

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AS AN ELEMENT OF STATE ARMAMENTS POLICY

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ABSTRACT

In today's interlinked, globalised world, international armaments cooperation is an indispensable aspect of state armaments policy which aims to achieve the effective technical modernisation of the armed forces and development of the defence industry. It is also a significant element of state foreign policy, and as such, it may be perceived as one of the means by which to create new or enhance existing relations with strategic partners. A wide range of factors and objectives of an economic, military, political and cognitive nature should be taken into consideration in the planning and execution of international armaments cooperation. This cooperation might be carried out in different fields, e.g. through the procurement or sale of military equipment or international research and development projects. It may be conducted in a range of forms and with various partners, including cooperation under the auspices of multinational organisations. For this reason, the last part of the article presents the context and a short description of some recent NATO and European Union armaments initiatives.

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Introduction

For every state, autonomous and self-reliant production and the acquisition and life-cycle support of military equipment should be methodically planned, managed and executed, as it is an indispensable pillar of building and sustaining a state's

defence capabilities. It should be a set of endeavours amalgamated into one dedicated and coherent armaments policy, led by government administration in coordination with scientific and industrial entities. The ultimate goal of armaments policy is to

¹ The opinions expressed by the author in the article are his own views and they do not reflect the official policy or position of the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Poland.

use, in the most efficient possible manner, a state's human (intellectual), economic and infrastructural resources in order to create an effective system for the acquisition of military equipment as well as to develop an innovative and competitive defence industry (as presented in a diagram in Fig. 1)¹.

Armaments policy might be influenced by a series of factors, the origins of which are both external and internal to a given state. Both categories can be further broken down into the following sub-categories: political, military, economic, technological, social and others (e.g. cultural, legal, etc.)². Such a wide spectrum of factors reflects the complexity and interdisciplinary character of armaments policy. It also indicates that the planning and execution of armaments policy should be a trans-sectorial effort involving not only defence and military assets but also other adequate state resources of a non-defence and non-military nature. It should be synchronised horizontally (through all necessary ministries, offices and other governmental and non-governmental institutions) and vertically (at all levels, from top to bottom). Within the government, it is almost intuitive that the leading role should be played by the ministry of defence (or its equivalent). However, close

coordination with other offices, mainly the ministries of foreign affairs, trade, economy or industrial development (depending on the composition of the state's government) is imperative for an effective and multifaceted armaments policy.

When it comes to areas of state armaments policy, four sectorial policies (sub-policies) can be identified: industrial policy, research and development policy, international cooperation policy and armaments acquisition policy. All four sub-policies are equally significant for state armaments policy, but in a globalised, highly mobile and dynamically changing world international cooperation policy is gaining in importance.

Nowadays it seems to be a truism to claim that international armaments cooperation is not simply a process of buying or selling military equipment. It is perceived to be much broader – as one of the crucial aspects of a state's foreign policy and a means by which to create new or enhance existing relations with strategic partners³. From a military point of view, international armaments cooperation can establish long-term training and logistics relations with the armed forces of a partner state. Economically and industrially, it might be a way to transfer innovative technology and know-how between the cooperating states at governmental and industrial level. International armaments programmes might also inspire cooperation beyond solely the defence area, providing stimuli to develop some dual-use or civil technologies. For those reasons, it is worth reflecting on international cooperation as an integral part of state armaments policy.

¹ A similar approach to armaments policy is presented in the Polish government's official strategy in which national armament policy is defined as 'the document determining a set of actions undertaken by the governmental administration in cooperation with scientific institutions and entrepreneurs, heading towards the development of an effective system for acquisition, exploitation and withdrawal of military equipment, and stimulation of development for an innovative and competitive defence industry. The national armament policy will stipulate, among others, the framework, and it will stress the directions for the defence sector's contribution to the development of economy based on knowledge and innovative technologies', *Strategy for responsible development for the period up to 2020 (including the perspective up to 2030)*, Warsaw 2017, p. 360.

² K. Dymanowski, *Polityka zbrojeniowa państwa* [in:] A. Nowakowska-Krystman, K. Dymanowski (ed.), *Zarządzanie przedsiębiorstwem w branży zbrojeniowej*, Akademia Sztuki Wojennej, Warszawa 2018.

³ In this article a partner (in international armaments cooperation) is defined as a foreign entity (including an organisation, a state or a group of states), with or via whom there is a political, military, economic and legal possibility of trading, jointly procuring or developing military equipment or defence technology.

Objectives of international armaments cooperation

International armaments cooperation should be comprehensively planned and executed to meet its desired objectives as well as the superior objectives of armaments policy. The key considerations in formulating objectives of state international armaments cooperation should include:

- the operational requirements of the national armed forces;
- the current capabilities of the national defence industry;
- strategy and level of ambition⁴ for the development of the national defence industry;
- the current and future capabilities of the defence industry of foreign partners;
- the needs and requirements of partners' armed forces (global armaments market);
- the state's membership in political and/or military international organisations;
- strategic national security interests and foreign policy objectives.

Each state should define its own set of objectives based on a balanced analysis of listed considerations. Notwithstanding the individual state's approach to international armaments cooperation, its objectives might be grouped in four general types: political, military, economic and cognitive (see Fig. 2).

Political objectives. International armaments cooperation might be a vital tool of state foreign policy and a way of sending political messages indicating strategic partnerships with foreign partners. Primarily, a

decision on establishing a joint armaments programme with another state or organisation should be based on military (fulfilment of operational requirements defined for a specific military equipment) and economic (costs and time of delivery) conditions. However, once these conditions are satisfactory, a state may include political factors in the decision-making process. Political aspects may be in favour of an option for international armaments cooperation (strengthening it) or against (weakening it). Either way, and regardless of whether a political factor is actually included in the analysis, a final decision might cause some intended and unintended political ramifications⁵. Therefore, international armaments cooperation should be supported by and included in state foreign policy and strategic communication blueprints. It is a tangible sign of a close strategic alliance with a foreign partner and translates into strengthening not only military but also industrial, scientific and even social and cultural bonds.

Military objectives. International armaments cooperation should support increased military capabilities by means of armaments projects aiming at the procurement or development of military equipment or technology together with foreign partners. The use of the same equipment by the armed forces of two or more states might be highly beneficial as it improves technical and procedural interoperability in the military domain.

Operationally, it is an opportunity to share experience including combat use, logistics support, and maintenance as well

⁴ Level of ambition shall be understood as level of competencies and range of specialisations of the national (domestic) defence industry, which are planned to be established by the state's government in a given period of time. It should be defined in accordance with the projected development of national and foreign armed forces, the current and foreseen shape of the national and worldwide defence industry as well as progress in defence technologies.

⁵ A topical example of such a case is the decision of the Turkish government to procure the S-400 missile system from Russia. In response, the USA government is considering using sanctions against Turkey and blocking its military and industrial participation in the F-35 programme. Therefore, the armaments contract might have long-lasting political repercussions influencing not only Turkey's relations with the USA but also with NATO.

as to develop concepts of operations and TTPs⁶ for a common types of armaments. In addition, a joint training programme might be prepared and conducted in facilities and with the specialist support of the armed forces of partner states. Logistically, there are options to jointly use supply chains, share spare part stocks and logistics management systems. Therefore, joint cooperation with foreign armed forces may not only bring military benefits but can also reduce the costs of training and overall logistics support of the equipment.

What is more, by means of international armaments projects, armed forces can obtain access to the latest defence technologies that are not produced by domestic industry, and thus improve their technical advancement and combat capabilities.

Economic objectives. International armaments cooperation may be a source of economic benefits of a budgetary and industrial nature. Consequently, economic objectives should be an indispensable part of any analysis while deciding whether to enter into armaments cooperation with foreign partners. Generally speaking, three kinds of economic objectives might be identified.

Firstly, to seek foreign providers and investors -international cooperation might be an instrument by means of which to provide the required capabilities to a state's armed forces whenever domestic industry does not have sufficient capabilities to do it on its own. In this case, a foreign company should be used as a provider of the desired military capability. However, such a commercial contract should be supplemented by a certain level of industrial re-

turn⁷ located by a provider in the defence industry of the contracting state. A provider may also include companies based in the contracting state as subcontractors in its supply chains for other markets.

Secondly, it may be used when the domestic industry does have the required capabilities but it is economically justifiable to share the costs and work with foreign partners. Joint research and development armaments projects are good examples of such cooperation.

Finally, international cooperation is a way to sell the products of one's own defence industry to foreign partners. By doing so, the export rate grows and the associated income is generated, plus the brand and status of a state's industry is solidified worldwide.

All in all, international armaments cooperation might contribute to the development of the domestic defence industry and the reduction of costs connected with the procurement and use of military equipment.

Cognitive objectives. International armaments cooperation might be also a way of sharing knowledge, and thus it has cognitive value for a state's military, industrial and scientific communities. By means of international armaments programmes, there is the possibility of acquiring innovative, cutting-edge technologies as well as gaining knowledge (know-how) concerning equipment production and servicing processes. It is also a method for developing skills of engineering and managing personnel cadre in the field of long-term and complex project management. Cog-

⁷ Industrial return, in some countries (e.g. Poland) labelled as 'offset', is a way of compensating for the costs of military equipment acquisition by the procuring state. Compensation is provided by the delivering company and might take various forms including investments in the procuring state's industry, the transfer of technology and know-how to the procuring state's industry or the inclusion of the procuring state's industry as a partner or subcontractor in the delivering company's supply chains.

⁶ TTPs – Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.

nitive objectives together with economic ones greatly contribute to the growth of the industrial and scientific potential of a state. In the case of selling military equipment abroad, cognitive objectives will be connected with building knowledge on investments on a foreign partner's territory and in its industry. Therefore, this is a practical way to verify different business models of cooperation. It helps gain experience of the selling state's business personnel and build improved options for cooperation on subsequent international armaments projects with other partners.

Four categories of objectives described above should always be considered together and with proper weights depending on determinants characteristic of each individual case of cooperation. Ideally, however, the priority should be given to military and economic objectives. This means that technical specification, cost and time of delivery should take precedence. In some cases, cognitive objectives might be of almost the same value. In particular, procurement of the latest state-of-the-art defence technology should be accompanied by the transfer of technology and know-how to domestic industry and scientific organisations. Finally, we must bear in mind that there is always political feedback, either intended or unintended, predicted or not predicted, associated with armaments cooperation. Therefore, political objectives, even if not decisive, should always be part of the cost-benefit analysis in the decision-making process, especially when it comes to high-budget and long-term armaments contracts.

Fields, relations and partners of international armaments cooperation

State international armaments policy should be shaped and executed with respect to the abovementioned factors and objectives. Depending on a state's level of ambition and assessments of the global armaments market, this policy may be established as either export- or import-oriented. It can be focused on commercial, tender-based procurement or on a more cooperative, joint venture model with the exchange of technology and know-how between partners. However, regardless of the adopted model, each state should identify its individual set of possible fields and partners of armaments cooperation.

Fields of international armaments cooperation might include, but are not limited to:

- procurement of military equipment from a foreign partner;
- sale of military equipment to a foreign partner;
- common research and development projects;
- common procurement of military equipment (from a third party);
- common sale of military equipment (to a third party);
- common use and life-cycle support of the same type of military equipment.

From a quantitative point of view, relations with foreign partners might have two forms:

- bilateral – a state or organisation cooperating with another state or organisation;
- multilateral – a few states cooperating in a dedicated format (established for a particular armaments programme⁸) or under

⁸ For example, the Eurofighter programme in which European countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and Italy) cooperated together at the military and industrial levels to develop combat aircraft that were introduced into operational service in 2003.

the auspices of existing organisations (e.g. NATO or the European Union)⁹.

Additional criteria might be introduced based on an armaments agreement or contract which may result in the following types of cooperation:

- government to government (G-G) when on both sides the signing bodies are authorised government representatives of cooperating states (e.g. ministers of defence, national armaments directors, etc.);
- government to business (G-B) when on one side the signing body is an authorised representative of a state government and on the other side the signing body is a business entity delivering military equipment;
- business to business (BB) when on both sides the signing bodies are business entities from cooperating states.

Historically, a bilateral formula has been used more often for armaments contracts. States have used this form more frequently because of only two stakeholders being involved as opposed to a multilateral model in which several members of a project have to agree on technical and financial conditions. In the bilateral model, a state, an organisation, or a business or scientific entity might be a cooperating partner. In most cases, governments have signed contracts directly with the delivering company (a G2B contract) while an additional G2G agreement has sometimes been required by a procuring partner (on the recipient side) as a sort of official endorsement of the G2B contract.

Recently, however, a pivot towards multilateral projects may be observed. This is especially due to more robust activity of international organisations in the armaments domain. Multilateral cooperation in the framework of international political or military organisation may provide for the compatibility and interoperability of the armed forces from several states (members of an organisation). It may strengthen their alliance or coalition through military and industrial relations as well as by reducing the costs of acquisition and life-cycle support of equipment. In multilateral cooperation, agreements are very often signed between participating governments (G2G or multi-G model). Such an approach is a sign of political will to cooperate and it also indicates that political objectives are taken into account alongside military, economic and cognitive goals. Additional G2B or B2B arrangements usually supplement an overarching G2G (multi-G) agreement.

Bearing in mind the growing efforts of international organisations to encourage armaments cooperation among their members, it is worth giving a brief overview of recent activities of two of the most significant alliances and potential armaments partners for Poland – the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU).

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. For many years NATO has proven to be an alliance that aims at building a reliable and interoperable military force. This has been done at various levels and in many areas and has encompassed procedures, training, operations, logistics and other spheres of military activity. The armaments domain has been no exception to that rule.

In the structure of NATO, there is a dedicated Defence Investment Division headed by the Deputy Secretary General for Defence Investment (DSG DI) to deal with

⁹ For example, the Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet (MMF) programme coordinated by the European Defence Agency, managed by the NATO Support and Procurement Agency and contractually executed by Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement (OCCAR). Within this programme, several NATO and EU states (to date, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway and Germany) have decided to jointly procure and operate a fleet of aircraft for transport and air-to-air refuelling purposes.

armaments issues. In the scope of his or her responsibilities, the DSG DI chairs the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD)¹⁰, a forum in which armaments leaders from every member state discuss possible forms and areas of cooperation. The armaments and capabilities development projects led or coordinated by NATO are normally conducted by dedicated groups, project teams and committees which act under the auspices of CNAD¹¹.

A significant NATO initiative dedicated to promoting multinational cooperation is Smart Defence¹². Its goal is to stimulate NATO states to develop common capabilities which they could not afford individually, for example by sharing the costs of acquisition of complex weapons and achieving savings through economies of scale. Although it is not a purely armaments project and is not overseen by CNAD, Smart Defence also aims to encourage allied armaments cooperation.

An example of a NATO armaments and capability programme supervised by CNAD is Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS). It is a complex programme with 15 participating states (including Poland), and has been implemented with many conceptual and configurational changes since the early 1990s.

The primary mission of AGS is to conduct airborne surveillance activity by means of a fleet of Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles as well as dedicated ground stations in order to provide a comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground in the areas of interest of NATO or its member states. It is worth underlining that each participating state will benefit from the industrial return to its industry at a rate proportional to the financial input given to the programme¹³.

In recent years, a few new NATO programmes to reinforce allied armaments cooperation has been launched under the auspices of CNAD. These programmes cover all operational environments including the newly established cyber domain. Some initiatives are in response to current deficiencies and short-term or mid-term operational needs, for example:

- Air to Ground Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) – cooperation for the provision of precision guided munition for airborne combat platforms. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on PGM was signed in 2016 and to date 13 NATO states (including Poland) have joined;
- Land Battle Decisive Munition (LBDM) – cooperation for the provision of ammunition for land-based combat platforms and weapons including tanks, artillery, rocket-artillery, mortars as well as anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems. The MoU concerning LBDM was signed in 2018. To date the programme has been joined by 18 NATO states (including Poland) and three non-NATO states (Austria, Finland and North Macedonia, for which the process of accession is in progress). The programme proved to be effective as the first delivery under the

¹⁰ Every NATO state nominates the National Armaments Director (NAD) who represents his or her government in armaments-related issues in the international arena, including NATO, EU and any other form of bilateral or multilateral contacts. For instance, in Poland the position of NAD is currently held by the Director of the Armaments Policy Department in the Ministry of National Defence.

¹¹ Examples of CNAD-subordinated bodies are: Major Armaments Groups – NATO Army Armaments Group, NATO Naval Armaments Group and NATO Air Forces Armaments Group – responsible for cooperation in, respectively, the land, maritime and air domains; or the NATO Industrial Advisory Group – responsible for advising NATO leadership in technical, industrial, economic, managerial, etc. aspects of armaments cooperation.

¹² The Smart Defence initiative was presented by the NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, at the Munich Security Conference in 2011. It was later discussed and agreed by member states during the Summit in Chicago in 2012.

¹³ There are three industrial and scientific Polish entities involved in the AGS programme which will benefit from industrial return: the Air Force Institute of Technology, PIT-RADWAR S.A. and Exence S.A.

- LBDM agreement was made in 2019¹⁴;
- Maritime Battle Decisive Munitions (MBDM) – cooperation for the provision of ammunition for maritime combat platforms. The MBDM MoU was signed by seven NATO nations (including Poland) in 2019;
 - Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (M3A) – cooperation for developing joint solutions for maritime anti-submarine and intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) aircraft. The Letter of Intent on M3A was signed in 2017 and so far eight NATO nations (including Poland) have joined this initiative;
 - Maritime Unmanned Systems (MUS) – cooperation for developing capabilities in unmanned maritime systems. The Declaration of Intent for this initiative was signed by 14 allies (including Poland) in 2018.

There are also programmes with a long-term perspective that aim to develop future military capabilities. An example of armaments cooperation with such a long-term perspective is Alliance Future Surveillance and Control (AFSC), which was initiated as a fulfilment of the declaration after the NATO Warsaw Summit 2016 at which the Alliance's members agreed to introduce the successor to the E-3 AWACS¹⁵ aircraft fleet. Currently AFSC is in the concept stage and it is intended to be procured in 2025, while its full operational capability is planned for 2035. In this programme there is very close and constant coordination between the NATO project team and industrial entities. Participating states will have the opportunity to engage their industries in the design and production of AFSC, thus gaining adequate industrial return including access to the newest technologies developed for the programme.

¹⁴ Three members of LBDM MoU (Denmark, France and the Netherlands) jointly procured anti-tank weapons.

¹⁵ AWACS – Airborne Warning and Control System.

A short review of NATO initiatives indicates that armaments cooperation has been brought to the forefront recently. This is due to a tendency to achieve compatibility at the technical level, as well as interoperability, synergy and economy of effort at the operational level. Common armaments projects may reduce equipment life-cycle costs and also tighten the bonds between allies in all DOTMLPF¹⁶ areas. Lastly, armaments cooperation is a means of strategic communications as it is an expression of unity and allied will to cooperate in order to strengthen the military potential of NATO.

European Union. Defence issues, which have been perceived predominantly as the domain of NATO by most European countries, are nowadays seeing increased advocacy within the EU. One such display of a pro-defence attitude is a strong drift towards cooperation in the armaments and defence industries within the European Union. The general reasons are similar as in the case of NATO: cost reduction, economy of effort, spirit of cooperation, etc. But these motives have been furthermore reinforced by the EU's recent policy of 'strategic autonomy'.

The current European trend towards armaments cooperation is a result of a series of political and legislative steps that have been taken since 2016 when the 'EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy' (EUGS)¹⁷ and 'European Defence Action Plan' (EDAP)¹⁸ were issued. These two papers formalised a new EU approach aiming to stimulate defence collaboration and promote 'EU strategic autonomy'. The intention

¹⁶ DOTMLPF – Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities.

¹⁷ *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy*, Brussels 2016.

¹⁸ *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – European Defence Action Plan*, Brussels 2016.

is to build and maintain the autonomy of the EU in the production of military equipment for the armed forces of member states and boost the development of the European defence industry. The autonomous EU defence policy is supported mainly by the biggest players such as France and Germany; thus, it is gaining momentum and is regularly fuelled by different defence initiatives.

The idea of the novel EU approach to defence and the defence industry is clearly reflected in the three main pillars of EDAP, which are defined as¹⁹:

- launching a European Defence Fund (EDF);
- fostering investments in defence supply chains;
- reinforcing the single market for defence.

Out of these three mainstays, the introduction of the EDF in June 2017 seems to be the most tangible factor that has changed the landscape of armaments cooperation in Europe. It has been the first time that the EU has implemented not only political and procedural incentives but also financial grants for collaborative defence projects. The EDF is intended to be developed progressively along with EU budgetary cycles and in two basic strands (so-called windows):

- research window – to stimulate and fund European research initiatives by means of which the EDF can be fully (up to 100%) and directly financed from the EU budget. Currently a pilot activity – Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) – is being carried out. It has a total budget of EUR 90 million for the 2017-2019 period. To date, eight common projects have been started under PADR, including areas concerning maritime awareness, future soldier systems, microelectronics and directed-energy

weapons²⁰;

- capability window – to stimulate and fund common development projects from feasibility studies to the certification of defence products or technologies²¹. This window is executed through the European Defence Industry Development Programme (EDIDP) with a budget of EUR 500 million for 2019 and 2020.

A total budget of EUR 590 million for the pilot phase of the EDF (PADR and EDIDP) might not be perceived as a game-changing flow of money. But for the next wave of EDF projects (from 2021 to 2027), a budget of EUR 13 billion is being considered. Together with strict criteria limiting the participation of industrial entities from outside the EU, this puts an entirely different perspective on European defence projects and may give a whole new impetus to armaments cooperation.

Another recent initiative which supplements the EDF and creates additional grounds for international armaments cooperation in the EU is Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence

²⁰ PADR projects for 2017 and 2018 include: OCEAN 2020 (Open Architecture for European Maritime Awareness), GOSSRA (Generic Open Soldier System Reference Architecture), PYTHIA (Predictive Methodology for Technology Intelligence Analysis), VESTLIFE (Ultralight Modular Bullet Proof Integral Solution for Dismounted Soldier Protection), ACAM-SII (Adaptive Camouflage for the Soldier II) EXCEED (Trusted and Flexible System-on-Chip for European Defence Applications), TALOS (Tactical Advanced Laser Optical System) and SOLOMON (Strategy Oriented Analysis of the Market Forces in EU Defence). Polish industrial and scientific entities participate in six projects: OCEAN 2020, GOSSRA, PYTHIA, EXCEED, TALOS and SOLOMON. For PADR 2019, the following areas are being considered: Electromagnetic Spectrum Dominance, Emerging Game-Changers, Interoperability Standards for Unmanned Systems.

²¹ Development phases that can be financed through EDIDP are: (1) feasibility study, (2) development of projects and specifications, (3) development of prototypes, (4) testing, (5) qualification and (6) certification.

¹⁹ *Communication from the Commission ...*, op. cit., p. 5.

(PESCO)²². The main aim of PESCO is to increase the effectiveness of member states in terms of addressing security challenges. This is to be achieved by deepening defence cooperation and the joint development of capabilities which may be used in EU-led military operations. After the implementation of PESCO, a wide range of capabilities and armaments initiatives have been discussed; as a result, by the end of 2018, the EU had initiated 34 PESCO projects. They cover many aspects of defence and security matters including standards and procedures (e.g. Military Mobility), technology and armaments (e.g. Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems or European Secure Software Defined Radio), training (e.g. Helicopter Hot and High H3 Training) and cyberspace (e.g. Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security)²³. PESCO is not only limited to armaments and industrial cooperation, but these areas can be part of every project.

Apart from the EDF and PESCO, in the framework of the latest defence activity in Europe and as a consequence of EUGS and EDAP, a wider spectrum of defence-related activities have been launched, including the Capability Development Plan (CDP) and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). A number of new European defence initiatives, supported by political messages from key European governments, form a systemic environment for armaments cooperation within

EU²⁴. As depicted in Figure 3, based on political guidance stemming from EUGS, EDAP and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the identification of priorities for defence capabilities is being conducted, by means of a process of CDP and in conjunction with national plans and programmes as well as the NATO Defence Planning Process. Once a set of priorities is established through CDP, the next step is undertaken within CARD. This is an analytical process conducted by the European Defence Agency (EDA) supported by a series of meetings with representatives from ministries of defence of member states. The aim is to identify possibilities for common defence projects, some of which can be later undertaken as PESCO or EDF projects. Furthermore, synchronising EU defence initiatives is encouraged, because when an EDF project is also a PESCO one, there can be additional financial support granted from the EU (EDF) budget.

A coordinated EU approach to the development of defence capabilities encompassing, inter alia, CDP, CARD, PESCO and EDF is meant to be complementary to NATO defence initiatives as was stated by NATO and EU in their Joint Declarations²⁵.

However, new defence and armaments initiatives have also been a subject of criticism. There have been claims that EDF and PESCO are tools of protectionism and mechanisms to close the EU armaments market to companies from outside the EU, especially from the United States of Amer-

²² A common notification on PESCO (as outlined in Articles 42(6) and 46 as well as in Protocol 10 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU) was signed by ministers of EU member states on 13 November 2017. Based on this notification, 25 member states, including Poland, joined PESCO. The countries which did not join are: Denmark, Malta and the United Kingdom.

²³ A list and descriptions of PESCO projects can be found on a dedicated webpage: <https://pesco.europa.eu/>, [accessed: June 2019].

²⁴ *Rozwój wspólnej polityki bezpieczeństwa i obrony oraz polityki przemysłowo-obronnej UE: zagrożenia i szanse dla Polski*, Polski Instytut Spraw Zagranicznych, Warszawa 2017.

²⁵ NATO and EU have so far issued two Joint Declarations as a result of NATO Summits in Warsaw in 2016 and in Brussels in 2018. The declarations were signed by the Secretary General of NATO, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission.

ica²⁶. Therefore, some have said that these new UE initiatives might somehow weaken the transatlantic link between Europe and the USA.

Advocates of a new EU defence policy claim that, among others, it is a response to US politicians calling for increased defence investments by European partners. It will support the development of not only EU defence capabilities but also those of NATO, as 22 countries are members of both organisations. It will also help the USA to pay more attention to parts of the world other than Europe due to the fact that European defence capabilities will be upgraded in a more coordinated and autonomous manner.

Conclusions

Nowadays, in a globalised world with a denser network of business connections, including international armaments cooperation in the process of developing state defence and industrial potential is inevitable. It is a way to access new weapon systems together with associated defence technologies and know-how. On the other hand, it is a method by which to promote and sell domestic products to foreign partners. All in all, international armaments cooperation might be a systemic instrument to transform a state's armed forces and inspire economic progress of the state defence industry. However, it should not be the only way of building a national industrial base and military power. Quite the opposite: it has to be one of numerous options to build and preserve defence ca-

pabilities. The ultimate goal of this cooperation is to contribute to establishing the maximum degree of state autonomy and independence within the defence sector in accordance with national security interests.

Therefore, as indicated in this article, international armaments cooperation should be a long-term and cohesive activity performed within the framework of superior armaments policy and closely coordinated with foreign policy. Four major objectives of armaments cooperation reflect its military, economic, political and cognitive aspects as well as the broad scope of factors that have to be taken into account in its planning and execution. Based on the national level of ambition concerning the procurement, production and servicing of military equipment and the defence industry, each state should define its own distinctive short- and long-term objectives, which shall be further transferred into proper governmental and industrial agenda including fields, relations and partners of international armaments cooperation.

For Poland, as for every other state, armaments cooperation with foreign partners should be a tool by means of which to obtain two overarching objectives of armaments policy, i.e. effective acquisition of military equipment and the development of the defence industry. More detailed objectives should be defined according to the modernisation plans of armed forces and the level of ambition for industrial capabilities concerning the provision and/or maintenance of specified defence technologies and weapon systems. The level of industrial ambition should reflect national security interests and safeguard a required industrial self-sufficiency in life-cycle support of different categories of military equipment.

Development of Polish defence industry potential should be supported by international armaments cooperation along two

²⁶ *US officials threaten retribution for European Union's restrictions on defense fund*, Defense News, <https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/paris-air-show/2019/06/19/us-officials-threaten-retribution-for-european-unions-restrictions-on-defense-fund/> [accessed: 25 June 2019]; *The poison pill: EU defence on US terms?*, European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/poison-pill-eu-defence-us-terms> [accessed 27 June 2019].

lines of effort. The first of these concern-receiving and absorbing - it is typically related to cognitive aspects of international armaments cooperation. It should be based on the reception and absorption of innovative defence solutions and know-how by means of offset or another form of industrial return acquired as a part of an armaments contract with a foreign supplier (governmental or industrial). The second line of effort should be focused on the increase of exports from the domestic defence industry. It should be based on thorough research on foreign markets and competitions as well as proactively promoting activity. Both lines of effort should be endorsed and supported by proper military and political representatives, which constitute added value to the commercial offer.

Taking into account national security and industrial interests, recent NATO and EU initiatives in the defence domain, namely the EDF and PESCO, should be an important factor in the preparation of an international armaments policy for Poland. The EDF's

huge budget is of particular importance and might be a bona fide stimulant for the growth of armaments cooperation among EU member states. This initiative gives another option for capability and armaments cooperation for Poland and should be incorporated in national plans and analyses.

A proper balance among partners, fields and relations seems to be the key to successful international armaments cooperation. This balance shall reflect the state's level of ambition concerning the modernisation of armed forces and development of the defence industry. Government activities in the field of armaments with foreign partners should stem from strategic interests and should be conducted in a coordinated, cross-sector and up-to-down manner. This will be possible when clear and tangible objectives for armaments cooperation are defined. Subsequently, as in any other area of activity, an initiative and pre-emptive approach aiming to create opportunities may bring the desired results.

Figures

Fig. 1. Concept and objectives of state armaments policy




Fig. 2. Objectives of international armaments cooperation





Fig. 3. An idea for a coordinated European Union approach to the development of defence capabilities



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