Sahel. France believes that only stable and well-managed neighboring countries within the European Union can contribute to the stability and security of the EU,
- Stabilization of the Middle East and the Gulf States. Of course, security in these regions is crucial to the preservation of the international community. France is famous for its commitment to the fight against terrorism in the Middle East and its support of an international coalition against the Islamic State. Human life is the most important thing; the sowing of humanitarian aid is spread on a very large scale, for example, people affected by the conflict in Syria. The state prides itself on being the initiator of the international agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, the aim is to prevent the development of nuclear weapons in Iran because, as you know, between the above country and the Western countries, the situation is

tense. The country works to this end, both within the European Union and in consultation with regional partners such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey,

- Contributing to world peace. France is an active member of the European Union and NATO, thanks to which it is involved in conflict resolution as a member of the UN Security Council. It acts to maintain peace in the world through peacekeeping missions, such as in Mali or Lebanon. Military-diplomatic actions, humanitarian aid, or support for the targeted countries' terrorism are just some of the things that France does on a daily basis. Collaboration and international and interstate dialogue are key to achieving world peace, and France is one of the leaders of this initiative.

France has five vectors in its security system, the key elements of the Strategy, which are at the same time the basic objectives of French policy defensively.

- Knowledge and prejudice – education in France is achieved at a very high level so that the young generation can in the future create their own state that is safe, secure, and democratic, which could be an authority for others. This country acts to counteract any threats that can only be imagined,
- Nuclear deterrence – France has a very well-equipped arsenal of nuclear weapons and considers it a fundamental part of its deterrence strategy, but it also considers it a final weapon, when diplomatic actions do not work, and the country of terrorism does not want to cooperate in any way. Nuclear weapons are considered the most dangerous but also the best-acting factor,



because they will effectively deter but at the same time kill,

- Protection – France defends its territory in a very effective way, including more of its citizens and interests around the world. The state tries to do everything to protect your own borders against threats such as terrorism or organized crime. The French government puts people first, which is why, immediately after the protection of citizens residing in the territory of France, it provides all possible resources for people of French origin outside the country,
- Prevention: The above country acts to counter threats before they become a real problem. The country is working for this purpose in an international framework organizations such as the UN, NATO and the EU. As a partner and member of the above organizations, he works in peacekeeping missions, extends a helping hand, and receives it,
- Intervention – France is the ultimate factor in the work to resolve conflicts within a given country, or problems of international rank, through diplomatic, peacekeeping and possibly military interventions. As has been repeated many times, the country believes that world stability is the key to its own security.

Despite its priorities, France also has four main rules for the implementation of its security and defense strategy:

- The principle of strategic autonomy means that the state constantly strives to possess its own military but also political capabilities, which in turn allow it to make decisions

on safety by itself. As it was before, France invests a lot of money in the development of its armed forces, such as the army, navy and aviation. Under this principle, France also seeks to possess independent technological capabilities, such as the production of various types of weapons. The principle of strategic autonomy also includes political issues, as well as taking international decisions independently of any other country. Strategic autonomy is one of the key elements of the concept of national defense in the country, and it allows the country to maintain its independence in crisis situations and to take effective measures for the security and defense of the country,

- Another important rule is the principle of consistency in the military model, which means that France strives to create a unified, common, democratic model of the military. Such forces enable effective action for security because soldiers have awareness of their high rank, which is currently very difficult to gain. This principle is based on key elements such as joint action in crisis situations or integrating different types of forces. The concept of reservists is also extremely important, and it is important because having a well-developed army is the key to success. The French reserve forces consist of professional soldiers and civilians who, of course, have reached the appropriate degree and have undergone the applicable training and preparation. The consistency of the military model also includes the development of cyber-encrypted capabilities and

electronics, which at the present time are the total minimum. In pursuit of consistency, the army enables effective action in crisis situations to protect interests and safety,

- The principle of behavior of various types of armed forces to implement strategic functions, it consists of maintaining a variety of military forces, including land, sea and aircraft. The purpose of this principle is to provide flexibility and enable adaptation to a very volatile situation on the international stage. The above rule is hard to maintain and requires a high level of training and equipment for every possible situation. That is why France invests in modern military technologies, such as drones, warplanes, submarines and rockets, to provide its forces with an adequate level of operational capacity,
- The principle of the need to look for opportunities to share skills together consists of striving to maximize the use of defense potential through cooperation with other countries. France is committed to developing cooperation with other countries in the framework of NATO, the EU and other international structures to strengthen its defensive potential. This cooperation shall include both the exchange of experience and the provision of military capabilities, such as air defense systems, transport military systems, or reconnaissance and surveillance systems. This way, the state is able to perform its defense tasks in a more effective and efficient manner, increasing your security in an international dimension.

The political and military conditions in France are important for the strategy, security, and defense of the country. It is a country with a rich political history, which has influenced its current position on the international stage. Politically, France is a semi-presidential republic in which the president serves as head of state. Systemic political power is based on the principle of the separation of powers, which means that the executive power, the judiciary, and the legislature are independent and separate. As part of its foreign policy, it aims to maintain independence and autonomy in decision-making, and to maintain its role as a key player in Europe and the world. In military terms, France has one of the largest and most technologically advanced troops in Europe. The French army consists of five types of armed forces: the land army, the navy, the air force, the space air force, and the National Guard. It is also one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, which gives it an impact on safety decision-making at the international level. The military and political conditions of France influence its strategy on security and defense, including decisions on the use of armed forces in international operations and the selection of appropriate tools and means to protect the country and its citizens.

France is one of the most important world powers, both politically and militarily. This country is one of the most important organizations internationally, such as NATO, the G7 Group, the G20 or the International Energy Agency. France maintains close relations with

the US, as well as with Russia and China. Cooperation with the USA is particularly important in the context of NATO and the fight against terrorism, while relations with Russia and China are often dominated by economic and strategic issues. At the same time, France is also acting as a leader in Africa and the Middle East. In the military-political field, France has conducted military operations in various regions of the world, including Syria, Mali, Chad, the Central African Republic, and Iraq. One of the priorities for France is also the development of its defense industry and military capabilities, including the maintenance of nuclear ones<sup>14</sup>.

France, like many other countries, faces various threats of security. Below are some of the most serious threats that France he can now bet:

- Terrorism: Recent years have been extremely difficult for the French because of terrorism. Torched cars, the use of firearms, or various forms of violence in this physical were at the beginning of the day, despite the fact that in a given country there are three main principles of freedom, equality and fraternity, and unfortunately, political conflicts occur in every part of the world, some of which are more or less visible,
- Cybersecurity: Technology is something that is constantly growing, becoming bigger and more powerful. Computers nowadays are an inseparable part of everyday life. The country is struggling with a given danger in various forms, such as phishing, ransomware and DDoS attacks,
- Organized crime: France is struggling with problems such as the trade of drugs and people, the falsification of documents, identity theft, migration of people, etc., and the smuggling of illegal substances, all these are the actions of gangs that operate on the territory countrywide,
- Pandemic COVID-19: fortunately, the name sometimes passes as part of the epidemic, but before it completely disappears, it will be a few more years. This is a huge challenge for France, despite the threat to public health, this pandemic is affecting national, economic, political or international relations,
- Immigration: A mixture of different cultures that you may encounter in France may cause intolerance, which is something that most people struggle with; however, this does not mean that it is inevitable. Multiculturalism brings risks such as xenophobia, assimilation, radicalism and social exclusion,
- Religion: in France, you can encounter several religions, from Christianity through Buddhism up to Judaism, although every religion prohibits crime. In the middle, religion grows a sense of superiority over its own, through which are born different kinds of conflicts,
- Espionage: in every European country, the practice is used to obtain secret information and data for the benefit of another country. This can be useful in times of war,
- French citizens staying abroad are also exposed to various threats, including

<sup>14</sup> [https://www.gdr-elsj.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/conclusions\\_decembre\\_2014.pdf](https://www.gdr-elsj.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/conclusions_decembre_2014.pdf) (access: 24.09.2023 r.).

terrorist threats, organized crime, and the dangers arising from political unrest and armed conflicts. French diplomacy and security services are taking a number of actions to ensure the safety of their citizens abroad.

## Summary

To sum up, France is a member and organizer of many international organizations, such as the UN, NATO, and the European Union, which act to increase security in their countries and the countries of the agreement. On the first level, France always puts the life of another person first, which can be seen on many international levels. The above country has a very well-developed safety structure and security system, and nuclear deterrence is finally the most effective decision. The stability of its neighbors and Europe's neighbors is a priority to guarantee your own safety. France participates in many peacekeeping missions, like those in Iraq or Russia. The above country is very positive and friendly towards others; it does not support violence, but for defense, citizens will do anything. Democratic governments operating on its territory are equally well organized, so it monitors every situation in the world that can create any threat or danger to your country.

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# ENTREPRENEURS LICENCED TO PROVIDE PERSONAL AND PROPERTY SECURITY SERVICES IN THE PREVENTION OF THE SPREAD OF A COMMUNICABLE HUMAN DISEASE

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## Abstract

March 2020 brought a major change in the functioning of public and economic spaces both in Poland and around the world, triggered by the spread of the human communicable disease COVID-19. Regrettably, though first perceived as temporary and not particularly affecting society and the economy, it has become long-lasting and led to a series of downright revolutionary changes. One such change was engaging entrepreneurs licensed to provide personal and property security services in managing the emerging public security threat. The COVID-19 crisis has necessitated the participation of personal and property security personnel in efforts to prevent the spread of the disease, primarily within protected premises. However, it appears that there is a lack of legal basis enabling private security personnel in Poland to carry out tasks in public security threat conditions, including during mass outbreaks of human communicable diseases.

## Key words

protection of persons, protection of property, human communicable disease, COVID-19, public security

## Introduction

Since the dawn of time, man has taken measures to prevent and counter emerging threats. Initially, threats to national security were limited to armed aggression by neighbouring countries. However, other facets of national security threats have been identified over the years. At the same time, it was concluded that ensuring the security of the state and its citizens requires addressing challenges, exploiting opportunities, and eliminating threats. The change in the traditional form of threats, previously of a predetermined and mostly military nature, and the emergence of asymmetric threats evolving along with civilisation's progress are influencing a transition in the approach to national security. Hence, the preparedness of security actors, enabled by an accurate identification of the nature of the threats, allows efficient action to be taken in emergencies. To guarantee development in a hazard-free environment requires a range of endeavours and the involvement of many stakeholders.

Today, the area of universal security, closely linked to other security domains, including public security, plays a vital role in national security. The term „universal security” can be construed in several ways, including as circumstances that ensure the protection of the life and limb of citizens and national assets

from the effects of natural and technological disasters.<sup>1</sup> In this context, one must note that the activities ensuring the protection of the life and limb of citizens and national assets, i.e. those aimed at the broadly understood protection of persons and property<sup>2</sup>, are also the responsibility of entrepreneurs licenced to provide personal and property security services.

## Entrepreneurs licenced to provide personal and property security services

As part of the present considerations, it is also necessary to clarify the term „entrepreneur licenced to provide personal and property security services”, as used in the title. Pursuant to the Act of 22 August 1997 on the protection of persons and property,<sup>3</sup> personal security services consist in activities aimed at ensuring the safety of life<sup>4</sup> and limb and bodily integrity. In turn, property security services involve preventing crimes and offences against property and damage resulting from such events, as well as preventing unauthorised persons from entering protected premises. Personal and property security services are provided in the form of direct physical protection and technical security. Direct physical protection may be carried out on a

1 B. Wiśniewski, J. Prońko, *Bezpieczeństwo powszechne*, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne RP w ujęciu systemowym i zadań administracji publicznej*, B. Wiśniewski, S. Zalewski (scientific eds.), Bielsko-Biała 2007, p. 24.

2 See: M. Feltynowski, M. Langer, *The role of EASeR project in enhancing search and rescue teams performance*, “Safety & Fire Technology” 2019, Volume 53, Issue 1, p. 130-143.

3 Act of 22 August 1997 on the protection of persons and property (Dz.U. /Journal of Laws/ of 2021, item 1995), Article 2(6), Article 15.

4 In itself, the phrase „safety of life (...)” already prompts the need to subject it to analysis.



permanent or ad hoc basis; it may also consist in the constant surveillance of signals transmitted, collected, and processed in electronic alarm devices and systems, and the escorting of money and other valuable or hazardous items. Technical security involves installing electronic alarm devices and systems to detect threats to protected persons and property, as well as their operation, maintenance, and repair at the sites where they are installed, and the installation of mechanical security devices and means, including their on-site operation, maintenance, repair, and emergency opening.

Pursuant to the Act in question, security tasks on „behalf of an entrepreneur licenced to provide personal and property security services”<sup>5</sup> or as part of an internal security service, i.e. armed and uniformed personnel employed by entrepreneurs or organisational units to protect them, <sup>6</sup>shall be performed by security officers, i.e. persons performing security tasks and entered on the list of qualified physical security personnel or qualified technical security personnel or persons performing security tasks to the extent not requiring entry on these lists. In turn, the applicable legal definition of an entrepreneur is contained in the Act of 6 March 2018 — *Entrepreneurs’ Law*<sup>7</sup>. According to the Act, an entrepreneur is a natural or legal person or an organisational unit that is not a legal person, which is granted legal capacity under

a separate act and performs business activity. Partners in a civil law partnership are also entrepreneurs to the extent of their business activities. Considering the above, an entrepreneur licenced to provide personal and property security services may be a natural person, a legal person, an organisational unit that is not a legal person or a partner in a civil law partnership pursuing economic activity in the field of personal and property security services under a licence they obtained. To standardise terminology, this article assumes that an entrepreneur licenced to provide personal and property security services is to be construed as a personal and property security agency (PPSA).

## Research question

One of the aims of science is to seek to know the objective truth about reality, to satisfy human cognitive needs and to improve people’s practical activities.<sup>8</sup> „Creative work mostly consists in finding or establishing new connections between already known phenomena, things, their parts, or between known concepts or other reflections of phenomena”.<sup>9</sup> The newer components and connections, the more creative the work is. The output of any creative work is „some kind of work, that is, an objective result”,<sup>10</sup> which is the objectified act of the human creator. Research into the use of PPSAs for tasks related to

5 Act of 22 August 1997 *on the protection of persons and property...*, Article 2(6).

6 *Ibidem*, item 8.

7 Act of 6 March 2018 — *Entrepreneurs’ Law* (Dz.U. /Journal of Laws/ of 2023, item 221), Article 4.

8 See J. Ratajewski, *Elementy naukoznawstwa i główne kierunki rozwoju nauki europejskiej*, Katowice 1993, p. 13.

9 J. Pieter, *Praca naukowa*, Katowice 1960, p. 22.

10 *Ibidem*, p. 22.

managing public security threats in the form of human communicable disease outbreaks is still a unique activity. In this respect, the sole notable publication is Waldemar Szuwała-Banach's doctoral thesis titled „People and Property Protection Security Agencies Within the System of National Security”, written at the War Studies University under the academic supervision of dr hab. Andrzej Czupryński. The author believes that the lack of research initiatives in this area of national security is due to such things as the fact that the generally applicable laws and regulations do not directly stipulate that PPSAs are organisations responsible for ensuring public security in the Polish crisis management system.

## Historical perspective of the protection of persons and property in Poland

The response to the growing demand for security in the 1990s was a systematic increase in the number of personal and property security agencies on the market. In Poland, the private security services sector emerged as early as the late 1980s. The first licences to provide services in this area were issued after 1 January 1989 under the Act on business activity<sup>11</sup>. Until the entry into force of the Act on the protection of persons and property, the private security sector

operated under the provisions of the Act on business activity, the Criminal Code, and other acts. However, due to the ongoing legal transition and evolving risks, these regulations did not correspond to the new socio-economic reality of the 1990s.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, the lack of regulation resulted in multiple cases of abuse, as noted in a 1997 report by the Supreme Audit Office, which accelerated the development of the new Act. Consequently, on 22 August 1997, the Sejm of the Republic of Poland passed the Act on the protection of persons and property,<sup>13</sup> which sets out the areas, facilities and equipment subject to mandatory protection; the principles for the establishment and functioning of internal protection services; the principles for conducting business activity in the field of personal and property protection; the required qualifications and licences of security personnel, as well as issues related to supervising personal and property protection. The Act has been amended several times, bringing the original legislation into line with the need to ensure safety in today's security environment.

In the first decade of the 21st century, personal and property security services were also provided under the Act of 2 July 2004 on freedom of economic activity<sup>14</sup> and Regulations of the Minister of the Interior and Administration of 27 May 1998 on the types of documents required when applying for a licence to carry out business activity in the field of

11 Act of 23 December 1988 *on economic activity* (Dz.U. /Journal of Laws/ of 1988, No. 41, item 324).

12 J. Lipski, *Służby ochrony osób i mienia w systemie bezpieczeństwa publicznego – wybrane aspekty prawno-organizacyjne*, [www.dobrauczelnia.pl/upload/File/KONFERENCJE/bezpieczenstwo\\_obywatela](http://www.dobrauczelnia.pl/upload/File/KONFERENCJE/bezpieczenstwo_obywatela) (access: 02.01.2023 r.).

13 Act of 22 August 1997 *on the protection of persons and property* (Dz.U. /Journal of Laws/ of 1997 No. 114 item. 740).

14 Act of 2 July 2004 *on freedom of economic activity* (Dz.U. /Journal of Laws/ of 2004, No. 173, item 1807).

personal and property security<sup>15</sup> and of 27 May 1998 on the documents required when carrying out business activity in the field of personal and property security and the duration of its storage<sup>16</sup>.

At the time, starting a business in personal and property security required a licence specifying the scope and form of the business. Entrepreneurs who were natural persons could apply for a licence if they held a Level II Physical Security Officer licence or a Level II Technical Security Officer licence; however, this was changed on 1 January 2014. In cases where the applicant was not a natural person, the Level II licence had to be held by at least one person who was a partner in a commercial company, a member of the management board, a proxy or a proxy appointed by the entrepreneur to manage the activities specified in the licence.<sup>17</sup> The security officer licence was issued by the Voivodeship Police Chief with jurisdiction over the applicant's place of residence. On the other hand, the licence to conduct business activity in the field of personal and property security was issued, by way of an administrative decision, by the minister in charge of the interior at the entrepreneur's request and after consultation with the relevant Voivodeship

Police Chief. Unless a special legal provision gave it a different character, the Police Chief's opinion was merely their assessment of the facts based on statutory or subjective criteria and was not binding on the decision-making authority. While undoubtedly relevant to the final decision, this was but one piece of evidence in the administrative case.<sup>18</sup> Notably, operating in the field of personal and property security without a licence constituted an offence under Article 49 of the Act on the protection of persons and property.

According to the legal solutions of the time, the tasks of personal and property security, performed by internal protection services, i.e. armed and uniformed personnel employed by entrepreneurs or organisational units to protect them,<sup>19</sup> were performed by security personnel. Security personnel could be any holders of a Physical Security Officer licence or Technical Security Officer licence and performing security tasks as part of an internal security service or on behalf of an entrepreneur licenced to operate in the field of personal and property security or persons performing security tasks to the extent not requiring a licence. Today, as mentioned earlier, a security officer is construed as a person entered

15 Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration of 27 May 1998 on the types of documents required when applying for a licence to carry out business activity in the field of personal and property security (Dz.U. /Journal of Laws/ of 1998, No. 69, item 457).

16 Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration of 27 May 1998 on the documents required when carrying out business activity in the field of personal and property security and the duration of its storage (Dz.U. /Journal of Laws/ of 1998, No. 69, item 458).

17 Informator dla przedsiębiorców ubiegających się udzielenie koncesji Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji na prowadzenie działalności gospodarczej w zakresie usług ochrony osób i mienia, Warsaw 2010, [http://bip.mswia.gov.pl/portal/bip/4/26/Ochrona\\_osob\\_i\\_mienia.html](http://bip.mswia.gov.pl/portal/bip/4/26/Ochrona_osob_i_mienia.html) (access: 01.01.2023 r.).

18 Who can operate a business in the field of personal and property security services and under what conditions?, <http://e-prawnik.pl/biznes/prawo-spolnek/dzialalnosc-gospodarcza/artykuly/kto-i-na-jakich-zasadach-moze-prowadzic-dzialalnosc-gospodarcza-w-zakresie-uslug-ochrony-osob-i.html> (access: 23.12.2022 r.).

19 *Act on the protection of persons and property...*, Article 2(8)

on the list of qualified physical security officers or qualified technical security officers and performing security tasks as part of an internal security service or on behalf of an entrepreneur licensed to provide personal and property security services, or a person performing security tasks to the extent not requiring entry on these lists, acting on behalf of an entrepreneur licensed to provide personal and property security services.

Thus, carrying out physical or technical security tasks required one to hold a Physical or Technical Security Officer's licence.<sup>20</sup> Two variants of the licences were available: Level I and Level II. Still, working as a security officer to the extent not mentioned above did not require a licence. This was because the legislator imposed the licensing requirement only on those groups of employees who could perform certain activities using the authorisations granted to them under the Act on the protection of persons and property.<sup>21</sup>

A Level I Physical Security Officer licence was necessary for the following persons to carry out personal and property security services in the form of direct physical protection: members of specialist armed security outfits; members of teams escorting money and other valuable or hazardous items; security officers directly involved in personal protection; persons supervising and controlling the work of unlicensed physical security officers; security officers entitled to use force or firearms; security officers performing tasks in areas,

facilities and devices subject to mandatory protection. On the other hand, the Level II Physical Security Officer licence would entitle one to perform personal and property security services in the form of direct physical protection and to develop a security plan, as well as to organise and manage physical security personnel teams. In contrast, the Level I Technical Security Officer licence authorised one to carry out personal and property security services in the form of technical security. A Level II Technical Security Officer licence would also allow the holder to develop technical security plans and organise and lead technical security personnel teams.

## Summary

The situation surrounding the COVID-19 outbreak caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus has resulted in security officers, especially those on duty at the premises, being reassigned to tasks related to disease prevention, including controlling the temperature of people entering the premises. One key conclusion emerged as a result of the present research: it is necessary to amend Article 3 of the Act of 22 August 1997 on the protection of persons and property by adding item 3 reading as follows: „The protection of persons may also be carried out in other forms, if this results from the necessity to protect human life and limb”. If no such amendment is passed, there will be no legal basis for engaging private security personnel

<sup>20</sup> A licence serves as an authorisation to carry out personal and property protection services to the extent set forth in the law.

<sup>21</sup> How to become a security officer?, <http://e-prawnik.pl/biznes/prawo-pracy/pozostale-3/artykuly/jak-zostac-pracownikiem-ochrony-strona-13.html> (access: 02.01.2022 r.).

in Poland to carry out tasks in public security threat conditions, including during mass outbreaks of human communicable diseases. Further, there is a need to develop a training programme for security personnel to improve their qualifications and skills in dealing with persons infected or potentially infected with human communicable diseases and to establish rules for interacting with other entities involved in disease prevention.

Until the amendments to the Act on the protection of persons and property came into force in 2014, the services offered by the private security sector included the protection of facilities and premises, the escorting of money and valuables, personal protection of individuals and security at mass events. The outbreak of the COVID-19 communicable disease forced security personnel to handle additional tasks. Hence, the „privatisation of security” was and still is one of the ways to improve public safety. Yet, one must note that while the private security sector significantly improves public safety, this is only true if proper legislative solutions and adequate controls are in place to supervise this sector.

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# EVALUATION OF DRILLS ORGANIZED BY INSTITUTIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR CIVIL PROTECTION

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Human needs may be met both individually and in group settings. Among the latter is the necessity of security, which is related, among other factors, to the protection of the population.

The modern world has never been, is not, and will ever be devoid of threats to human security. Political, economic, and social tensions caused by conflicting interests generate threats ranging from military conflicts and terrorist attacks to organized crime, corruption,

and information security hazards. In the process of far-reaching globalization, natural disasters have gained widespread importance, the unpredictability and scale of the threats require that the state be supplied with the forces, as well as the means necessary to eliminate the consequences of these hazards. Ensuring an acceptable level of civil protection is primarily the responsibility of state power, which uses specialized institutions and state organs at its disposal<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> See: M. Miśta, *System bezpieczeństwa powszechnego RP*, [in:] *Organizacyjno-prawne aspekty ochrony ludności i obrony cywilnej w RP w XXI wieku w świetle doświadczeń krajowych i zagranicznych*, B. Wiśniewski (ed.), Bielsko-Biała 2010, p. 14.

“The concept of organized civilian protection (...) was born in Europe during the First World War (...). Influenced by the experience of the First World War, the ongoing changes in armaments after that war, especially the growing capabilities of aviation, chemical weapons and the accompanying theory of armed conflict, a picture of the future war and the dangers to the population and the economy at the rear of the front was created, a cruel war that engulfs entire nations.”<sup>2</sup> It has undergone significant transformations since those years. Today it is understood as a consolidated activity of all public administration bodies and entities carrying out tasks related to the protection of life and health of the population and property, environment, cultural heritage in conditions of occurrence of risks to general security<sup>3</sup>. Security understood as a process that ensures the protection of life and health of citizens and national property from the effects of natural and technical disasters.<sup>4</sup> It deserves to be emphasized here that this concept is different from environmental security, which refers to the natural surroundings, to vegetation, animals, water, air, and land. As the aforementioned definition indicates, the subject of universal safety is human life and health. Threats directly related to universal security are natural calamities, environmental disasters, and technical failures. Due

to changing climatic and atmospheric conditions, the most common disaster is a natural catastrophe, defined as “an extreme natural phenomenon causing significant damage to the area affected, often leaving behind an altered image of the earth’s surface.”<sup>5</sup> The occurrence of this phenomenon often comes unexpectedly wreaking havoc on a given territory, causing massive losses to the human economy, and directly threatens the lives of citizens.

The procedures of the institutions responsible for civil protection undoubtedly require scientific research, which boils down to the acquisition of information, and particularly the ordering and formation of scientific knowledge. The endeavours mentioned above concern not so much the need, but even the necessity of such research related to the functioning of the civil protection system and its improvement, the most effective form of which are the drills.

The essence of exercises organized by institutions responsible for civil protection is the development of knowledge, the formation of skills for solving problems in the field of this protective system (according to the competence of these institutions) and the formation of appropriate social attitudes. In order to be able to “develop” and “shape”, it is necessary to properly assess the level of activities performed by the practitioners. All this is done in order to

2 J. Suwart, *Zarys Obrony Cywilnej w Polsce w latach 1920-1996*, Warsaw 2003, p. 9.

3 B. Wiśniewski (eds.), *Organizacyjno-prawne aspekty ochrony ludności i obrony cywilnej w RP w XXI wieku w świetle doświadczeń krajowych i zagranicznych*, Bielsko-Biała 2010, p. 8.

4 B. Wiśniewski, S. Zalewski (eds.), *Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne RP w ujęciu systemowym i zadań administracji publicznej*, Bielsko Biała 2006, p. 35.

5 Ibidem.



adequately organize the process of rationalization of the professional development system.

Recent years are emerging as a period in the scientific literature devoted to, among other things, civil protection issues "(...) a time rich, as expected, in works of two types: summaries, syntheses and assessments (...) and forecasts (...). This is the focus that can be seen both in the output of study centres, projections, and analyses, as well as in the publications (...) of scientific research centres and universities (...) all over the world (...). The need for this very knowledge is, as can plainly be seen, derived from the primary motives of our, human activity – the need for existence and safe development concretized further by our individual or collective standards of existence and development: quality, pace, scale, relations, etc. This need is also universal, common to individuals, groups, organizations, regardless of their size, location, domain of activity"<sup>6</sup>. Tomasz Zwęglinski's monograph "Cognitive Problems of Evaluation of Civil Protection Exercises" (ISBN 978-83-966806-7-9), published by the Fire University in Warsaw in 2023, is devoted to these very problems.

The monograph in question is the result of a well-considered and properly adopted research concept, which consequently led to the development of a solidly constructed scientific work. It consists of three chapters preceded by an introduction and crowned by a conclusion.

In the introduction, the author assumes (not explicitly) that drills are

a type of practical training, in which the subjects of such activities are public administration bodies and managers of state organizational units, their serving offices, organizational structures for the operation of which the managers of the units are responsible, entrepreneurs and other organizational units, as well as social organizations that carry out tasks in the field of civil protection.

The first chapter entitled. "Diagnosis" was dedicated to establishing the legal basis for the organization of civil protection training exercises. It presents the need (and even the necessity) for the organization of drills, including their evaluation. It analyses and evaluates the current state of affairs of the reality under study. Valuable in this part of the work are considerations of a retrospective nature, the essence of which is a scientific look into the past. In general, they make it possible to identify the sources of risks and the requirements necessary to meet in the past in order to fully understand scientific theories. The content on exploratory possibilities should be equally appreciated, as they provide answers to the following questions: what state of affairs existed? why did the identified state of affairs occur? The contents of this chapter further indicate that the author realizes that the need for diagnosability is related to the hardship of finding points of contact between theory and reality.

The next chapter, entitled "Forecast," presents the assumptions of what the paper calls the rational concept of

6 *Nowe cechy i zdolności sił zbrojnych w kontekście wyzwań XXI wieku*, C. Rutkowski (ed.), Warsaw 2008, p. 5.

exercise evaluation. It systematizes and develops the knowledge of drill assessment into a theory based on the taxonomy of civil protection functions. Of particular interest in this part of the work is the content that refers in its essence to the intensity of change and comparisons of the predicted state with the existing one. This is valuable because modernity is an uninterrupted series of transformations that are increasingly turbulent and violent, and the increasing rate and frequency of their occurrence, while at the same time the probability of predicting the consequences of these changes is decreasing, cause disturbances that may lead to the need to evolve the rules of training exercise organization.

The third chapter, entitled 'Validation of the theory', contains examples of the practical application of the proposed solutions. The content presented therein is the result of exercises carried out using the validated theory. This part of the work indicates the need for civil protection drills to be appraised by specialists from different scientific disciplines. The analysis of this part of the work also convinces that not only researchers should be appointed to the research teams, but also those people who, by virtue of their duties, handle civil protection issues on a non-scientific level on a daily basis.

In the conclusion, the author has correctly alluded to the most relevant issues relating to the research assumptions and results of the study conducted.

Proceeding to the detailed evaluation of the monograph, it must be noted that the way of presenting the

problems included in the synopsis is in line with the methodology used in security sciences. The research process performed resulted in valuable cognitive and utilitarian material. Such an assessment was influenced by the Author's skilful application of appropriate (to the needs and possibilities) research methods and a correctly designed, as well as properly implemented research process.

The analysis and evaluation of the methodological aspects of the monograph additionally allows us to state that, in the course of the research and final elaboration of the dissertation, worthy and extremely broad literature on the subject of the Author's research (to a large extent foreign language literature) was used, which is evidence of a thorough search of source materials, referring directly and indirectly to the problems reflected in the title of the monograph.

By reviewing and evaluating the different parts of the work, it can be concluded that it has been developed to meet the expectations of both theorists and practitioners. For the former, background information and scientific theories were used. For the latter, a unification of views was accomplished.

The issues presented in the revised work are delivered with varying degrees of detail, which in itself is not a shortcoming.

The layout of the reviewed monograph deserves to be regarded as correct. It is worth emphasizing the fact that the presented issues are often supplemented with the author's comments based on the results of the conducted

research. The author of the monograph skilfully familiarizes the potential reader with the records of the relevant documents and presents their interpretation, and above all describes the analysed events paying special attention to the nuances of both civil protection and organisation of drills, including their evaluation. This way of presenting the Author's views makes the monograph not purely formal, but a study accessible to a wide audience. It is important to highlight that the monograph is characterized by an appropriate scientific level, which indicates the Author's well-established knowledge. The way in which the content of the written work is presented is logical.

In conclusion, it is appropriate to agree with the words of the Author noting in his monograph that "the results of the presented research make an important contribution to the discipline of security sciences by creating and verifying the theory of drill evaluation. This theory makes it possible to organise and rationally plan the processes of improvement and development of systems operating for civil protection based on a taxonomy of their functions and capabilities, verified in an accurate and reliable manner in the process of cyclic training exercise evaluation". This is a sufficient argument to recommend Tomasz Zwęgliński's monograph "Cognitive Problems of Evaluation of Civil Protection Drills" to those interested in civil protection and the organisation of exercises.

Emergency hazards to people and the environment belong to the category of threats that we are incapable of countering individually. In order to sustain as little damage as possible as a result of their occurrence and, as swiftly as possible, restore the normal functioning of a given community, we need to take collective action. Countering this type of danger seems to be one of the fundamental premises for the formation of societies and states<sup>7</sup>. The now available knowledge of this book can also serve that purpose.

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<sup>7</sup> J. Prońko, B. Wiśniewski, *Administracja publiczna w systemie przeciwdziałania nadzwyczajnym zagrożeniom dla ludzi i środowiska*, material with typescript rights.

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